


CRITICAL & CONSTRUCTIVE
ASPECTS OF
PROF. R. D. RANADE'S
PHILOSOPHY



B. R. KULKARNI
M.A.-LL.B

Critical

&

Constructive Aspects

of


Prof. R. D. Ranade's Philosophy

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By

B. R. Kulkarni

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Publisher's Note

Shri Gurudeva R. D. Ranade was the Founder and sole Trustee of the Public Trust - Academy of Comparative Philosophy and Religion, Belgaum. To commemorate his memory, a lecture series, known as Gurudeva Ranade Memorial Lectures, was started by this Academy.

This is the fifth series of the lectures and it was delivered by Professor B. R. Kulkarni in March 1973. He was very close to Sri Gurudeva Ranade and lived with him for years. He had the good fortune of studying philosophy by sitting at the feet of Gurudeva Ranade.

Dr. R. H. Karmarkar, F.R.C.S. (Eng.) delivered the inaugural address. He observed; 'First I congratulate the Trustees on their selection of the speaker for this year's series of lectures. The subject he has chosen for his talk is very appropriate, viz: Critical and Constructive Aspects of Professor R. D. Ranade's Philosophy and it will at once appeal to all keen students of philosophy in general and to the Sadhakas in particular.'

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Extracts from the inaugural address

of

Dr. R. H. Karmarkar,

F.R.C.S. (Eng.)

It is gratifying to note that this Academy of Comparative Philosophy and Religion stands for perpetuating the holy memory of Shri Gurudev by holding this series of lectures every year. I am also aware of its other activities like (1) Organising Seminars, Lectures, Pravachans of distinguished scholars and sadhakas on subjects of Philosophy and Religion, (2) publication of the journal 'Pathway to God' twice every year, which is by itself a big task involving collection of articles by outstanding authors; (3) maintaining a Library for serious students of Philosophy and last but not the least, managing this beautiful Gurudev Mandir meant to be a veritable Anubhava Mantap or spiritual assembly, and thus aid in the sadhana so essential for a mystic's life. I pay my homage to the office bearers for their commendable efforts.

•

As you know, Shri Gurudev had achieved the highest ideals in the academic field and that he advocated God-realisation as the sole objective of a Sadhaka. About his high ideals it may be worthwhile remembering the incident of his resignation from the Deccan Education Society in 1924. I quote an extract from his letter to the Society prior to the resignation: "Unless the members of the Deccan Education Society gird up their loins and understand that they are the type of an Indian Institution which must have its deserved place in the Educational Institutions of the world, their name will not be recorded in the annals of learning.....I wanted to make them a university. They have chosen to make themselves a big school."

How varied and all pervading interest he had in all branches of science can be judged from another instance which I quote from my personal experience. Shortly after my return from England in 1938, he engaged me in a talk on experimental neurology in one of my visits to Nimbal. He asked me several questions on the experimental works of Mr. Head whose researches on the function of Thalamus had proved it to be the seat of emotions... I gave answers to Shri Gurudev as best as I could, but I realised then and there that I was facing an intellectual of Himalayan heights. This conversation took place after his Presidential address delivered at XIII session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Nagpur in 1937. It was here that he had dealt with Philosophy, Biology and Neurology and coined the word 'spiriton' corresponding to the term 'Bindule' used by Jnaneshwar and other mystics. He suggested to me to do experiments like

Mr. Head on the ventricles of the brain and its relation to the various mystical experiences....

As I said earlier, God- realisation as the sole objective of one's life was the sheet anchor of his teaching of Mysticism. About great mystics he writes in his introduction to the 'Pathway to God in Hindi Literature' as follows:. "It is not without reason that great mystics like Shankaracharya and Yajnavalkya, Plotinus and Spinoza, St. Paul and Augustine, Jnaneshwar and Kabir have produced the great intellectual works that have lived after them. We must say about these works that they enjoy certain amount of immortality, and they can never perish so long as the world prizes their inner mystic fibre. There is no doubt that Gurudeva's works on the Upanishads and Vedanta etc. will have the same immortality because of the "inner mystic fibre."

....You will have the benefit of hearing the discourses of the learned lecturer on the subject "Critical and Constructive Aspects of Prof. R. D. Ranade's Philosophy." He has the proud privilege of being associated with the monumental writings of Shri Gurudev. Students who used to stay at Nimbai and Allahabad under his protective wings had to labour hard. As later history shows, he has showered grace on everyone of them in their life time.

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જન્મ
જમશંડી
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Chapter I

Introduction

The problem of supreme importance to mankind, according to Prof. R. D. Ranade, is the problem of the existence of God and His relation to man and nature. Unquestionably the search after God remains the highest problem even today and a philosophical justification for our spiritual life is as necessary today as it was hundreds of years ago. Prof. Ranade devoted the whole of his career to the solution of this problem both from the standpoint of philosophy, i.e. the intellectual side and from the standpoint of religion, i.e. the practical side. He was led to make a living acquaintance with mysticism and religious thought before he came to undertake a deep study of Indian and Western philosophy. Even after such a study he firmly believed that to come to grips with the attainment of God from the practical point of view was a far

greater achievement than to determine the nature of God from the philosophical point of view which would merely plunge us into a bog of intellectual warfare.¹ Reality is beyond all theories like Dvaita, Visistadvaita etc. A spiritual man, he says, has got nothing to do with these intellectual controversies.² Otto's view is equally illuminating 'Here, if anywhere, coercion by proof and demonstration and the mistaken application of logical and juridical processes should be excluded; here, if anywhere, should be liberty, the unconstrained recognition and inward acknowledgement that comes from deep within the soul, stirred spontaneously, apart from all conceptual theory.'³ Prof. Ranade considered philosophy as a barricade to religion, a wire-compound preventing the stray cattle from coming inside. Morality for him was more than a word; it determined the worth of a man. And religion was more than an aspiration; it was the *elan vital* of man's life. He had achieved for himself a grand harmony of natural and spiritual life. His aim was to explain the real nature of religion or life in spirit and bring about a unity of all religions.

Prof. Ranade's philosophy, be it epistemology, metaphysics, ethics or religion, is characterised by a single unifying principle of God-realisation. It brings all things under the focus of mystical union with God.

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation,

P. 231

2. Pathway to God in Kannada Literature, P. 114

3. R. Otto : The Idea of the Holy. P. 149.

Spiritual experience for him is not an *ad hoc* hypothesis to explain an unintelligible phenomenon but the starting point, the basic reality, for which he wanted to give philosophical justification. "What we feel, what we realise and what we experience should alone constitute our philosophy,"¹ he exclaims. What William James said about sensation, Prof. Ranade would have said about spiritual experience: 'Experience is the mother earth, the anchorage, the stable rock, the first and last units, the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem*' of philosophy. And this experience is not the sensationalistic experience but the intuitive experience (Anubhuti). A mystic who so much stresses experience is really an empiricist *par excellence*. His empiricism is a transcendent empiricism, if such a term can be used.

Regarding metaphysics, ethics and mysticism he says an attempt to solve the question what is real would lead a philosopher into the very heart of metaphysics and when a certain intellectual solution is arrived at, the next problem would be how practically to attain to that knowledge, what should be the norm of conduct following which one may hope to appropriate the Godhead. The culmination of this practical endeavour would come in the mystical attitude which completes the moral endeavour.² Or again, the mystical view of reality alone would enable us to reconcile all the intellectual dogmas which have infested

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1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation : P. 191
 2. See-A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, P.P. 64-65

the philosophies of the world. Theism and pantheism, even though they may be contradictory as philosophical systems can yet be reconciled in a theory of mystic attainment of God. Forty years of philosophic pursuit, as he himself points out,¹ had given him a point of view which reconciled philosophic, linguistic and other interpretations of a doctrine. That was the viewpoint of mysticism or the unitive experience of God which gave every doctrine its place in the scheme of the universe. Such a reconciling attitude would not allow philosophy to remain a splendid record of perpetual conflict of opposite doctrines for real reconciliation is constructive. Construction requires some fundamental basis and Prof. Ranade's philosophy has that basis in the spiritual nature of Reality. And his construction had a purpose, that of appropriating this Reality or realising the Godhead.

This realisation for him is not an event but a process; it is an approximation, a perpetual progressive realisation without actually collecting in hand the final goal which might be attained at infinity. This doctrine of approximation is a distinctive feature of Prof. Ranade's philosophy. The doctrine implies that achievement of perfection in any field is a never-ending process. The best example given in this connection is of asymptotes. We know from mathematics that the base line and the curve of the hyperbola seem to come near each other. One may get an impression that they meet nearby. But they do not meet in

1. See-Pathway to God in Kannada Literature, P. 2

the finite space at all and are taken to meet at infinity thus involving approximation to each other. Any process which may take infinite time to achieve the goal thus becomes approximation. Kant has used the concept in proving the immortality of the soul. Man, according to his theory, has both reason and sensibility. Now sensibility is to be eliminated, because morality according to Kant, is a life of pure rationality. But driving out the surd of sensibility is a never-ending process thus making the self endure through infinite time.

The doctrine of approximation runs through the whole of Prof Ranade's philosophy. In epistemology, there is approximation to divine self-consciousness as Truth itself, in metaphysics to divine self-consciousness again as Reality itself. In both the sciences it is the divine self-consciousness which is the goal, divine self-consciousness being an epistemologico-metaphysical concept. If it is true that by the knowledge of Brahman or the ultimate reality, one becomes Brahman it is equally true that one has to become Brahman to know Brahman. None of these is purely a cause and the other purely an effect. There is reciprocal causality between them. The more one knows Brahman, the more one becomes it; similarly the more one becomes Brahman, the more one knows it. In Ethics, man, being morally imperfect, has to strive after moral perfection infinitely long though the process may be. The same doctrine holds good in the realm of religion where the truth is: not perfection but progress, not realisation but approximation. The attain-

ment of Mukti or liberation is a gradual process. It may come immediately if there is no impediment. Otherwise as the Bhagaved-gita says, it may even be a matter of a number of lives. The doctrine of approximation has the advantage of steering clear of both the evils, pride of perfection and fear of non-attainability. If the goal comes in our hand we become relaxed and leave our effort; on the other hand, if the goal is too difficult it may appear to be beyond our reach and we may not try at all. But the doctrine of approximation reminds us that we should not be self-complacent. It further inspires us with the hope of attaining the goal some day-it may even be the eschatological optimism taught by Kant who guaranteed post-mortem equalisation of virtue and happiness.

According to Prof. Ranade the problem of philosophy is identical all the world over and there is no distinction of country or race in the world of thought. The kernel of philosophy is not the difficulties or obscurantisms but a metaphysical and moral pith. It would be a problem for the philosophy of immediate future, he felt, to place mysticism on a truly philosophic basis. Rational mysticism which had been hitherto a contradiction in terms must now be a truism. Mysticism transcends philosophy and cares only for the intuitive apprehension of God. The liberating influence of rational mysticism is that it justifies mysticism as a scientific doctrine by freeing it from rusty chains of mysteriousness, inactivity and occultism to which it was wrongly confined.

From his Presidential Address to the Twelfth

Session of Indian Philosophical Congress, we learn that there is a perfect reconciliation between the discoveries of science and the truths of religion. "Science merely deals with the works of God"¹ Religion strengthens activity and not weakens it. It is evident from this how wrong it is to label mysticism as being inactive.

Mysticism does not so much sin as it is sinned against. Any irrationalism is dubbed as mysticism. Spirituality is dragged into the same camp and the whole doctrine is considered a taboo. Though rich in content and meaning, it is ridiculed as unscientific and occult. Those who criticise mysticism should first undertake an objective and unprejudiced study of it. Socrates' attitude in this connection is remarkable and worth emulating. In criticising the theory of Protagoras, he makes an appeal that the theory must first be understood. 'There is real point in these questions, but we must take care not to 'crow' over Protagoras and his theory prematurely. If he were alive he would probably have known how to make a telling rejoinder to such cavils. As he is dead and has no one to represent him we must try to act as his advocates ourselves and to plead the cause as effectively as we can.'² Is this not the very method of philosophical exposition in Indian Philosophy? Objections are anticipated and the view of the Purvapaksin (opponent) is clearly stated. Arguments in the

1. Philosophical and other Essays, P. 183.

2. A E. Taylor : Plato, the Man and his work, P. 31.

defence of the opponent's view are set forth as vigorously as the opponent himself would have done it, though in the Uttarapaksa, argument is met by counter-argument relentlessly. In Western philosophy also we come across this attitude, especially when the dialogue method is employed to put forth the philosophical views, Plato providing by far the best example in question. This is therefore the philosophic spirit: to understand clearly the opponent's stand and then offer reasoned criticism. The more powerful the opponent the more the value of your criticism. The merit of your system depends on the strength of your opponent. Incidentally, Indian commentators do not mix up whatever persuasion they might belong to. When they comment, they substantiate the point as if it is their own Paksa or stand. This attitude of identifying oneself with the opponent's view is seen at its best in Vacaspati Misra. While commenting upon Nyaya he is a Naiyyayika, when commenting on Advaita, he is an Advaitin and so with Samkhya and Yoga. It becomes difficult to know his own position for different systems claim him as their own. It is not likely that he is just a commentator; so great a thinker cannot but have a position of his own and it may well differ from all systems on which he has commented. Hence the aptness of his being regarded as Sarva-tantra-Swatantra.

Immediate experience of reality is more important than a discursive knowledge about it. So Prof. Ranade remarks that there is a great deal of difference between the intellectual conviction of God's omnipresence and

a mystical vision of Him. This vision is intuitive no doubt, but this intuition is not Bergson's intuition. Bergson's intuition deals with things under the aspect of time, *Sub specie durationis*, as he himself puts it.¹ Reality for him is real duration or filled time and intuition is confined to that sphere. Intuition experiences reality and reality cannot be understood apart from time. He says that to know a thing we have to know it from within, be one with it and not go round it as intellect does. But the Bergsonian intuition is anti-intellectual and not trans-intellectual and works only on the biological level. The mystical intuition on the other hand is definitely translogical. It uses logic and transcends it. Though immediacy is common to both of them there is a pre-logical immediacy i. e. immediacy which precedes analysis as there is a post-logical immediacy which follows it. In between these two types of immediacy there comes the stage of discursive thinking or intellectual reflection which analyses an object into its 'that' and 'what' or existence and content. Such an analysis into relational categories is absent from both the stages of immediacy. But while the lower immediacy has not yet reached the rational stage, the higher immediacy has already passed through it and has discarded reason only in so far as reason is unable directly to grasp the real. This is by no means belittling reason. Here reason is given its due. It is too well-known that reason has limitations. 'Reason is a physician that can heal everyone's

1. A Study in Metaphysics : The Creative Mind, P. 129.

wound but its own.’¹ But reason is great enough to know its limitations and point a way beyond itself. So long as we are confined to the sphere of reason, there may not be any solution and so we have to step out of it. And just as seen from the process of Kant’s thought through the great critiques, one has to go from pure to practical reason, from knowledge to faith. As McTaggart says: “A Mysticism which ignored the claims of the understanding would no doubt be doomed. None ever went about to break logic but in the end logic broke him. But there is a mysticism which starts from the standpoint of the understanding and only departs from it in so far as that standpoint shows itself not to be ultimate but to postulate something beyond itself. To transcend the lower is not to ignore it.”² In fact such an attitude reconciles intellectualism with mysticism. Intellect is not outlawed but allowed full sway in the analysis of mystical experience. It probes into the nature and criteria of mystical experience. It rules out superstition and blind faith from the field of mysticism. Mysticism when it takes the help of the intellect—as it must and does take—is not an esoteric doctrine. It is rational mysticism and in a spirit of a thorough experimentalism throws out a challenge to anybody and everybody to test the validity of mystical experience for himself. One should believe in what one perceives and if one cannot perceive what a mystic perceives one has only oneself to thank. Otto has

1. E. Caird: *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*: Vol. II P. 131.

2. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*: P. 292

given a very significant subtitle to his book: The Idea of the Holy. It runs: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its relation to the Rational. This is exactly what rational mysticism is. It is an enquiry (a rational enquiry) into the immediate experience (mystical experience). It by no means tries to reduce the non-rational or supra-rational element in religion to the rational elements, nor does it limit its enquiry to the sphere of the rational and neglect the supra-rational. Why any theory of religion is full of 'concepts' i.e. rational ideas is obvious, says Otto. A language always tries to convey anything in terms of concepts and an examination of religious truth in terms of language must inevitably depend on concepts. But these rational attributes do not exhaust the idea of the deity but in fact imply a non-rational or supra-rational subject of which they are predicates.

Rational mysticism is an attempt as far as possible to understand this supra-rational element, this overplus of meaning in the mystical experience. It is the rational analysis, though it is bound to be inadequate to express the 'extra' in the religious experience. Mystical experience may not admit of definition but still it admits of being discussed. The blind who is not endowed with the faculty of vision still 'reads' with the help of Braille and tries to grasp the meaning. So reason which does not have the intuitive power tries to comprehend mystical experience, though only in the fashion of the blind. Prof. Ranade has said many times that experience is one thing and expression

quite another. Expression is an attempt to approach the inexpressible. It is the march of the undaunted reason to take at least a peep into Truth. Rational mysticism is a theory of mysticism and as such is necessarily one degree removed from mystical experience itself. Rational mysticism again implies a harmonious development of both reason and intuition. It is giving to reason what belongs to reason and to intuition what belongs to intuition. As in Platonic justice each element of man's soul achieves its virtue without suppressing the other, the whole contributing to the grand harmony, so here does the ripeness of reason prepare the base from where intuition takes its flight. Reason in turn receives illumination from intuition in the form of saving experiences. Intuition has thus come to fulfil and not to destroy reason. By undertaking a rational analysis of mystical experience, reason tries to isolate the unnamed Something in it, Something which does not respond to the call of reason. But this isolation itself is very important; it makes us aware that beyond the sphere of reason there is a vast arena, by no means untrodden but where reason is forbidden to enter and where intuition is the only guide. Rational mysticism is a brief for intuition. But if reason had not done any preliminary work, mysticism, as Otto remarks, would be only unbroken silence. Though religious experience is not reducible to anything else, still there is one way to help us to an understanding of it. "He must be guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through the ways of his own mind until he reach the point at which 'the numinous' in him perforce begins to stir, to start into life

and into consciousness....Our X (by X Otto here means the numinous state of the mind), cannot, strictly speaking, be taught, it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes 'of the spirit' must be awakened".¹ Reason does this work of guiding and evoking; it leads you to the door, then bows and withdraws.

Another way of understanding rational mysticism is taking Jnana itself as illumination. By the word Jnana Prof. Ranade does not mean ordinary discursive knowledge but intuitive knowledge. Real knowledge is thus very much compatible with devotion. There is no contradiction between a Jnani and a Bhakta. "On the other hand, the Bhagavadgita regards a real Jnani as a Bhakta of the highest type."² Real illumination, he says again, can proceed only from a quality of heart. It is something like understanding by heart or feeling with intellect, a combination not ordinarily found. Similarly Kant had talked of perceptive intelligence or intuitive understanding, an intelligence which can take in the whole first and the parts next unlike the ordinary understanding which knows the parts first and through them, the whole.

Rational mysticism enquires as to what is the faculty of God-realisation, what is its nature, whether it receives material from outside (i.e. peripheral initiation) or whether it spins it from itself (central initiation). Is self-knowledge possible and if so, how? What are the criteria of spiritual experience?

1. R. Otto : 'The Idea of the Holy: P.7 See also pages 1-7

2. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature - P. 78

Intuition is a deiform faculty comprising within itself the intellectual, the emotional and the will aspects but not being comprised by them exhaustively. Intuition with its directness experiences God. The intellectual aspect involves the knowledge of God, the emotional aspect love for Him and the will aspect desire for union with Him. They are not three but one and are not a means to anything outside, for the intuitive apprehension of God is an end in itself. As Spinoza said, blessedness is not a reward of virtue but virtue itself.

Now Kant, inspite of being one of the greatest of European philosophers, is lacking in one element,¹ remarks Prof. Ranade. That element is intuition. What figures as intuition in Kant is but sense-perception and not the supersensuous faculty going beyond reason. So rational mysticism as advocated by Prof. Ranade goes one step ahead of the Critiques of Reason whether Pure or Practical. In fact the three great Critiques are supplemented by a new Critique, viz., the Critique of Intuition.

The times of the great movement of thought which characterises the latter part of the 19th and early 20th century were days of political awakening. These were the days of reconstruction. The agnostic and atheistic trends were threatening faith in the spiritual powers and their efficacy in determining the destiny of man. Men like Shri Ramakrishna and Viveka-

1. The Bhagavad gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation P. 280

nanda were weilding their influence to emancipate people from rusted chains of meaningless superstitions and ritualism. They attempted to reveal the value of ancient spiritual traditions which are at the bottom of our culture.

To this moral and spiritual awakening not a little contribution was made by the Nimbargi Sampradaya which had produced great God-realisers. Here the conviction is that 'the two poles around which a spiritual man's life should revolve are meditation on the one hand and morality on the other.'

The history of the Sampradaya can be traced to the Navanathas. Revananatha who is also known as Revana-Siddha or Kadasiddha took his habitat in Siddhagiri, a hillock near Kolhapur. Shri Nimbargi Maharaj belongs to this Sampradaya of Kadasiddha. In this Sampradaya, difference between Upasana of Siva and Upasana of Vishnu, between Brahmins and non-Brahmins, between high and low or literate and illiterate has no place. Shri Nimbargi Maharaj was born in the year 1790, and lived up to 1885. He had been to Siddhagiri where he was initiated by Kadasiddha. The Samadhi of Shri Nimbargi Maharaj is at Nimbargi which is 18 miles from Nimbai. It is an ideal place for quiet meditation; the calmness, the serenity, and sacredness that prevails there is unique. One does forget the worries of the world when one meditates near the Samadhi of Shri Nimbargi Maharaj.

Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj of Umadi was initiated by Shri Nimbargi Maharaj. Umadi is six miles away

from Nimbargi. There is a small room where Maharaj used to meditate. Today we see it as renovated by Prof. Ranade. Attached to the small meditation room is another room where Sadhakas can conveniently sit for meditation.

Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj established a Matha at Inchageri which is 12 miles from Nimbargi. He also erected a temple in memory of Shri Nimbargi Maharaj. His own Samadhi is also at Inchageri. Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj mostly stayed at Inchageri which soon became a centre of spiritual gatherings. Thousands of Sadhakas gathered at Inchageri for Saptahs. From here he spread the message of Nimbargi Maharaj far and wide. Prof. Ranade looked upon Inchageri as an important Tirthaksetra.

Shri Amburao Maharaj or Baba was a disciple of Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj and used to stay at Inchageri. After Maharaj he used to initiate people. His Samadhi is also at Inchageri. Thus at Inchageri, almost in the same compound we have a confluence or Trivenisangama of three spiritual springs—we have a temple built by Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj in memory of Shri Nimbargi Maharaj, the Samadhi of Bhausaheb Maharaj himself as well as the Samadhi of Shri Baba. In all the three places Nimbargi, Umadi and Inchageri one has the fortune to visit the actual places where these mystic saints meditated – may be a small hillock nearby, or a valley, or a neighbouring forest, all places far from the madding crowd.

Prof. Ranade had the good fortune to be initiated into this Sampradaya. To the already existing powerful flow of spiritual realisation he added the current of theoretical study thus lending an impetus to it. He was born on 3rd July 1886 at Jamkhandi in Mysore State. In 1902 he passed his matriculation examination of the then Bombay University and won the first Jagannath Samkarset Samskrit scholarship. In 1914 he got his M.A. in Philosophy and was awarded the Chancellor's Gold Medal. During 1914 to 1924 he worked as Professor of philosophy in Deccan Education Society's Fergusson College, Poona and in Willingdon College, Sangli. He engaged himself with continued and sustained interest in all philosophies and religions of the world. He founded an Institute, Academy of Philosophy and Religion, to bring together all those interested in the philosophical investigation into the problem of God. As he says in the prospectus: the Academy will try to combine what is of value both in Indian and European philosophy, and let us hope, may offer thought constructions for the future in the originality of which and in the theopolitan foundations of which alone may lie the hope of India as a spiritual nation. He also started a quarterly, The Indian philosophical Review. He had planned an encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy in sixteen volumes with some thirty collaborators. In 1927 he was invited to the Chair of Philosophy in the Allahabad University by the then Vice-Chancellor Dr. Ganga Nath Jha. From that time he was in the Allahabad University first as professor of Philosophy and Dean of the faculty of Arts and for some time as

Vice-Chancellor. After retiring from the Allahabad University in 1946, he stayed at Nimbai in Mysore State. He passed away in 1957 at Nimbai. He had left partaking of anything including water, five days prior to his Nirvana. He devoted the whole of this time to listening to the letters of his Master which he got read and to intense meditation. Absorbed in meditation and in serene calmness he offered to God whatever was already God's. This reminds us of Krishna's leaving away his body which is graphically described in Mahabharata. Lord Krishna, though divinity incarnate and all-knower, desired, whatever was already ordained, to leave the mortal coil. Having stopped the sense organs, speech and mind he entered Mahayoga.

Right from his childhood Prof. Ranade was of a religious bent of mind. In 1901 Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj of Umadi initiated him into the spiritual path. By meditating with great devotional fervour on the name of God he began to have religious experiences. His meditation grew more and more intense and by the Grace of his spiritual teacher he was blessed with spiritual experiences of a high order. He was convinced by his experience that it is only God-realisation that bestowed perfection, sublimity and divinity on life. In fact he said: the veracity and virility of any metaphysical theory is to be gauged by its power of making life more divine and therefore more worthwhile living. His meditation continued uninterruptedly till the end. Spiritual life had been his aim from the beginning of his philosophic career and it was its culmination also.

Prof. Ranade did not put forth his philosophy in any single book. Instead of putting forward his point of view directly, he speaks through the mouths of saints and philosophers, thus keeping his own personality completely in the background. His philosophy concerning epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and religion can be gathered from his books on the Upanisads, the Bhagavad-gita and the Vedanta as well as from his other works. His exposition is lucid, consistent and logical; his words winged with etymological and spiritual meaning; his writing precise and clear. One is struck by the vitality, the progressiveness and ripeness of his thought as well as the wide compass of the subjects he handled, mathematics or rhetorics included. There is a single consistent thread of mystical approach in his interpretations. Thus the two-fold characteristics of comprehensiveness and internal systematisation are found in his writings. Prof. Ranade had an open mind welcoming knowledge from whichever quarter it came. The process of accumulation of knowledge begun early in his student days went on throughout his life. He had a passion for an unceasing research into the originals of a doctrine. He learnt even Greek for this purpose. He brought his knowledge of various languages, both Indian and European to bear upon the solution of philosophical problems. To cull out sources, classify them, arrange them in philosophic sequence and interpret them is a characteristic feature of his method. Thus his was a philologico philosophical approach to the doctrines. In the light of historico-philological evaluation and the modern literary criticism the source material whether it was the Upani-

sads, the Bhagavad-gita or the saintly literature in Marathi, Hindi or Kannada, was arranged. He coined new words if words already in vogue failed to convey the sense he wanted. Thus he uses the word Sonanism to indicate the sound aspect of the name of God or Nama. He credited the name with the production of illumination dispelling darkness of ignorance. Though he criticised many a philosophical doctrine, his criticism was always constructive and never destructive, for reconciliation was the main thread of his philosophy. He did not reject any doctrine in toto but sought out a grain of truth in it and gave it its proper place in the perspective of a more wide doctrine. The method he adopted may be said to be a method of construction through a systematic exposition of all the problem concerning a doctrine. He evaluated what had already been done previously and built a new.

In his early years, before he turned his attention to philosophy, he was enamoured of mathematics which he thought to be the most precise science. It was this same precision and exactness of mathematics which had made Descartes exclaim; "Considering also that of all those who have hitherto sought for the truth in the sciences, it has been the mathematicians alone who have been able to succeed in making any demonstrations that is to say, producing reasons which are evident and certain."¹ In fact right from Pythagoras is seen

1, Haldane and Ross: Philosophical works of Descartes : Vol. I,
Pp. 92-93

the tradition of mathematician-philosophers: Descartes, Leibnitz, Bolzano, Boole, Frege, Whitehead, Russell are a few names in the galaxy.

Prof. Ranade would demand factual evidence for any belief. The spiritual school to which he belonged is known for its rational attitude. Thorough-going rationalism did not interfere with ardent devotion. His spiritual teacher discouraged all superstition. Similarly Prof. Ranade while discussing the view that a mystic must pass off with his face turned towards the north remarks that if God is both to the north and to the west, it matters not in what direction a mystic turns his face at the time of his death.¹ Similarly his rationalism is seen in comments like : “ The story of Pariksit, as the derivation of the word itself shows that he was seeing God all around himself in his mother’s womb, protecting him with his mighty disc from the treacherous missiles of the enemy is a story more for mythology than for history or experience. ”² Prof. Ranade approvingly quotes Ramadas: Miracles do not constitute spirituality and are not a true indication of spiritual greatness. Spiritual greatness lies only in the knowledge of the self or Atmajnana. Or again, “ Badarayana and Ramadasa agree[and we also agree] with them that liberation is a thing which is *sui generis* and is not dependent either on the Sukla marga, or

1. Mysticism in Maharashtra : P. 35.

2. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature, P. 9.

on the Kṛṣṇa marga.³ While analysing the veracity of spiritual experiences, he sounds a cautious note that a saint should not 'introduce poetry in the account of his realisation'.⁴

When a student, he was a perfect student, curious, studious and obedient. When a teacher, he was a perfect teacher embodying in himself love for the subject, love for the students, a great deal of learning and a superb skill to make easy and interesting what he taught. Every year he taught new papers in order to study new and new branches. He let other teachers in the department choose their papers and himself taught whatever remained unchosen. He then prepared these subjects making his studies up-to-date by reading contemporary developments in those branches. In addition to books he would study the standard journals like *Mind*, *Hibbert Journal*, *Philosophy* or *International Journal of Ethics*. It was a treat to listen to his thoroughly prepared lectures in which a student would get exhaustive material. It is no wonder that this well-developed and fully arranged matter served as the basis for books brought out by some of his students. When any student happened to refer to a new point, Prof. Ranade used to appreciate it and give credit for it even though the point might be against his own stand. Students were thus encouraged to think independently. When a writer he was a perfect writer, went to the sources; picked up even a

3. The Bhagavad - gita as a Philosophy of God - realisation P. 35.

4. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 210.

smallest merit of a doctrine or a book; kept a number of viewpoints before his eyes and reconciled them with his synoptic vision. He wrote in a powerful and chaste language which convinced his readers that his writings were backed by his own spiritual experiences; for, though he always spoke through somebody else's mouth, thus exhibiting humility, it was his own experience he was talking about.

The foundations of his system are firm; but a creative thinker that he was, the outer limits of his system were not rigid or closed. Like Bradley's window frames they are ever ready to spread out. In him we see a rare combination of originality and freshness of thought coupled with remarkable capacity for systematisation. As such it is wrong to impose our preconceived notions on him. "We would not say more where he has said nothing." His life-long conviction of the correctness of some methods like fidelity to the original text, and consistency in the interpretation of the text e. g. Gita or Brahmasutra was so great that he would not hesitate to point out the limitations of untenable standpoints or inconsistent interpretations. He gave more value to a doctrine than to its author. And if he found that a thinker had erred in representing a doctrine, the might of the thinker did not deter him from subjecting him to a searching criticism. It is interesting to note the similar attitude of Aristotle when he criticised Plato's theory of Ideas : "It is uphill task to do so, seeing that the authors of the doctrine are our friends. If Plato is dear to us, truth is dearer still."

He always preferred the natural interpretation. He would go where the real meaning of the word would lead him to. He has given a natural interpretation of words like Udapana or Avatara occurring in the Bhagavad-gita, or again of Vedanta Sutras like Adhikamtu bhedanirdesat (II. 1. 22) or Antara upapattah (I. 2. 13). In this connection he observes : We, who stand for no dogma in particular know how to understand the Upanisadic passages on this head, because we want to take a merely historical survey of the doctrine, and not to press the passages into the service of any particular view to which we may be committed.¹

There has been so much ado about Analysis that some thinkers have no hesitation in characterising our age as the ' Age of Analysis in Philosophy '. The stand of Russell was that language employed by philosophy should be precise and with this no one need quarrel. An analysis of language will help remove confusions or misunderstandings regarding philosophical notions. But at the hands of later analysts, the camel ousted the Arab, analysis of language coming to occupy their attention and Philosophical problems being driven out. Philosophy, they held, is mainly the clarification of language. The logical positivists, on the whole have branded metaphysical questions as meaningless & their stand generally is not to solve metaphysical problems but to dissolve them. But analysis is, after all, an instrument. That it is a valuable instrument even Socrates, who insisted on

1. A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy : Pp 164-65.

exact definitions, admitted. But that it should become the sole occupation of philosophy is not understandable. Prof. Ranade remarks in this connection : “ A philosopher should deal with philosophic problems and not with merely linguistic or textual questions. These to him ought to be secondary and should remain secondary ”. ¹

His aim was to prepare the way for a deliberate formulation of his own thought on the problems of metaphysics. He had planned a work on the general or universal Pathway to God with reference to the philosophies and religions of the East and the West. It would have been an important treatise which unfortunately could not see the light of day. He had already dealt with, in a synthetic way, the philosophy of mysticism as found in the Upanisads, the Bhagavad-gita, the Vedantasutras and the saintly literature in Marathi, Kannada and Hindi. He wanted to supplement this with his comparative study of Western Philosophy. And then by a process of abstraction and generalisation a higher order synthesis was to be achieved which would have been a veritable metaphysics of mysticism. It would have been a doctrinal study where particulars like thinkers, regions and languages would be in the background and would come forward when a reference to them would be felt necessary in the treatment of a doctrine. The main theme was to be the genesis, growth and culmination of mystical

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a philosophy of God-realisation : P. 94.

experience. About this general pathway or A Study in the Philosophy of Beatification he says : ' How the mystic criterion of reality compares with the idealist, the realist, and the pragmatist criteria, how the mystical faculty of intuition compares with intellect and feeling, how we may reconcile the phenomenal and the noumenal elements of human experience showing man simultaneously to be a denizen of two worlds, the one human and the other divine—which alone can make it possible for him to realise the divine in the human, shall form a subject of a forthcoming work on the Pathway to God.' Some of the chapters planned were : The criterion; Nature, Self, God; the ethical ideal; the beginnings of the pilgrimage; the vicissitudes of the mystic path; unitive victory or the vision of theopolity. He also wanted to discuss the nature of religion and religions i. e. a comparison of historical religions which have ethnic and temporal significance as against the true religion which is universal and for eternity. It is the mystical experience which is the unifying principle of all religions. He visualised India as a birthplace of universal religion, for, along with Hinduism, religions like Mohammedanism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Jainism also have thrived on the Indian soil.

The exhaustive scheme of writing an encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy prepared as early as 1918¹ reminds us of Francis Bacon's Great Instauration. Bacon had proposed to deal with human sciences and gave a comprehensive scheme designed to give

1. See Appendix A for the detailed scheme.

a new philosophy. The writing of Indian Philosophy by Indians was long due. When we glance at the scheme of the work that was programmed giving due regard both to philosophy and to religion, including in its scope schools both orthodox and heterodox, written in Sanskrit and modern Indian languages, we are convinced that it heralds a renaissance in the writing of a systematic history of Indian Philosophy. Another scheme¹ of publishing sixteen volumes on behalf of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion was prepared. This was to deal with philosophical and religious problems both in the East and West. A couple of volumes under this scheme have been published.

He had also contemplated to write a treatise entitled "From the Indian Patmos". We learn that Patmos is an island in the Aegean sea where St. John was exiled and where he wrote the Apocalypse – revelatory writings – predicting the final deliverance of the world. Prof. Ranade's idea might perhaps be to give expression to the efficacy of the spiritual path which would lead to ultimate victory of the good over the evil. Perhaps he might have also wished to proclaim the saving experiences of the great teachers of the Sampradaya and to deliver the message of his Master.

He is one of the philosophico-mystical luminaries whose fullness and variety of mystical experience and whose manner of systematic exposition of it stand

1. See Appendix B for details.

almost unparalleled in the literature of mysticism. His treatment of any philosophical problem is as lucid and profound as it is full of fervour of spiritual experience. His philosophy is so close to us as it flourished in our own time that it is not easy to evaluate its influence. An attempt is here made to place before readers Prof. Ranade's views in his own words. Presenting his philosophy in his authentic style and diction would help us to be faithful to the matter and manner of his exposition.

Chapter II

The Critical Aspects Of Prof. Ranade's Philosophy.

Prof. Ranade's criticism is not just finding fault with any doctrine. It is like Kant's idea of criticism which is opposed to a dogmatic attitude. Any philosophy is dogmatic if it does not first examine the faculty of knowledge but merely tries to confirm conclusions which have already been arrived at. It is well-known that every dogmatism, because it is inadequate, is met by an opposite dogmatism. Thus every dogmatism has latent in it opposite dogmatism and the result is a reasoned despair of knowledge. This is skepticism. But skepticism is a medicine which purges itself along with the disease and real skepticism recognises that it is impossible to rest in itself and that it must accept some fundamental belief. When skepticism becomes aware of its own deficiencies, it has ceased to be skepticism and has become criticism.

“ Not unfrequently the term ‘ criticism ’ is applied to a process which has scarcely any rule or principle, a process which consists simply in raising manifold objections from any point of view that may suggest itself to the theory or doctrine criticised.... It is a criticism without a criterion.”¹ Real criticism on the other hand, is going beyond the sphere of controversy and reaching principles which both the disputants may agree with. Principles are prior to the controversies because controversies are usually carried on regarding particular details and the parties are not aware that there is a common ground where they can meet. Criticism leads them to this common ground by taking them out of the narrow arena where they are fighting.

To adopt a critical attitude is to act like a disinterested judge. The task of a critique is not to approach a problem ‘ with an unreasoned trust or with an unreasoned distrust but to investigate ’. As reconciliation was the main thread of Prof. Ranade’s philosophy, he did not reject any doctrine in toto but sought out a grain of truth in it and gave it its proper place in the perspective of a more wide doctrine. Prof. Ranade’s method was construction through critical exposition. Western Philosophy, both Greek and Modern, and Indian philosophical systems are subjected to a searching scrutiny in his writings.

1. E. Caird : Critical Philosophy of Kant; Vol. I, Pp. 1-2.

One prominent feature of Prof. Ranade's treatment or examination of any doctrine is his method of comparing the doctrine in hand with a similar one in Indian and Western Philosophy. He has as if a chart of different philosophies before his eyes and any new doctrine instantly makes him point out on the chart the place of that doctrine. And this chart is not a simple plane, it is a multidimensional solid representing different view-points like psychological, ethical or mystical. Every doctrine in one plane has its counterpart on the other planes. We know that such classification is essential for it makes complex things simple. It is immediately known as to which doctrine goes with which other doctrine. Prof. Ranade's comparison of doctrines becomes complete when the two doctrines are compared as two shades of colour are compared by a painter and judgment passed as to the superiority or inferiority of one doctrine in relation to the other. He had a profound love for Indian Philosophy and thought that it was an "irony of fate that India should have been most known for her philosophy, while her philosophy itself should have been most neglected."¹

Rather than mere translations and philological studies of Indian texts, the method which would do justice to philosophy is interpretation, correlation and construction. He wanted Indian philosophy to be a chapter in the world's thought. He wished to relate Indian philosophy with European thought and that alone, he thought, would create in the mind of the

1. Essays and Reflections : P. 1.

Westerners an interest regarding our rich philosophical heritage. In this strain he notes the great resemblances between the ancient metaphysical systems of India and the contemporary metaphysical systems of the West. To take a few examples : In the field of metaphysics, the absolutism of Bradley has numerous points of contact with the Advaitism of Samkara. Both declare the unreality of space and time as well as identity of cause and effect. For Bradley as for Samkara the world possesses only phenomenal reality. This naturally results in accepting the doctrine of degrees of reality. And Bradley is as bold as Samkara in declaring that the God of religion does not possess ultimate reality but occupies a subordinate place compared to the Absolute. Prof. Ranade exclaims that it would have been far better had Bradley been inspired with the mystical ideal of the attainment of God. One would then have called him, without hesitation, the Samkaracarya of the West. He compares the philosophy of Ramanuja with the theism of James Ward and with personal idealism of writers like Rashdoll. Ramanuja has the same concept of the Absolute - as including God and the world and souls as Ward later on had. Further, for both Madhva and Catholic theism, there is plurality of souls and reality of the world; and in both, God is the ruler of the world. Resemblance is noticeable in the Samkhya conception of the plurality of souls without a ruling God and the pluralistic, non-theistic idealism of McTaggart. But the resemblances are not confined only to the sphere of metaphysics; they are also found between the Aristotelian logic and Gautama's logic as

also between ethical systems like Epicureanism and Carvaka to mention only a few.

Understanding a doctrine, subsuming it neatly under a class and giving it its technical name, form part of Prof. Ranade's method. If an existing name of a type of doctrine is not suitable he will devise a new one. Perfect nomenclature thus is another of the chief characteristics of his exposition. It becomes easy even for a layman to grasp a thought if it is presented systematically under labels that define it. Logicians tell us that for the efficiency, preservation and progress of thought, scientific terminology is necessary. It is well-known that some of the clarity of biological sciences is due to its scientific nomenclature (thanks to Linnaeus, the Swedish naturalist). The need for exact nomenclature is felt by all sciences as well as philosophy. Prof. Ranade always tried to replace equivocal terminology by precise and unambiguous terms. Evaluation of a system came next. Here he would first evaluate a system from the point of view of internal consistency i. e. whether the various teachings in a system are consistent with the basal tenets of the system. Secondly he would evaluate any system from the mystical standpoint, and the value of any doctrine would be determined from how much the general tenor of the system is conducive to God-realisation. If a doctrine is to be examined, its presence in different systems in various forms and its different senses are noted e. g., the doctrine of Ajati is picked up from many systems and its roots are discovered. Ajati doctrine is found in many systems though as a

result of divergent conceptions. " There is Ajati in Buddhism because there is no concatenation (the previous link is destroyed before the next arises); in Vedanta, because of delusion (the world is not real but only an illusion and so the question of creation of it is irrelevant). Samkhya teaches Ajati of the world in the sense of permanence, (if the world is Nitya, the question of the creation of the world does not arise). Gaudapada teaches Ajati in the sense of non-existence. " Or again, " the Trigunas become analogues of certain other conceptions : humours as in Medieval Physiology, Tridosas as in Indian Medicine and colours as in spectroscopy... our socalled psychological types are based upon these three Gunas. " ¹

He studies a doctrine as it is treated by different authors and reserves his judgment and when the judgment is given it is clear and unambiguous. " Nor does Gaudapada believe in the doctrine of grades or degree of reality which is a mere compromise between monism and pluralism " Or again, " the present writer does not think that in any other provincial literature of India, there is this peculiar combination of epigram, wit, humour, sarcasm, love, devotion, service and general advice to humanity which we find in the Dohas. " ²

His developmental approach is evident in his arrangement of the concept of self in different Dar-

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1. The Bhagavad-gita as a philosophy of God-realisation : P. 29.
 2. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 270.

sanas. To take an example from his Notes which he prepared for teaching : “ In Prabhakara the soul is always Jada, while in Nyaya the soul is Jada in Susupti but in Jagrti it gets the attribute of knowledge. Knowledge is thus an adventitious quality of the self. In Kumarila the soul has Samvid even in deep sleep not to speak of the state of wakefulness. It is a fully conscious entity. In Vedanta, the soul is Samvidrupa at the least. There may be even Aparoksanubhuti. ” Thus so far as the problem of knowledge is concerned, Prof. Ranade arranges the four systems in a graded order as follows : Prabhakara, Nyaya, Kumarila, and Vedanta.

Though uncritical acceptance of all that is contained in the scriptures is not advocated, the general trend is to pick up the eternal principles from the heritage and cast away the chaff. On the whole, respect for traditions is recommended. In fact, so great are our scriptures that Vivekananda says: the glory of Vedic scriptures is unique in history of religion. And this is not merely because of their great antiquity; but vastly more for the fact that they alone amongst all the authoritative books of the world warn man that he must go beyond all books.

It does not however seem possible in practical life that every one is capable of interpreting the scriptures himself, let alone experiencing their truth himself. Hence the necessity of saints and seers. The common man has to keep them as standards. As Shri Aurobindo says : it is the God-possessed who should be the standard in doing our duties. That saints and seers

should be the standard has been an ancient cry. "The philosopher-king is doubly demanded as the only adequate embodiment of the Socratic conception of goodness, and also as the authority whose personal insight into good creates the public tradition by which the rest of society is to live. To do full justice to the conception we must not forget that Socrates's statesmen are expected to combine two characters which are not often united. They are to be original scientific thinkers of the first order, but equally, they are to be "saints".¹ And Aristotle: "the rightness of the Logos which the man of practical wisdom possesses and applies to limit the mean, depends in the end upon the ultimate standard of value in human life which he truly conceives. It is because he knows the true mark to aim at that the rules he formulates are correct."²

We know that virtue according to Aristotle is the golden mean; this mean is relative to an individual's station and its duties in the Polis, the city state. If a common man cannot determine this mean, it should be determined by the man who possesses both intellectual excellence and practical wisdom. In fact, moral virtue and insight find their common root in education by which "the insight of the older generation produces the virtue of the younger."³ It is interesting to note that both Plato and Aristotle give importance to tradition. In the same strain Prof. Ranade emphasises the place of tradition even

1. A. E. Taylor : Plato, the Man and his Works : Pp. 282-283.

2. H. Joachim (Ed.) The Nichomachean Ethics : P. 167.

3. E. Zeller : Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics : Vol II P. 187

in spiritual life. “ Unless we are born in a spiritual tradition, nothing spiritual is likely to accrue to us. It is only through the lineal descent from a spiritual saint that we can hope to have some kind of spiritual experience. ”¹

We may now refer to a few critical notices of Western thinkers. Prof. Ranade highly appreciated Anaximander's characterisation of Apeiron as Deity. While discussing the conception of Infinitude, Prof. Ranade takes up the idea of the unlimited in Pythagoras, the idea of the Indeterminate in Aristotle and the idea of Apeiron in Anaximander, and remarks that Pythagoras and Aristotle could not unfortunately understand the real significance of Anaximander's Apeiron. Pythagoras, it is well-known, had made mathematical forms the essence of things; here the unlimited became an even and not an odd number and as such became capable of multiplicity and evil. This is obviously fantastic. Further Aristotle though his own conception of the Indeterminate was based on Anaximander's conception of Apeiron, fell short of the height to which Anaximander ultimately rose. Aristotle's matter is indefinite; it is mere potentiality. It does not exist without being somehow actualised as form. As mere potentiality it is not actual; still Aristotle is not prepared to say that matter is something which is not-being. He sometimes conceives of matter in abstract as mere potentiality; sometimes in the concrete as being

1. Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : Pp. 225-226.

a retarding principle which limits the complete realisation of form in individual things, or as being the cause of the lawless and the purposeless in nature. As such Prof. Ranade remarks that the conception of the Indeterminate is the weakest spot in Aristotle's philosophical system¹. Though both Aristotle and Anaximander understand the unlimited as matter, in Aristotle the unlimited forms the lower limit in his doctrine of development while in Anaximander the Apeiron comes to occupy the place of the highest principle for he identifies it with God. As Windelband aptly puts it : " Still another predicate was given by Anaximander to the infinite, to Theion, the Divine. As a last remembrance of the religious home in which scientific reflection arose, it shows for the first time the inclination of philosophers, constantly recurring in history, to view as " Deity " the highest conception which theory has led them to use for explaining the world, and so to give it at the same time a sanction for the religious consciousness. " ²

Indeed it has constantly recurred. Philosophers have postulated one cosmic principle to explain the universe, and later on deified it. But the identification of the existing Being सप्रपञ्च तत्त्व with the most perfect being is also arrived at in a reverse way. Philosophers have conceived of the most perfect being or God and then as if seeking help from the fourth anti-

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature ; P. 405
2. Windelband : A History of Philosophy P 34

nomy identified it with the necessary being. The ontological argument helps them to assert (in Kant's opinion, illegitimately) that such a being must exist. Here the most perfect becomes the necessarily existent. It is too well-known how St. Anselm, and after him Descartes, and others have gone this way. Thus the identification of perfection and existence i. e., value and reality has been achieved either by attributing value predicates to the primal principle or by hypostatising the idea of the most perfect being. There is anyhow a process of establishing a connection between a perfect (*ens perfectissimum*) and the most real Being (*Ens realissimum*).

In his brilliant essay on Heraclietos Prof. Ranade undertakes a critical examination of the philosophy of Heraclietos. His estimate of Heraclietos is that Heraclietos is not a mystic. He criticises Herr Pfleiderer for including Heraclietos in the mystical tradition and points out that Heraclietos rather belongs to the scientific tradition. His only claim to a place in the assembly of mystics is that he wrote in an aphoristic, epigrammatic and cryptic style. But mere aphorism, Prof. Ranade points out, is not mysticism. Heraclietos was a dry rationalist. After taking a survey of arguments of Burnet and Zeller the former saying that there is no conflagration in Heraclietos and the latter asserting that there is conflagration, Prof. Ranade points out that in both these scholars there is one gratuitous assumption which is common and that is, that conflagration and change are contradictory. He further remarks that far from conflagration being

contradictory to change it is necessary to change. In conflagration things are reduced to a ball of fire and at the time of creation new things emerge from the ball of fire. Thus conflagration makes possible the phenomenon of change. There is therefore no harm in holding that Heraclietos believed both in conflagration and in change.

Prof. Ranade points out that causation is not the only metaphysical problem; for metaphysics includes other considerations no less vital. He therefore criticises Aristotle for having found fault with Xenophanes who neglected the problem of causation. He defends Xenophanes against Aristotle because Xenophanes had given thought to moral considerations rather than only to abstract and bloodless metaphysics.

Prof. Ranade had studied Greek Philosophy from the originals and thus could form his estimation of Greek philosophers better than can be done from an English translation of the Greek works. He had a high regard for the philosophy of Parmenides.¹ He completely disagrees with the materialistic interpretation of Parmenides given by Burnet and Zeller. He points out that it is not correct to hold that Parmenides' Being is material only because it is compared to a sphere. Comparisons and analogies are useful only to a certain limit and they are to be understood only in respect of the point of comparison. Analogy gives

1. Philosophical and other Essays : Pp. 32-42.

some point of resemblance and does not at all indicate an identity. Being therefore need not be material. The ' Truth ' of Parmenides, Prof. Ranade points out, is like the Paramarthika reality of Vedanta and his 'opinion' like the Vyavaharika reality. Parmenides identifies being and thought. Both Plato and Aristotle have correctly understood this identification between the real and the rational given by Parmenides. Now this identification is just like the Vedantic identification of Sat and Cit. But the similarities between Parmenides and Vedanta do not end here. Parmenides' criticism of the logical universal in the Platonic dialogue is exactly like Samkara's criticism of the Vaishesika category of Samanya. Further if we find Parmenides talking about being and not-being we have in Samkara Brahman and Maya. These similarities are so striking that they enable us to call Samkara the Indian Parmenides. On the whole Prof. Ranade thinks that if along with Parmenides we also consider the teachings of Xenophanes, Zeno and Melissos we can even say that the Eleatic philosophy is the earlier forerunner in Greece of Vedantism.

Zeno had thrown a challenge to the philosophical world by putting forth different puzzles in proof of his theory of a motionless Being. He had contended that an attempt to prove motion leads to infinite regress. But is infinite regress always a defect in philosophical construction? Infinite regress is sought to be surmounted by positing an arbitrary last term to the infinite series. Thus the Samkhyas posit Prakrti, or

Descartes posits a first creator as the cause of the world. The whole question of creation and the consequent infinite regress is rendered to be an *ignoratio elenchi* by Samkara who says in his commentary on the Vedanta Sutra II. 1. 35 that creation is beginningless, (अनारब्धत्वात् संसारस्य). But why should infinite regress be taken as an evidence of a defect in any argument? According to Royce, the concept of infinite variety in unity is consistent in itself. Royce gives an example where infinite regress becomes essential in order to describe the true nature of Being. He takes an example of a map. The map of a country has to describe the minute details of the surface. Now if that map is drawn on the surface of the same country, that drawing also will have to be shown in the map. And in that small map within the bigger map, the map must again have a place and so on *ad infinitum*. "For the map, in order to be complete, according to the rule given, will have to contain, as part of itself, a representation of its own contour and contents. In order that this representation should be constructed, the representation itself will have to contain once more, as a part of itself, a representation of its own contour and contents; and this representation, in order to be exact, will have once more to contain an image of itself; and so on without limit."¹ This method of representation, which Royce calls 'self-representative system', and which involves an infinite regress is not

1. J. Royce : The World and the Individual : 1st Series

wrong at all according to him. This infinite process is something which is necessarily required by the principle on which the system is created. "For one who understands the purpose of making within England a map of England, and the purpose of making this map absolutely accurate, would see precisely why the map must be contained within the map and why, in the series of maps within maps, there could be no end, consistently with the original requirement."¹ The same can be seen if we bring to our memory the tea-packets of Jakooja with a picture of a woman carrying the packet on the shoulder and on the packet in the picture, there is again that picture on a small scale and in that picture, the packet on yet smaller scale is still present. And the same will be true of the vision, described by Jñanesvara, which Arjuna has of himself in the eyes of Krishna where both of them, like two mirrors placed in front of each other, go on reflecting the object before them infinitely. That an infinite regress may not be objectionable is not a novel contribution of Prof. Royce. Prof. Ranade refers in this connection to Aristotle's criticism of Zeno, which implies an unconscious distinction between an infinite regress which is objectionable and another which is not so. He also refers to Russell's similar distinction² which deserves some notice. Russell says that an infinite regress is objectionable only when the meaning of a proposition is in question, since no proposition

1. J. Royce : *The World and the Individual*—P. 506

2. B. Russell : *The Principles of Mathematics* : Pp. 348-349.

having a definite meaning is ever reached in this case. "Two people are said to have the same ideas when they have ideas which are similar and ideas are similar when they contain an identical part." In short such an infinite regress results from arguments like circular definitions. On the other hand, if no such circularity is involved infinite regress is not objectionable e. g. if A implies B and B implies C and C implies D and so on, we need not know the whole series before A acquires a meaning. Implication is a synthetic relation, new and new things are said to be implied by A; but they are not necessary to understand the meaning of A. A can be fully understood without these implications; these implications are only further appendages of A. Such an infinite regress is not objectionable. Russell remarks: "If then, it can be shown that the implication of the parts in the whole when the whole is an infinite class of numbers, is of this latter kind, the regress suggested by Zeno's argument of dichotomy will have lost its sting."

Prof. Ranade agrees with Russell that motion is a spatio-temporal relation and points out that Zeno holds the card of space in one hand and the card of time in the other hand and that it is necessary to compel him to show the cards at once. Motion must be understood as a differential coefficient ds/dt , it is a correlation of the two and is different from either. He further remarks that in the defence of Zeno made by Russell we have a rehabilitation of Zeno. Russell and Weierstrass both try to banish all infinitesimals to which Prof. Ranade strongly objects. He states that

the real solution of Zeno's puzzles is given only by infinitesimal calculus which is slightly treated by Weierstrass and Russell. A mathematician of Russell's calibre should not have done so. Infinitesimal calculus shows how an infinite number of infinitesimally small units produces a finite whole in combination. As this is possible, motion of an arrow or the noise of the bushel of corn which were impossible on Zeno's hypothesis become very much a reality. Prof. Ranade's treatment of Zeno, which fully analyses the mathematical implications of the puzzles is scientific and not speculative.

Time and again Prof. Ranade has complimented Aristotle for his scientific analysis and for his sharp insight. He has picked up a number of philosophical truths from Aristotle's criticism of his predecessors. The subtlety of Zeno's arguments is well-known throughout history of philosophy but the merciless logic and profound insight into science with which Aristotle meets them are not equally known. Thus Prof. Ranade credits Aristotle with having contributed three important ideas to the history of thought. They are : (i) the distinction between relative and absolute motion, (ii) the philosophy of the Infinite and (iii) the philosophy of the continuum.¹

And again, Aristotle has pointed out that there are differences of value among things. According to Prof. Ranade this is the most important criticism

1. Philosophical and other Essays : P 48.

against a relativistic skeptic. There are no degrees of truth; but there are degrees of error. Truth is one. The nearer you approach truth the less of an error you commit. There is more or less in error which may take infinite forms. When truth is one, it admits of no degrees. This absolutistic theory of truth follows from Aristotle's metaphysics for whom all things that are moved are emblems of error while only the unmoved mover is the emblem of absolute truth.

Prof. Ranade has a high regard for the mystical philosophy of Plotinus. Many a time he has quoted from the *Enneads* and Plotinus' idea of the flight of the alone to the alone is his favourite. He compares the philosophy of Plotinus and Vedanta, for in both there shines one central Reality from which emanate the secondary entities. He finds the roots of this Plotinus' theory of emanation in Plato, where from the central idea of the Good emanate other ideas. Again, both in Plotinus and Vedanta, the mystical attainment of God is the aim. His estimation of Plotinus is that he represents the Vedantic mysticism more than any other Western Philosopher.

It was the failure of Kant according to Prof. Ranade that he supposed the ultimate reality unknowable. Vedanta here gains an upper hand for it recognises that not only is this reality knowable but verily the only object of knowledge. But he is all praise for Kant for his suggestion that the moral is to be regarded as the most sublime conception of experience. "No man has spent greater labour upon the justification of

the moral life than Kant; no better book has been written on ethics than his Critique of Practical Reason; and no more important statement has been made by anybody than by Kant that the proof of God was to be found through an analysis of the conception of the Summum Bonum from the point of view of the adjustment of merit and reward."¹ But the Practical Reason was not the last word Kant wanted to speak on Ethics. He continued to think on the ethical problem till the end and we find a complete revolution in his thought as regards the Summum Bonum and the Categorical Imperative which becomes evident from some of his writings which were posthumously published. Following the usual Kantian method, Prof. Ranade classifies the new conclusions of Kant into three stages, the negative, the positive and the constructive.

i) *Negative* : Kant states that the Summum Bonum has no power to prove the existence of God. Here even the moral proof suffers the same fate as the other three proofs and is dismissed as entirely untenable and too theoretical.

ii) *Positive* : Now the Categorical Imperative gets the power of directly leading us to God for the Categorical Imperative itself is a command of God. This verily is the position of the Bhagavad-gita. Further Kant speaks in a theistic manner and regards

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

God as the power and wisdom in one. How very anti-thetic is this position of the earlier Kant who criticised the procedure of human reason which transforms an idea into an object !

iii) *Constructive* : But the great Kant did not halt at this theistic stage and becomes a supertheist when he asserts his indentity with God. Prof. Ranade sums up by saying that Kant rises from mere agnosticism to moral purism, from moral purism to theism, from theism to theologism and from theologism to a mystical identitate philosophy.

A survey of Prof. Ranade's views on Indian Philosophy reveals that according to him the RgVeda is a great hymnology to the personified forces of nature and thus represents the earliest phase in the evolution of religious consciousness viz. the objective phase of religion. The Upanisads, on the other hand, mark the subjective phase of religion. From the psychological point of view the RgVeda may be regarded as a great work of emotion and imagination; the Upanisads a work of thought and reason. Every revival of the study of Upanisads has synchronised with a great religious movement. The Upanisads have a unique place in the history of Indian philosophy as they are the bedrock of it. Upanisads are capable of giving us a view of reality which would satisfy the scientific, the philosophic as well as the religious aspriations of man. That all the later schools of Indian Philosophy are rooted in the Upanisads has been shown systemwise and in great details for the first time by Prof. Ranade

in his monumental work on the Upanisads.¹ He describes with minute details how a number of doctrines later developed by the Darsanas, particularly the Vedanta Darsana, find their origin in the Upanisads. There are rudiments of Samkhya-Yoga, elements of Buddhism and Jainism, ideas of Saivism and Mimamsa as well as different strands of opinions developed independently by the Vedanta schools. Upanisads contain the seeds of the Dvaita philosophy of Madhva, the Visistadvaita of Ramanuja and the Advaita of Sankara. He has also shown that impersonalistic as also personalistic theories of the creation of the world are hinted at by the Upanisads together with some theories of the moral ideal like self-realisation and even supermoralism. "The Upanisads do not contain either nature poetry or love poetry, and hence the beautiful does not much fall within the scope of Upanisadic thought; but the Upanisads deal nevertheless with the sublime in nature, or with the sublime in the region of mind, or even in the transcendental sphere."² Prof. Hiriyanna also says that the beautiful is not recognised by Indian philosophers and that they are silent about this value. Mysticism, according to Prof. Ranade, is the culmination of Upanisadic philosophy as it is the culmination of all philosophies and one who does not understand that the cosmology and the psychology, the metaphysics and the ethics of the Upanisads are merely a propaedeutic to their mystical doctrine can scarcely be said to have understood the

1. See : A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy, Chap.IV

2. Ibid : Pp. 42-43.

spirit of Upanisadic philosophy. The Upanisads supply the basis for speculation for various kinds of philosophies but a supreme clue for the reconciliation of these could be found in a mystical interpretation of the philosophy of the Upanisads which would cancel none of these systems and yet absorb all of them and give to each an appointed place in the thought evolution of the Vedanta.

The Bhagavad-gita is a universal scripture inviting innumerable commentaries from various quarters. It takes on a different perspective to different interpreters. Through a labyrinth of interpretations, like gnosticism, devotionism, activism, numenism or divinisation and so on, Prof. Ranade finds the clue in a mystical interpretation of the Gita. God-realisation, according to him, is the supreme teaching of the Gita. In fact the Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita synthesises the moral, the sublime and the divine in a crowning philosophy of spirit.

Out of the three couplets of the six systems of Indian Philosophy, he observes : one is orthodox and the other heterodox. Nyaya, Yoga and Vedanta are orthodox while Vaishesika, Samkhya and Mimamsa are heterodox in a way, Vaishesika because it does not recognise Sabdapramana, Mimamsa because it is atheistic and Samkhya because it finds no necessity for God. Why brand only Buddhism and Jainism as being heterodox ? Within the fold of the so called orthodox systems, one does not believe in the Aptavakya while some others unfurl the banner of atheism. Prof. Ranade observes that in the doublets Vaishesika-

Nyaya, Samkhya-Yoga and Mimansa-Vedanta the first is heterodox while the second orthodox; and that it may probably be a movement of thought. We get a different classification of systems of Indian Philosophy in his notes. (i) Samkhya, (ii) Yoga, (iii) Buddhism, (iv) Jainism, (v) Nyaya-Vaisesika and (vi) Mimansa. We do not know on what basis he proposed this rearrangement. One reason is hinted at in the Analytical Table of Contents of his Vedanta Volume. Perhaps he wanted to treat these systems as Purvapaksas for which Vedanta constitutes the Uttarapaksa. There may probably be other reasons also, for he has followed this classification even in his notes on Indian Philosophy. Vedanta system, which is a culmination of Indian Thought does not form part of the six systems. Indian thought surely includes Buddhism & Jainism along with Samkhya, Yoga & so on.

१०७२५५

A great religion like Buddhism cannot be based upon the foundation of no-spirit. In his soliloquy¹ immediately after his spiritual illumination Buddha refers to the soul which is the builder of the body or Gahakaraka.

गहकारक ! दिट्ठो'सि पुन गेहं न काहमि ।

सञ्चा ते फासुका भग्गा गहकूटं विपंखतम् ॥

विसंखारगतं चित्तं तण्हानं खयमज्झगा ॥ धम्मपद 154

“ But now, Maker of the tabernacle, thou has been seen, thou shall not again build up this tabernacle.

1. Quoted in 'The Master as I saw Him,' by Sister Nivedita, P.47

All thy rafters are fallen. Thy ridge pole is broken. The mind, approaching the eternal, has attained to the extinction of all desires.”¹ What he meant by preaching a doctrine of no-soul is that the body or the mind or the senses were not the soul. Prof. Ranade observes that the Buddhistic idea of soul lies in between James and Hume. According to William James thoughts are not separate or independent; on the other hand the previous thought completely envelopes the next one for they both belong to the same self. The thought which comes later inherits all that the previous one had, and nothing is allowed to be lost. “Each Thought is thus born an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realised as its Self to its own later proprietor.....Who owns the last self owns the Self before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed.”² Hume has a completely antagonistic idea; for him the self or anything for that matter is a collection of discrete things and there is no continuity whatever between any one event and any other. “When I see.....a billiard ball moving in a straight line towards another, even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse, may I not conceive that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause ? ”³ Hume’s contention is that any other succession of events is possible and that we should never be sure that an event will necessarily be succeeded

1. Quoted in ‘The Master as I saw Him’ by Sister Nivedita P. 47

2. W. James : Principles of Psychology : Vol I, Pp 339-340.

3. Hume : Enquiry concerning Human Understanding : § IV:
Para. 10.

by a particular one as a result of taking impetus or energy from the first. Here is no inheritance as in James. Hence every thought is born a bankrupt and even if it dies rich it cannot bequeath its property to its successor. In the Buddhistic idea of soul there is discreteness between events as in Hume, for there is a gap after the death of the first thought and the birth of the second. There is no link, far less a causal link between them. But similarity with Hume ends here. According to Buddhism, when the first thought dies it passes on its Samskaras to its successor. The idea of bequest seen in James is found here. Though there is no enveloping of the previous thought by the later, though the possessor is not possessed by the succeeding proprietor, the title is transmitted as if by a will! There is no direct contact between the bequeather and the inheritor but the Samskaras are transmitted alright. Thus in Buddhism there is discreteness as in Hume and there is inheritance as in James.

No religion can have essencelessness of things or void as the supreme ideal. Prof. Ranade interprets the Buddhistic ideal in a positive way. He gives ten conceptions of Nirvana classifying them under five heads :

Psychological

1) Nirvana may be looked upon as freedom from desire and

2) freedom from suffering especially Adhyatmika. Something is judged to be painful which has to be

eliminated and in this there is involved an axiological element too.

Epistemological

3) In the first place Avidya which is the first link in the chain of twelve Nidanas and which is the root of all suffering is sought to be destroyed. Nirvana also means,

4) a predicateless existence i. e., beyond 'is' and 'is not'. This latter is a logical characterisation of Nirvana.

Ontological

5) Buddhism aims at annihilation of being as well as annihilation of evil, suffering, desire and the fires of vices.

6) Though Buddhism starts with the annihilation of Being, in its later development Nirvana becomes perpetuation of being.

Ethical

7) This aspect is by far the most important in Buddhism and implies extinguishment of the three fires, viz., Raga, Dvesa and Moha. This is similar to the stoic ideal of Apathia or the absence of emotions. Emotions are a disease of the soul and a wise man should not be perturbed by them.

8) Another side of the same virtue which is equally stressed by the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Skeptics alike is Ataraxia or imperturbability which consists in freedom from the outer world. Because

the outer world cannot be controlled, what is left to us is to aim at inner control. This inner isolation reinforces equanimity and the wise man finds his happiness in himself alone. He attains to tranquillity, calmness and peace.

Mystical

9) This aspect of Nirvana consists in the realisation of the supreme bliss.

10) Further Nirvana also implies living in Dharmakaya here and now. Prof. Ranade further remarks that this ideal of Dharmakaya may be compared to the Vedantic Jivanmukti, the Parnirvana being comparable to the Vedantic Videhamukti.

He lays his finger on the central doctrine of Jainism and points out that relativism is good only as a tentative stage. Relativism means no one doctrine is absolutely true; but it may possess partial truth. In fact, different standpoints are only truth-claims one of which would be established as the truth. Prof. Ranade wonders as to why the Jaina probabilistic epistemology should stop at the seventh stage and not go on further. Why not add, he asks, Syad na avak-tavyah as the eighth and then go on *ad infinitum* with further permutations and combinations?

In his critical evaluation of Samkhya philosophy which is one of the oldest systems, Prof. Ranade says that here we get intimations of the great philosophical proofs of Reality. Whether a proof is offered for the existence of Prakrti or matter, or the existence of

Purusa or Spirit, it is wonderful to note that the Samkhya philosopher handles with dexterity the arguments which come to be known in the history of philosophical thought as proofs for the existence of God. No philosophy of religion can be complete without dealing with the ontological, the cosmological and the teleological proofs. The ontological proof is given for the existence of Purusa postulated as an Adhithana or eternal background. Here Prof. Ranade remarks that the first Karika uses Purusa in the singular; hence there is a subconscious monism lurking in the mind of the Samkhya philosopher. The ontological proof made famous by St. Anselm after whom it is called, and made more famous by Kant's reduction of all other proofs to this proof should really go in the history of philosophy as the Samkhya proof. But why the ontological alone? Samkhya offers the cosmological proof for the existence of Prakrti and the teleological proof for the existence of Purusa again. They too are the original contribution of the Samkhya Philosophy. Incidentally it may be remarked that the moral proof which posits God as a dispenser of justice by equating virtue with happiness and vice with misery was recognised by the Naiyyayikas long before Kant. The three Gunas constitute the corner stone of Samkhya philosophy. But the question is; are the three Gunas substantival or adjectival? What is their relation to Prakrti? Does Prakrti exist first or do the Trigunas exist first? These questions remain unanswered. A student of Kant is familiar with the idea of schematism. The problem before Kant was how to apply the categories of the understanding to the perceptions?

The categories are a priori while the perceptions are a posteriori. How can there be any relation between perceptions and categories without a mediator which shares characteristics with both the sides? Such a mediating principle Kant finds in imagination which is intellectual like categories and sensuous like perceptions. As Watson points out, imagination depends on categories for unity and on perception for matter. This schematic function assigned to imagination by Kant is relegated to Buddhi by the Samkhya philosopher. Buddhi mediates between Prakrti which is Jada and Purusa who is Caitanya. The Purusa is reflected in Buddhi because of its transparent character. But the idea of schematism is beset with difficulties. A new schematism is required for any pair of schematiser and schematised. Infinite regress is always involved in all schematism for there must again be a mediator between a schematised and the schema as between the schematised and the schema. Indeed as in Kant, schematism is the weakest point in Samkhya epistemology. Further, when the 36th Karika speaks of the Purusartha or the purpose which the Purusa has in view, it militates against the vaunted Samkhya doctrine that Purusa is uncontaminated. Prakrti now cannot follow its own nature. Thus with a break in the activity of Prakrti and with an attribution of purpose to the Purusa the very bottom of the rigid dualism of Samkhya Philosophy gives way. It is noteworthy that inspite of many a defect in Samkhya system it tries to give a scientific explanation of reality.

Looking again to the Western World, we find

that the problems of natural science were included in philosophy for long centuries. Those were the problems with which the Greek mind of antiquity was much concerned. Cosmogony or the creation of the world occupied the mind of the Vedic Rsis as well as the early Greek thinkers. "What is then the original ground of things which outlasts all temporal change, and how does it change itself into these particular things or change these things back into itself?"¹ The Samkhya philosophers seem to have attempted an answer for such an enquiry by saying that all things came out of Prakrti and repair back to Prakrti.

The Yoga doctrine of God like that of the Samkhyas is not above censure. It stands in between the Samkhya and the Vedanta doctrines. Here God is only an epiphenomenon or an appendix to the Samkhya system. Though Yoga recognises a Purusa-visesa he is not really the supreme principle but only a primus inter pares, first among equals. Again, it is stated in the system that meditation on God or Isvara is *also* a way to realisation: Isvara-pranidhanatva (Yoga Sutra I. 23). Prof. Ranade's very significant comment on this is that the Sutra should have been Isvara-pranidhanadeva i.e. realisation is possible *only* through meditation on the Godhead. He, however, recognises one very important contribution made by Yoga to the doctrine of realisation, for it identifies God with the Atman when it speaks of liberation as consisting in the abiding of the self in its own

1. Windelband : A History of Philosophy : P. 27.

nature.¹ Yoga, according to its derivation, is a positive, persistent and final determination to seek out the truth.² Prof. Ranade has discussed various aspects of the Yoga ideal of Kaivalya. The affective side connotes painlessness or desirelessness. The epistemological aspect becomes manifest when Yoga talks of the unity of Grhitr, Grahana and Grahya. The intellectual element in Kaivalya consists in the discernment of the self from the not-self. The moral point is to be noticed in the assertion that the cloud of virtue comes to him who has no interest left in intellection. Mystically, Kaivalya consists in the self abiding in its own nature.

Disagreeing with the criticism of the conception of Jivanmukti by the Dhyananityogavadins though sympathising with their contention that the ultimate import of the Vedanta texts is for a life of meditation or contemplation, Prof. Ranade says that their criticism of Jivanmukti is wrong because the scriptures uphold Jivanmukti इहचेदवेदीय सत्यमस्ति (Kenopanishad II.13). Further, it is also logical because even after the attainment of Jivanmukti, the body may continue for a while by the force of Karmika inertia. He means by Jivanmukti desirelessness, destruction of ignorance, realisation of the self and particularly the last; and when this is attained, liberation is attained. Nothing valuable might be achieved by liberation at death (Videhamukti) or enjoyment of bliss then; Kramamukti

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1. See : 'The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :
Pp. 229-230
 2. Philosophical and other Essays : P. 177.

is merely a theological makeshift; nor need Jivanmukti involve Sarvamukti.¹ Why is Videhamukti said to be not so valuable? The reason seems to be that partaking of bliss even while living is really important. On this Prof. Ranade has insisted many a time. But if a saint does not want bodily limitations which are inevitable as long as he lives, Videhamukti might be regarded as a higher conception. One, however, has to remember that this Videhamukti or complete mergence will be achieved only if one has attained to the state of Jivanmukti previously. It is not mere death which leads to Videhamukti but it is the death of a Jivanmukta which leads to Videhamukti.

He points out that in their criticism of the doctrine of Sphota, Badarayana and Samkara fail to sympathise with the mystical significance of it. They hold that the world comes from the word (and not Sphota) which they identify with Brahman. The doctrine of Sphota may be objectionable if understood in the Grammarians' sense that it means the power of signification or the meaning of a word. But when it is identified with the mystical doctrine of Sabda, Prof. Ranade says, the Vedantins need have no cause of grievance against it. He compliments Panini who alone held that the Sabda, which he identified with the Sphota (explosion), was the primal energy of the world. This insistence on the realisational aspect is seen when he comments on the Gita expression सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत्. "We may submit here that neither Samkara nor Ramanuja has taken into account the mystical

1. Vedanta - The Culmination of Indian Thought : P. 167.

manifestation of God to an aspirant in the process of his realisation.”¹

Though the Vedanta condemns extreme sensationalism of the Carvaka type and the extreme idealism of the Vijnanavada type, Prof. Ranade points out that it is an idealistico-spiritualistic philosophy. We come across Vedanta explaining in many places the meaning of liberation as desirelessness. This, according to Prof. Ranade, is only a negative conception. But the highest ideal cannot merely be negative. It must have a positive content. And this positive content, according to him, is beatification.² The realisation of the divine bliss for oneself and others is the be all and the end all of the Vedantic mystic and to that end all the activities are directed. The true summum Bonum for the Vedantist is not liberation whether of the asymptotic or of the catastrophic kind but the enjoyment of divine bliss here and now.

We find in the history of thought many incrustations gathering round any good theory as time passes on. The spirit is forgotten and unhealthy rituals loom large. True worship by means of the heart is replaced by fatuitous elements. The theoretical basis of Tantrism when it recognises itself to be the practical counterpart of Advaitism is no doubt sound. Similarly we may not fail to notice that it has rendered one good service to psychology : its insistence on the unfoldment of the vast power lying in the mind and

1. The Bhagavad - Gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation : P. 45

2. See ; Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 400.

body of man by means of Sadhana is commendable. It has also contributed to the development of physiology in its doctrine of Cakras or plexuses. The justification of the Pancatatva Sadhana lies in understanding its philosophical import. But the generality of mankind is not expected to have a dispassionate view of things and there is thus a danger of the practices being misused as well as going the way of occultism. A moral purist, Prof. Ranade would not allow any erotic interpretation to be foisted upon religious consciousness. Mysticism and eroticism have as much in common, according to him, as the south pole with the north pole. He examines the supposed sexual relationship between the Gopis and Krishna and points out the absurdity of such a view. He utterly denies that eroticism has got any thing to do with spiritualism. The relation might be understood allegorically representing the relation between the senses and the self. He gives his own mystical explanation of the way in which Gopis may be supposed to have enjoyed Krishna. "May it not be possible, that in their mystical realisation, each of the Gopis had the vision of the Godhead before her...."¹ The similarity of their experience only supports that it was a spiritual vision of God disproving any carnal relationship between them.

Prof. Ranade's wide range of studies included subjects like rhetorics.² Of the three forms of meaning Abhidha (expression), Laksana (indication) and Vyanjana (suggestion), he regards Vyanjana the most

1. Mysticism in Maharashtra : P. 11.

2. See : Paramartha - Sopan (Hindi) : Appendix II.

fundamental process though it was not so regarded for a long time. Vyanjana and Dhvani are related to each other as process and product. The Dhvani is a good rhetorical counterpart among the Alankarikas to the metaphysico-mystical doctrine of Sphota among the Vaiyyakaranas and the Yoga philosophers. The three chief manifestations of Dhvani usually recognised are : Rasadhvani, Alamkaradhvani and Vastudhvani having a psychological, a rhetorical and a metaphysical or mystical significance respectively. It might be noted that the Dhvani might produce in the mind either a particular Rasa or a particular Alankara or the conception of a Vastu (metaphysical fact) or the highest Vastu (mystical fact). The Vastudhvani has been brought to a low level by the Natyakaras or dramaturgists; they shut their eyes to its metaphysical not to speak of its mystical significance.

The enumeration of the different Bhavas (emotions) and the basing of different Rasas (sentiments) on them is a great achievement of ancient writers. Rasa has rhetorical, psychological and metaphysical or mystical aspects. The Rasa of poetry and even of spiritual poetry is but a faint echo of Rasa as God. The Bhavas are related to Rasas as function to structure in modern physiology and are as superior to Rasas as Tanmatras to Pancamahabhutas in Samkhya philosophy.

Prof. Ranade examines the question of the number of ultimate Rasas and after criticising the nine-fold scheme of the ancient rhetoricians, puts forth the new nine-fold scheme of Rasas. The greatest defect of the

traditional scheme is its non-recognition of Bhakti as a Rasa. In the cabinet of the Rasas Santa is coopted while Bhakti is rejected, which shows the depth to which human thought could descend. A God-less philosophy and a soul-less psychology are just prototypes of a devotionless rhetorics. Prof. Ranade regarded Bhakti not only as a Rasa in its own right but also as the king of all Rasas (Murdhanyarasa). His nine-fold scheme of Rasas is : 1) Sringara 2) Hasya 3) Karuna 4) Vira 5) Raudra-bhayanaka 6) Bibhatsa 7) Adbhuta 8) Santa and 9) Bhakti. All the Rasas are aspects of Bhaktirasa.

Criticism, as we have seen, contains in itself the seed of the constructive aspect. Prof. Ranade's constructive philosophy can be described as rational mysticism which leaves behind both irrationalism (popularly misunderstood as mysticism) and rationalism (which does not recognise a higher faculty than reason) and rises superior to them by saying that the faculty by means of which we can enter the spiritual life is intuition. Instinct is direct but exclusive of reason; intellect is rational but indirect; whereas it is intuition which is both direct and inclusive of reason. We may next turn to the constructive aspects of his philosophy.

Chapter III

The Constructive Elements In Prof. Ranade's Epistemology and Metaphysics

Attainment of knowledge has been stressed by most of the systems of Indian Philosophy. Generally knowledge is taken as a means for the attainment of the supreme Reality sometimes as the only means and sometimes even an end in itself, knowledge and reality being identical. In this context Jnana or knowledge is taken by Prof. Ranade to mean spiritual illumination rather than philosophical knowledge or intellectual conviction. Though he lays great stress on intuitive realisation of God he does not exalt the intuitional at the expense of the logical. The intuitional is not contradictory of the logical but subsumptive of it. We are not speaking here of the subrelational intuition but rather the superrelational one. This is a direct vision of the truth. It is not a knowledge by description, but a 'completely consummated acquaintance' in James phrase, or 'not spatial juxtaposition' but 'diving deep into the Real Duration' in Bergson's terms. The attainment of this unitive knowledge is a matter of approximation.

After giving a progressive delineation of the six Pramanas from the Carvakas who recognise only one

Pramana, to Kumarila who recognises all the six Pramanas through Vaishesikas recognising two, Samkhyas three, Naiyyayikas four and Prabhakara five, Prof. Ranade reduces all the Pramanas to one, namely, Pratyaksa. Pratyaksa is understood as Atindriya Pratyaksa or Anubhava. He elaborately discusses in his Vedanta¹ the doctrine of the criterion. In Indian Philosophy Pramana does not mean merely a source of knowledge but the criterion of knowledge as well. Thus Pramana combines in itself both the functions, i.e. it gives us the source of knowledge as well as validity of knowledge. "The word Prama is used to designate only a true cognition (Yatharthajnana) as distinct from a false knowledge (Mithya Jnana)... Knowledge strictly speaking, should always stand only for a cognition that is true or uncontradicted. The ordinary division into true and false knowledge is an instance of loose thinking. True knowledge would be a tautology, false knowledge a contradiction."² Prama thus stands only for valid knowledge, and Pramana means a source of valid knowledge. Different systems adopt different Pramanas and criticise the Pramanas which they do not approve of. Prof. Ranade takes a survey of these criticisms and agrees with the view that Pratyaksa in the sense of Aparoksanubhuti is the only Pramana. Even sabda or revelation comes to be included under Pratyaksa for what is accepted as a revelation is after all the result of God-experience. Revelation is "not any external message delivered to man from without,

1. Vedanta, the Culmination of Indian Thought : Pp. 35-41
2. D. M. Datta : Six ways of Knowing: Pp. 19-20.

but a divine afflatus springing from within, the result of inspiration through God-intoxication.”¹ In this connection it must be remembered that the Vedantins have maintained that Apauruseya means inspired by God: Purusa prayatnam vina prakatibhuta.

Pratyaksa according to Prof. Ranade is immediate apprehension of reality. Reality may be ineffable but it is experienceable. This Anubhava is nothing but the beatific vision of God. He makes a significant remark that Anubhava blinks at intuition on the one hand and at beatification on the other. It is intuition which is the source of real mystical experience and real mystical experience confers bliss on the aspirant. Hence intuition and beatification are respectively the genesis and culmination of Anubhava. Further, intuition is a faculty of supersensuous experience which is aroused in us by proper spiritual initiation and practice.²

In addition to being intuitive, such experience exhibits some more characteristics. In ordinary psychology, each sense-organ is unique and opaque to others. There is a principle known as specific energies of sensory nerves. According to this principle every nerve has its own specific function which it discharges. The application of a proper stimulus brings about a specific response. For example, light gives rise to visual sensation. Again on our skin are scattered localised receptors. A sensation of cold is aroused

1. A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy : P.9.

2. Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : Pp. 2-3

only at particular spots which are known as cold receptors. The response is evoked by a cold stimulus. Thus a particular spot exhibits specific energy. This specificity is noticed in a peculiar way when an application of an unusual stimulus evokes the same determined response. The phenomenon of paradoxical cold is an example of this. Von Frey in 1895 found that an application of a hot stimulus to cold spots resulted in a sensation of cold. It means that a particular nerve responds with a predetermined sensation provided the stimulus has sufficient intensity. It is now known that the specific energies are located not in particular nerves but rather in their cerebral connections. So it is not the optic nerve which sees but the visual area in the brain. It is not the auditory nerve which hears but the auditory area in the brain. Leaving aside the controversy whether the function is peripheral or central, we can say that the specificity of nerves has its counterpart in the opacity of sense organs. The eye only sees but does not hear. One sense organ does not communicate with the other. But in super sensuous experience there is inter communicativeness. The eye is able not only to see but also to hear, smell and so on. So with other senses. It means that any sense organ does the work of any other sense organ. This is suggested by Purandaradasa. This can be explained only when we cease to talk about perception and talk about apperception. Perception is a function of sense organs, apperception is the function of the brain. Perception is peripheral, apperception is central. This is the physiological expression of the synthetic unity of apperception. It may be called the brain or the mind

or the self, says Prof. Ranade. Whatever the name, such a synthesising principle is necessary.¹ Kant has used the term synthetic unity of apperception and it means self. So it is not the eye which sees but the self. It is not the ear which hears but the self. There is an inter-communicativeness in supersensuous functions which is denied in the sensuous sphere.² This experience is centrally initiated and not peripherally initiated. The experience is not caused by external objects but originates from inside.

Over and above intuition, supersensuousness and central initiation, mystical experience shows other psychological characteristics, namely, continuity and growth. If there is no continuity in the experiences, if you get them only by fits and starts, if they do not grow, they cannot be said to be mystical experiences at all, Prof. Ranade emphatically asserts.³ These are some of the marks by which mystical experiences are known. These can be said to be the epistemological features of the mystical experience.

In epistemology philosophers have suggested different criteria to test the validity of any piece of experience. A criterion must be self-evident and comprehensive. It must be both necessary and sufficient i. e. without it truth would not be known and with it truth would not be missed. It is evident that there can be only one such criterion. What does

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P.225

2. Ibid : P. 373

3. Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : See P. 3

such a criterion do ? It certifies an experience to be valid after ascertaining that it fulfils certain conditions which it is expected to fulfil. Thus it is contended that any thing to be real must be necessary, objective and universal. Further, the condition demanded by the realist is that there must be correspondence between internal perception and external reference, by the pragmatist that the thing should confer on you satisfaction and by the idealist that the thing be coherent. We need not go into the details of these epistemological tools but say that no one criterion is found to be above censure by the metaphysicians. Briefly, the very ascertainment of correspondence is an impossibility because ascertainment involves either a circular argument or an infinite regress, hence the realist's criterion is rejected. As there is no standard unit of happiness agreed on all hands, the pragmatist's criterion goes the same way; for theories from homomensura to theo-mensura prescribe their own units. Now a perfectly concocted falsehood appears as coherent or sometimes even more coherent than a real story (as is evidenced not infrequently in law-courts) and so the idealist's criterion also shares the fate of the other two. Naturally, there is a conflict among the criteria as they are but mouth-pieces of the metaphysical assumptions underlying them. But all of them throw hints as to what is expected of a real experience and so are not entirely useless. Let us see how the mystical experience embodies these elements.

Coming to the element of necessity in the experience, Prof. Ranade tells us that if we follow a definite

path, it will lead to necessary consequences; therefore, if we follow the spiritual path its necessary effect, namely, spiritual experience will be a logical consequence. There is a wonderful similarity in the spiritual experiences of saints. "As the cumulative experience of the mystics of the East and the West would prove, there is a certain amount of universality in their mystical experience. They have the same teaching about the Name of God, the fire of devotion, the nature of Self-realisation and so forth, and it is due only to an over-weening superciliousness that certain people would regard the mystics of one country or religion as different from, or superior to, the mystics of other lands or faiths. If all men are equal before God, and if men have got the same "deiform faculty" which enables them to "see God face to face", then there is no meaning in saying that there is a difference between the quality of the God-realisation of some as apart from the quality of the God-realisation of others."¹

The universality of experience found among mystics makes these experiences objectively valid. Kant has shown that the reality of an experience consists in every one having the same experience. Hence spiritual experiences shared by mystics all over the world, are not subjective illusions but objective truths. By reality of mystical experience is meant that the experiences are the real indications of the fact that the mystic has come into contact with God and that his utterances are authentic expressions of God-expe-

1. *Mysticism in Maharashtra*, Preface: Pp. 24-25.

rience. But does objectivity prove a divine element in an experience or need objectivity itself be backed by divinity to make it a sure test of the reality of experience? Thus we read "We suppose that the objectivity and necessity conferred by mystical experience is of a higher order than that of any other kind of human experience just because it is "deiform". It is this element of divinity in it that makes it so supremely compelling and valid."¹

It seems that objectivity in itself is not the final criterion but objectivity itself is guaranteed by the divine element in the experience that is ultimate. There seems to be some kind of circularity lurking in this argument. The validity of God-experience is proved by objectivity and the latter by the former. This apparent circularity can be disposed of easily as has been done in the history of philosophy. Descartes had argued that clearness and distinctness of ideas is the criterion for God's existence and the criterion is valid because it is guaranteed by the veracity of God. Similarly in Nyaya proof for the existence of God. God exists because the Vedas say so, and the Vedas are true because they are created by God. In both these cases the charge of circularity is refuted by pointing out that in the order of existence, God comes first and in the order of knowledge, the criterion. The criterion does not add to the truth value of any statement for truth is constitutive while the criterion is only epistemic in significance. Truth is truth whether you know it or not, while it is with the help of the

1. Ibid: Preface : P. 25

criterion that you apprehend it, the criterion thus being subordinate. So here also objectivity is an indication of the reality of experience of God but in fact it is God who has given that power to objectivity.

Our experience must be a veritable perception of God. There is a perfect parity between internal and external perception of God. It is only when the experience, viz., seeing the same form of God both inside and outside is attained that the mind can be said to have realised the spiritual existence of God. This is the element of correspondence in mystical experience. Prof. Ranade further explains: "If there is internal perception to which nothing external corresponds, it may be a case of imagination, hallucination or illusion. If, on the other hand, there is something external to which nothing internal corresponds, then it cannot be evidently a case of supersensuous experience and may be ultimately unreal."¹ Obviously such a kind of experience is just ordinary perception. And again: Whatever we spiritually visualise, is ourselves. Mystical law states that whatever a mystic perceives at any time corresponds exactly to the stage of development of his own spiritual temper and capacity. His spiritual status is measured by what he is able to see. For he sees what he is.² Or again whatever a devotee mystically experiences, is always an index of his own spiritual achievement."³ We are also told that expe-

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp. 141-142.

2. Ibid: P. 246

3. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation: P. 70

rience of colours is dependent on emotions as different colours correspond to different emotions. When emotions are lifted high due to devotional songs we experience different colours accordingly. Thus far the element of correspondence.

As the mystical experience confers on the mystic happiness par excellence, the pragmatic criterion of satisfaction as well finds a place in mystical experience. This happiness is not sensual pleasure. Controversies had been raging among the moralists as to whether pleasures admit of any qualitative difference among themselves. The hedonistic calculus takes a quantitative view of pleasures in as much as it aims at the greatest amount of pleasure recognising no difference of quality between a pleasure and a pleasure. But Prof. Ranade is emphatic that the difference of kind must be accepted and going beyond Mill he says that as even dissatisfiedness of Socrates is superior to satisfaction of a fool, so too dissatisfiedness of a mystic is superior to the satisfaction of a Socrates. There is a graded order. Above the sensual pleasure stands the intellectual happiness and above this intellectual happiness is the bliss of a saint. The element of bliss offers much more than what is required to satisfy the pragmatic criterion.

Now coherence will reject whatever is self-contradictory or inconsistent. It will not pronounce as valid an experience which is fragmentary, or disjointed or made up of conflicting elements or is torn from inside. The mystical experience includes an element of coherence as it demands that whatever is experienced forms

a systematic whole. This system is characteristic of mystical experience for the whole of reality is looked upon as neatly arranged along a central principle or a central thread, namely, God. God is the Sutra in which are threaded small and great things in the universe thus introducing harmony in variety. God is the *vinculum substantiale* joining every thing to every other thing. It is the indwelling and enlivening principle, the *Natura Naturans*. In other words the mystical experience is a vision that "the macrocosm is fully present in the microcosm. The microcosm...fully reveals the presence and the power of God."¹ The immanence of God in the universe again makes the experience a coherent whole. A mystic sees God everywhere and nothing but God anywhere. He "sees God in all beings and on all beings."² This is how Prof. Ranade has interpreted the term *Samadarsinah* in the *Bhagavad-gita*. Every grain in the universe is a theophany; nothing is to be thrown out for it is God's. Every thing has its appointed place in the scheme of the universe. It appears bad if it is seen in a wrong place. Thus when dirt is supposed to be matter in the wrong place it expresses the idea that each thing is good if placed properly. Another important aspect of coherence is that a mystic sees God in a symmetrical and harmonious fashion. Prof. Ranade further tells us that "proportion, symmetry and harmony are the essential features of the form and experience of God."³

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature: P. 241

2. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

Pp. 268-269.

3. Ibid: P. 269.

The same idea is reiterated when we are told that "it is possible only for the most advanced mystics to have the vision of both the feet of God or Guru evenly placed, presented to them."¹ It is clear that only at a very high stage one can experience the harmony and the symphony in the universe.

Another question is whether the coherent experience like that of every thing arranged round a thread is known by a mystic where he himself is included. To be a part of the system and to know it are two different things. One is ontological and the other is epistemological. Now the mystical experience of a finite being remains inadequate and fragmentary and to that extent lacks coherence. It is altogether different in the case of the infinite Being or God. God not merely runs through the universe as the cohering principle but knows it to be so; for self-consciousness constitutes His very being. If he *is* the central thread he *knows* that he is so. He does not harmonise things only to stand outside and face the harmony as the 'other'. His standing outside will create a gap. In his case being and knowing is the same. He as if knows the coherence from within. Coherence in his case rises to the highest level, that of transparent coherence. Everything is consistently harmonised, God included; and it is known to be so by Him. Human experience is more or less coherent showing various degrees of incoherence (not degrees of coherence, for coherence is one and has no degrees). And epistemologically speaking we have to approximate to the perfect coherence.

1. Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : P. 170.

It would not be possible to know the self in the technical meaning of the word knowledge. Still God and self are not only objects of faith but they are objects of mystical realisation. The Atman is unknowable in its essential nature. How could the eternal knower be known? How can the eternal subject of knowledge be an object of knowledge to another beside him? Another question is : granted that the self is the eternal knower of object, granted also that there is no other knower of him, would it be possible for the knower to know himself? The answer is : it is possible for the knower to know himself. "The self is endowed with the supreme power of dichotomising himself...into the knower and the known."¹ In fact self-knowledge or self-consciousness is not only possible but alone real. Self-consciousness to the Upanisadic philosophers is the eternal verity. God to them is not God unless he is identical with self-consciousness. Existence is not existence if it does not mean self-consciousness. Reality is not reality if it does not express throughout its structure the marks of pure self-consciousness. Self-consciousness thus constitutes the ultimate category of existence. But it must be remembered that this is not ordinary human consciousness. Prof. Ranade remarks that human self-consciousness is given much importance by Western idealistic philosophers. 'Priority of cognitive consciousness is the Cardinal principle of Idealism' says one writer while taking a survey of different philosophical schools.² Here consciousness constitutes

1. A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy : P. 274.

2. See : R. B. Perry : Present Philosophical Tendencies : P. 114.

the pivot of all existence. This priority is logical and not chronological and thus consciousness finds a place of honour in the philosophy of idealists. The very existence of the outer world depends on the knowing mind according to them. In other words, reality becomes anthropocentric and if there is no consciousness the world itself will melt away. According to Prof. Ranade, in the place of human self-consciousness, Divine self-consciousness must be substituted. "Aristotle was thus able to describe the nature of God as Thought of Thought and to characterise that state as Theoria. Divine Self-consciousness alone would thus constitute the foundation and peak of all Thought and Existence."¹ If, the highest reality is of the nature of thought, there remains practically no difference between Epistemology and Metaphysics.

Very often we meet with agnostic tendencies in Prof. Ranade's writings. While discussing the apparent disobedience shown to his father by Prahlada he writes : it might rhyme with the will of God to punish the wicked but the principle of morality, i.e. obedience to the father, is here set at naught. God could afford not to obey the dictates of morality, because he is probably a supermoral being. In any case, this involves a certain incalculability in the achievement of a particular end.² Or again ' Resignation or submission to the will of God would be a more potent instrument of achieving the end than either belief in an unseen power or a philosophic reconciliation with the

1. The Bhagavad gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation : P. 192

2. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 37.

world-order'.¹ He has also enumerated helplessness in life's calamities which will instil in the mind of man the conception of power altogether beyond the range of his own impotent reflection. "This inscrutability", he tells us, "might take any of the following four forms. Either, it might concern itself with the indeterminateness of the power as such, and its consequent unpredictability and incalculability. This would be a reasonably scientific attitude. But it may also assume the metaphysical shape of a belief in fatalism, and may result in an unpurposive view of the universe. A third alteranative might take the shape of a belief in a world-order or what the Stoics call 'Nature' and may result in some such utterance as "All that is good to Thee, Oh Nature, is also good to me." A fourth might be a man's modest attitude—that of resignation or humility or submission to the will of God."² It is not possible to understand fully, he tells us, the architectonic skill of the Creator. What is granted to man is only partial knowledge; it is God who can be non-agnostic for He alone can be said to possess all-comprehensive knowledge, his own knowledge included.

We now pass on to Prof. Ranade's views regarding metaphysical problems. As with the Pramanas, so with the categories, he reduces all categories like Dravya, Guna, Karma, Samanya, Visesa, Samavaya and Abhava to one category, namely, Dravya.³ But

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp 40-41.

2. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp. 35-36

3. Vedanta, The Culmination of Indian Thought : Pp. 21-26.

there cannot be many substances if by substance we mean a self-existing entity. By substance Prof. Ranade understands the spiritual reality or the Atman as the Vedanta takes it. Thus substance is the only category and spirit is the only substance. This conception of reality, by the way, solves the problem of psychophysics, says Prof. Ranade. As long as mind and body are regarded as two the problem remains verily insoluble. Let the body be mentally reconstructed – which follows from our conception that spirit is the only reality – there remains no disparity between the stimulus and the sensation. In fact the school of functionalism in psychology has treated the mind-body distinction as a methodological device and not as an existential one.¹ Ultimate reality is spiritual in nature and this can be termed God or Brahman or Atman.

He points out that recent discoveries in modern physics, biology or neurology all tend to prove that spirit is the only reality. He agrees with James Jeans that nature is nothing more than waves of our knowledge. This is idealism taken in the epistemological sense. There is one continuous stream of life or spirit which runs through the whole of nature. This is spiritualism taken in the metaphysical sense. His interpretation of philosophy is thus in terms of spiritualistic idealism. Incidentally it may be noted that the beginning of Prof. Ranade's philosophy was spiritual monadism. He had started with a pluralistic conception of spiritual Reality.²

1. See: E. Heidebreder : *Seven Psychologies* : Pp. 217–218

2. See Radhakrishnan & Muirhead (Ed.) : *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* P. : 540

Prof. Ranade then discusses the criterion of the reality of God. Logic or reason cannot give us the true nature of God. Hence scriptures must be taken resort to for the knowledge of God. But he would not agree in placing scriptures above God. The authority of intuition must be regarded as higher than the scriptural authority. This intuition is the result of intense meditation on God. In Prof. Ranade's own words : we thus see a ladder of threefold criteria of reason, revelation and intuition in an ascending order of value. The real criterion is Anubhuti or intuitive experience in the state of Samradhana or worshipful meditation with Yaugika Pratyaksa and Anumana resulting therefrom as subservient to intuitive perception.¹

The arguments for the existence of God are all invalid; it is one's own spiritual experience which provides a justification for the belief in God. The intellectual arguments which have tried to prove God are not proofs. The alleged proofs for the existence of God, as Kant said, are really sophistry and illusion. God is not a matter of proof but experience. The arguments have been put forth by philosophers time without number but are refuted everytime. What remains is the inner conviction which lends support to the so called proofs. "Thus from the point of view of religious experience, we may say indifferently either that the ontological proof is a clumsy discursive way of conveying a certainty which is really immediate or

2. See Vedanta: The Culmination of Indian Thought : P. 73

that the minor premiss of that proof carries in itself the whole conclusion. If God is supreme in our experience, then for our experience, He is and there is no more to be said.”¹

Atman or God is both the ontological substratum of all existence as well as the epistemological nucleus of all knowledge. Presence, power and lustre constitute the essence of God's being. He is capable of housing in himself contradictory attributes because he surpasses them all. Nicolas of Cusa speaks of God in the same terms when he describes God as the greatest of all things as well as the smallest of all things. In him meet the contradictory attributes according to the principle of ‘*coincidentia oppositorum*’. Naturally it would be more appropriate to characterise the ultimate reality in negative terms rather than positive terms. As described by Jñaneswara “Thought along with its determinative quality disappears, and thus proclaims the glory of Brahman”.² The ultimate principle, namely, the Atman is declared to be beyond being and not-being; beyond the reach of egoism, beyond the senses, mind and understanding; baffling all description by means of words; and transcending all perceptual and conceptual knowledge. Further, “Brahman is beyond all relative conceptions, such as existence, intelligence, and happiness; as also beyond the opposites of these that are implied in them. It is neither existence, nor non-existence, for it is absolute

1. Boyce Gibson : The Philosophy of Descartes : P. 147

2. Mysticism in Maharashtra : P. 149.

existence; it is neither intelligence nor non-intelligence as it is absolute intelligence; and it is neither happiness nor misery, since it is absolute bliss."¹

The question is whether ultimate reality can be described as formless. The triad is form, formless and transcending form. The characterisation of God as Saguna corresponds to the first, Nirguna to the second and Gunatita to the third which transcends both form and formlessness. The ultimate reality can be characterised as Gunatita instead of Nirguna. God is neither personal nor impersonal but transpersonal. While discussing the same problem with reference to the Vedanta Sutas, Prof. Ranade remarks that if the two characteristics, personal and impersonal are taken, there will be four categories instead of three. They will be (i) God is personal, (ii) God is both personal and impersonal, (iii) God is impersonal and (iv) God is neither personal nor impersonal. Madhva holds that God is personal; Ramanuja and Vallabha say that He is both personal and impersonal; while Samkara would maintain that God is impersonal. Prof. Ranade points out that Badarayana holds the fourth view, for God is designated as Atat (III.2.12), neither this nor that. He agrees with Badarayana in holding the transpersonalistic view because the expression Arupa in the Sutra III.2.14 might also mean Atirupa or transcendent form or ineffable lustre.² The category of personality is thus inapplicable to God. The seer can only maintain an epoche about God.

1. Ibid: Pp. 147-148.

2. See Vedanta, The Culmination of Indian Thought : P. 75.

He can enjoy Him in silence without characterising Him by words.

God is the protecting centre of the universe, says Prof. Ranade, the great centrifugal and centripetal reality which sends out and draws in all the existence in the world according to its laws. God is immanent in the universe and every particle is the centre of the universe. The things may perish but the centre remains. We are familiar with the view that God is the Sutra round which the pearls of existence are woven. But the poet saint, Raidas, inverts the relation by calling God the pearl and himself the thread. Prof. Ranade terms this relation inverted immanence. Raidas meant: God is valuable as a pearl while he himself valueless like a thread. But Prof. Ranade finds a Vyanjana in Raidas's argument: pearl becomes valueless unless a thread is woven through it; likewise unless Raidas is there as a Bhakta.... God will have no value.¹

Prof. Ranade has extensively discussed the doctrine of Sabda in his writings. The name of God or Sabda is a symbol of ultimate reality. It stands for God and leads you to God. It is the logos which is intermediate between man and God. It is the illuminator (Prabodhaka), the witness (Susakhi) and interpreter (Dubhakhi) between the Saguna and the Nirguna. In fact Sabda may even be taken to be the ultimate Reality, the noumenon itself. Sabda or the word is the highest reality both epistemologically and

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp. 116-117.

metaphysically. It is truth and reality in one. It ramifies itself into different existences. Philosophically, Sabda is self-immanent and Prof. Ranade compares it with Spinoza's substance which exists in itself and is conceived through itself. It is *causa sui* and is both the material and instrumental cause of itself. Further it is its own criterion. It is credited with the arachnomorphic function of sending forth the universe and re-absorbing it in itself.

As to the problem of world, there has been a lot of discussion about the purpose of God in creating the world. If it is pointed out that God creates the world in sport (Lila), the questions still remain whether this Lila is purposive or purposeless, or again whether it implies personality or impersonality on the part of God. Prof. Ranade remarks in this connection that to sit in judgement on the motives of God is a difficult matter but to sit in judgement on the motives of saints may not be impracticable. When saints speak about spiritual sport, it means blissful activity. As to the presence or absence of purpose in God's creation it is better to hold one's peace.

As regards creation, Prof. Ranade also examines three other theories viz. 1) Is the world an evolute of God? 2) Is there an identity-in-difference between world and God and 3) Is the world an emanation of God? He says that these three theories are Purvapaksas. His own answer is that creation is mysterious. This doctrine which he terms Vicitravada constitutes the Uttarapaksa. The ways of God in creating the world are mysterious. The world is a mysterious mode of God.

As in the matter of creation, so in the matter of incarnation (Avatara), Prof. Ranade puts forward Vicitravada. As we cannot explain God's purpose in creation, so too we cannot fathom into his motive in incarnation. He may have innumerable reasons for incarnating himself on the earth. But ignorant creatures like us should not venture into trying to unravel the mystery of mysteries.

He stresses the aspect of the element of divinity in all cases of Infinitude as, for example, in the Behad of Kabir, Nirbayalu of Kannada Saints or the Apeiron of Anaximander. He interprets Behad of Kabir as a unitary and divine being or an infinite and incomprehensible beyond in which a saint lives. Similarly he gives a three-fold meaning of the term Nirbayalu. Firstly it may mean spacelessness and secondly the losing of one's individuality in the Absolute. The third and final view which according to Prof. Ranade is the correct one, is that Nirbayalu means foundational reality.¹ Elsewhsre,² while commenting on the nature of the ultimate reality which is termed Vastu and which in Vedantasara is designated as Kalatra-yanapayyatmaiva vastusabdarthah, Prof. Ranade says that reality is infinite in both ways in space as well as in time; it is entirely unique.

While examining Gaudapada's doctrine he is emphatic that inspite of the Absolutism every such doctrine is compelled to admit some reality of the world

1. See Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : P. 18.

2. See Ibid : P. 214.

for the sake of ethical and religious practices. Though in sensuous experience the reality of the world could never be gainsaid it is only in the ecstatic state that the doctrine of appearance would have sufficient vindication. Relativism has no application to divine life while its proper sphere of application is only phenomenal or the empirical sphere. The world is ephemeral. Ephemeral things appear to be real under the guise of Maya. "There is an extraordinary "Moral" meaning in the doctrine of Appearance which critics of that doctrine systematically ignore".¹ He quotes Carlyle who says that creation lies before us like a glorious rainbow but the sun that made it lies behind us, hidden from us. The moral note which we are expected to take is that the rainbow, though an appearance, should remind us of the sun behind it. The sense world or the finite world should not be disposed of for it serves the function of leading us unto the infinite.

Guthrie has brought out this point very well while treating Plato's view. "For Plato it is sense-perception that recalls to us the eternal ideas.... Platonism is undoubtedly a two-world philosophy, and anyone whose thoughts are confined to this world can never hope to understand it. Yet equally it is a closed book to him who is not alive to earthly beauty, which must be to the philosopher as the first rungs of the ladder which will finally take him all the way from bodily beauty to beauty in his ways, from there to the beauty of scholarship, and from there to the wondrous vision of beauty

1. A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy : P. 232.

itself, never changing, nor growing, non-diminishing, nor yet beautiful in one part and not in another, but beauty itself, stripped of all fleshly colour and mortal dross and standing out in the immortal radiance in which beauty and truth become one."¹

Since antiquity philosophers have argued defying all syllogism that the finite implies the infinite. From little that is given, they have asked for more. William James describes this feeling as a common nucleus of all creeds. He speaks of an uneasiness and its solution. The uneasiness is that there is something wrong about us and the solution is that we are saved if we establish connections with higher powers. We become conscious of a 'MORE'. This can save us when everything else goes to pieces in the wreck.² The idea of consciousness of finitude leading to the Infinite is present in other philosophers also. Descartes has argued from this consciousness of finitude to Infinitude. He says that in the *Cogito ergo sum* one is made aware of the self but only as a finite self. This finitude is understood as finitude because one has an innate idea of infinitude. Descartes has not elaborated the point but he has clearly indicated that the finite implies the Infinite. As awareness of our ignorance is an indication of a rise of knowledge and as faint awareness of our dreaming means that we are on the point of waking so consciousness of our limitedness means that our windows are opening to the infinite. There may not be a working

1. W. K. C. Guthrie: *The Greek Philosophers* : Pp. 120-121

2. See *The Varieties of Religious Experience*; Pp. 383-384

of an analytic syllogism in such a process which is merely making explicit whatever is contained implicitly; there may not be going from the universal to the particular; not just subsuming a case under a law. But surely the process by which religious consciousness arrives at the conception of God can be explained as a working of a synthetic syllogism which puts more in the conclusion than in the premisses.¹ Shri Ramakrishna Paramahansa, however, sounds a note of warning that there should not be complacency that all Maya will automatically take us to God. Everything is Maya. But, "some of this Maya helps us towards freedom, the rest only leads us deeper into bondage."

Coming to the problem of self, we notice that some philosophers hold the view that the soul is atomic or infinitesimal, while others contend that it is omnipresent or infinite. Prof. Ranade sets aside the controversy by saying that the question of the size of the soul is off the point because the soul is to be regarded as having no spatial quality at all. He thus gives a *coup de grace* to the opposite theories of infiniteness and infinitesimalness. If the soul is both greater than the great and subtler than the subtle how can it be said to have any spatial quality? In fact it is to deny the spatial nature of the self that it is given the contradictory attributes : Mahato Mahiyan and Anoraniyan. In modern terminology, it is making a vacuous proposition to apply any spatial character to the soul. The proposition 'soul is extended' is neither true nor false

1. See E Caird : The Critical Philosophy of Kant : Vol. II

and thus is not a logical proposition which should admit of being true or false. It is said to be a non-proposition. It must be noted that there is a difference between negation and denial. We do not merely negate the spatial character of the soul but deny that spatiality is applicable to it at all.

Regarding the psychological states through which a man's soul passes, Indian Philosophy talks of the first state as the bodily consciousness or Jagrti, second as the dream-consciousness or Swapna, and the third as the deep sleep-consciousness or Susupti. And beyond all bodily and mental limitations there is a fourth state, namely, pure self-consciousness or Turya. If it is said that there is a state beyond Turya, Prof. Ranade would not agree. He says that further positing of any state—call it either Unmani or Turyatita—is only an unneeded venture in the region of the *ad infinitum*. Further he holds that noumenally the selves are one though there is phenomenal disparity amongst them. To talk of the soul's passing to movable and immovable existences is only a mode of speech. Transmigration from the ultimate standpoint is a mere illusion. If the soul is identical with God and hence all pervasive, from where and to where will it transmigrate ?

While analysing the problem of sinlessness and the vision of God, Prof. Ranade says that the two are interdependent like the obverse and the reverse sides of the same coin, that neither could be achieved without the other. If at all, the two are achieved simultaneously. This simultaneity implies the rela-

tion of reciprocal causality between them. As one becomes more and more sinless one gets more and more of the vision of God; and as one has more and more of the vision of God, one becomes more and more sinless.¹ Another instance of the doctrine of reciprocity of causation is the doctrine of Bandhuta. The doctrine of Bandhuta is to be found in the Brahmanas according to which there exists an occult and subtle bond between a deity and certain things which are technically termed its Bandhus.² Such an inward bond connecting everything with every other thing is an analogon of the doctrine of the reciprocity of causation.

From the intuitional point of view, it is immaterial as to whether the self is knowledge or knower because the spiritual experience transcends the subject and the object as well as the relation between them. The Triputi of God, flavour and saint, Prof. Ranade compares to the Triputi of Jnata, Jneya and Jnana. He further states that ultimately God and Saint would cease to exist and only the flavour or Rasa would remain. Vedantins have said that Jnata and Jneya would vanish and only Jnana would remain as the ultimate category. According to Prof. Ranade these are Triputilayas in mysticism and metaphysics respectively. He goes on to point out that this idea can be traced back to that cryptic utterance from the Upanisads, Raso Vai Sah. The ultimate upshot of flavourism would thus be that flavour alone

1. See Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : Pp 229-230.

2. See : The Creative Period : Pp. 61 ff

would remain, neither he who imparts the flavour nor he who receives it.¹

Prof. Ranade asserts that when you have seen the form of God, you are liberated.² There is no difference between realisation and liberation. The same can be put in another way, namely, a soul whose true nature has manifested itself may be called liberated. Self-realisation alone constitutes the Summum Bonum. What higher ideal than self-knowledge can there be if the self is identical with God or Brahman and if knowing Brahman is being Brahman? We get the same thought in his philosophical interpretation of the different stages of spiritual experience which he arranges in a series of five developing propositions. At the first stage we are exhorted to realise the self as though we are distinct from it. The natural tendency is to identify the self with the body but we are told that there is, other than the body, some entity, namely, soul which must be realised : *Atma va are drastavyah*. Secondly we must experience that it is not the bodily-self but the pure self which constitutes our essential nature: *Atmanam Vijaniyat ayam asmiti purusah*. Thirdly this self must be experienced as identical with the Absolute : *Ayam atma Brahma*. The fourth proposition is arrived at syllogistically from the second and the third, viz., I am the self, and the self is the Absolute. These two premises give us the conclusion that I am the Absolute : *Aham Brahmasmi*. With

1. See : Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp. 226-231.

2. Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : P. 236

the projection of I on thou, which may be termed empathetic identification, the thou is brought into the same ken thus making the thou also identical with the Absolute : Tattvamasi. The fifth stage consists in realising that when the subject i. e. I is the Absolute and the object i. e. thou is also the Absolute, verily everything is the Absolute : Sarvam Khalu idam Brahma.¹

Something more may be said about the fourth stage. Here it is pointed out that the identification of the thou with the Absolute is another aspect of the identification of I with the Absolute. Both are covered in the same stage and it can safely be taken that they stand on the same footing. Together they constitute the fourth stage. This is the philosophical interpretation—the two propositions are equal in status as they imply the same thing. But we find elsewhere a comparison made between these two propositions. I am the Absolute (So'ham) and Thou art that i.e. the Absolute (Tattvamasi).² Here So'ham is rated as higher than Tattvamasi. We are told that Tattvamasi is in the third person and So'ham is in the first person. So'ham brings you directly and personally into relation with Reality while Tattvamasi establishes a connection between 'thou' and the Absolute as if the Aham is only a bystander! This is a realisational point of view. The So'ham is a unitive experience whereas Tattvamasi seems to introduce a third element, namely, thou. The identification of Thou and Brahman

1. Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy : Pp. 276-278

2. See - Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : Pp. 216-217

(Tattvamasi) may be said to be one degree removed from the identification of one self and Brahman (Aham Brahmasmi). The latter presupposes a direct and first hand experience while the former is arrived at by substituting Thou for I and is in a way, an intellectual construction. Of course, the two imply the identity of subject and object; but So'ham hits a mark slightly above Tattvamasi. So'ham therefore stands on a higher level from the point of view of realisation. The same emphasis on self-knowledge is seen in an intenser form in another of Prof. Ranade's statements that the "vision of self is probably higher than the vision of God."¹ Though the statement is guarded, the meaning is clear and it is that when one has the vision of God, God may still be 'the other'; when one has the vision of self, the feeling of identity is completely infiltrated into oneself to the bone-marrow. If knowing Reality is Knowing it from within or extracognitively experiencing it, and if the 'knowledge-object' is to be immersed in 'an inclusive, vital, direct experience,' then knowing reality is being Reality. No wonder if the realisation of the self is said to be supremely important. In metaphysics we have to approximate to this ideal.

So far as the relation between the liberated self and God is concerned three stages are indicated by Prof. Ranade. First the soul's identity with the Saguna Brahman, second the soul as reflecting the Nirguna Brahman and third the eschatological mergence of

1. Ibid : P. 115.

spirit with spirit to which the soul ultimately attains. "We need neither say that the Saint is a physical metamorphosis of God, nor need we say that he fully mirrors the Absolute. On the other hand, it would be perfectly legitimate for us to suppose that when the Saint has passed away, his spirit merges with Absolute spirit. This would be a perfectly scientific conception."¹ Even in the case of a liberated man the limitations of body and mind are always there. So as long as the saint is living we cannot completely identify the saint with God. On the other hand, when the Saint leaves the mortal coil, his spirit merges into the highest spirit. "From that point of view Videhamukti (liberation at death) might be regarded as even a higher conception than Jivan-mukti" (liberation here and now). However it must be remembered that this kind of Videhamukti is not just freeing of the soul from the bondage of the body. The mergence of spirit with spirit can take place only if one is a Jivanmukta already. So what is left to us is only to try to attain to Jivan-mukti leaving to God to decide the time of death or the final emancipation. Prof. Ranade would not agree with the conception of Sarvamukti (liberation of all): It breaks the law of sufficient reason. It is too much to believe that when one saint is born the whole world is saved. In contrast with the conception of Sarvamukti stands the conception of Ekamukti or liberation of one. Prof. Ranade strikes a new note in his doctrine of what he calls Pariwara-mukti.² The Ekamukti and the Sarvamukti are the thesis and the antithesis of which the

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp. 331-332.

2. See Ibid : Pp. 264-265.

Parivaramukti is the synthesis. The spiritual teacher liberates not merely himself but also his associates, Parivara. His associates in Leibnitzian fashion get the benefit of the spiritual vinculum with him.

A question arises: has the liberated soul to reap the fruits of his actions? A distinction is made between Sancita, Kriyamana and Prarabdha Karmas. Sancita is like a granary where all our Karmas are deposited. Out of this some Karmas begin to yield fruit; they are called Prarabdha. The Kriyamana are those which are being performed now. In the case of a released soul, Kriyamana becomes ineffective; Sancita is destroyed as a result of God-vision; and on this there is general agreement. But philosophers differ as regards Prarabdha. Some hold that the fruits thereof will have to be enjoyed even after realisation: Bhogena tu itare Ksapayitva Sampadyate is the verdict of Badarayana (IV.1.19). Others hold that Prarabdha also is destroyed as an effect of realisation. Saint Ekanath as well as the saint of Umadi asserted that the Grace of God destroys even Prarabdha. Both views can be reconciled, holds Prof. Ranade, by saying that Prarabdha is not destroyed along with Sancita but follows its natural course of yielding fruit; but it can be annihilated by God's grace if it pleases Him.¹

The working of the philosophising reason rests on a 'triplicity' inherent in the very nature of reason. Reason, Fichte had taught, is itself simple reality but

1. See: Vedanta, The Culmination of Indian Thought :

at the same time it reflects upon itself as the 'other.' These two acts of reason remaining in itself and beholding itself as an outsider are opposed to each other. But this stage of contradiction is no longer stable, for conflict is broiling inside. A new state emerges where both the former states are subordinated and transmuted. This new state is a combination of the first two. There goes on the process where the first inadequate position inevitably gives rise to an opposite (but an equally inadequate) position and the consequent subsumption of both under a third inclusive one. Thought follows the line of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Such was the dialectic developed by Hegel. Each conception according to him contains potentially the seed of its contradictory. The seed germinates into an antithetical conception and then both of them are taken up and united in a higher synthesis. This synthesis itself serves later on as the thesis and thought spins itself indefinitely in this three-fold fashion. But long before Fichte spoke about the self as rent into seer and seen, and long before Hegel philosophised about this dialectical way of the working of the human reason, Kant had expressed some of his very important ideas in the thesis-antithesis - synthesis-wise form of an antinomy. He spoke of antinomies or the difficulties into which reason falls in the field of rational cosmology—where both sides appear to be logical and correct. How are we to accept both the contradictory sides as correct? It is by means of a synthesis which is formed out of the two. Prof. Ranade finds a similar process in the Bhagavad-gita.

In the constructive part of his treatment of the

philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita, Prof. Ranade mentions five antinomies.¹ These are:

- 1) Is God personal or impersonal ?
- 2) Is God an actor or a spectator ?
- 3) Is God immanent or transcendent ?
- 4) Is the world real or unreal ?
- 5) Is there Videha-mukti or Krama-mukti ?

All the antinomies of Kant belong to the sphere of cosmology. But the antinomies of the Bhagavad-gita which Prof. Ranade discusses belong to the sphere of psychology and theology as well. The first three antinomies are concerned with the sphere of theology, the fourth with that of cosmology and the fifth with that of psychology.

Now the solutions of the antinomies are given in two ways. When two antithetic propositions like A is B and A is not-B are put forward the solution may be given as : A is both B and not-B, where the synthesis includes both the thesis and the anti-thesis. In other words, it says yes-yes or et-et to both thesis and anti-thesis. This solution is given in the case of the third and the fourth antinomies of Kant. On the other hand the synthesis may include neither the thesis nor the antithesis and escape through them. It says no-no or nec-nec to both the thesis and the anti-thesis. This is found in the first and the second antinomies of Kant. Both these types – the ec-ec type and the nec-nec type–

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

are found in the solutions of antinomies in the Bhagavad-gita. Prof. Ranade discusses all these antinomies and states how the thesis, the antithesis and the synthesis are found in the Bhagavad-gita itself.

The first antinomy poses a question as to whether God is personal or impersonal. We find in the Bhagavad-gita a definitely impersonalistic description. The supreme principle is characterised as beginning-less, as neither being nor non-being. The opposite stand has no less evidence to put forward. In fact there is no dearth of theistic presentation of the ultimate reality in the Bhagavad-gita. For example, in verses like XV. 17-18 God is referred to as Purusa; and this gives us a personalistic conception of God. Now the reconciling verses IX.17-18 describe God as the mother and father as also ground (ground as against cause indicates impersonalism) of the universe. The Gita solution found in these verses seems to be of the et-et type because both the personalistic and the impersonalistic characteristics are fused here. But we are told that the reconciliation is found in the concept of superpersonalism. This is a nec-nec type of solution where both the personal and the impersonal aspects are denied. How then are we to understand the reconciliation? Are the personalistic and the impersonalistic views to be reconciled in the concept of personal-impersonal or in that of super-personal? Though in the verses both types of characters are brought together, it really indicates a super-personalistic stage. Because Brahman cannot be described by any quality, pairs of opposites are taken resort to in an attempt to describe

Brahman. Contradictory characteristics are brought together with an express purpose of showing that whatever seems to house contradictions must really be beyond them. The contradictories cancel each other and what remains is the indescribable Brahman. God therefore must be understood not as personal-impersonal but as neither personal nor impersonal, the personal-impersonal stage being only a caravansarai to the latter.¹ God is super-personal or trans-personal because the category of personality is not applicable to him.

The second antinomy concerns itself with the problem whether God is active i.e. Karta or only a spectator or Akarta. In the first place we have a verse that anything is produced as a result of the conglomeration of five causes (XVIII.14). God evidently is not included in these five. How can God be said to be a Karta then? The Karttva or the agency of action does not go to Him. On the other hand, the intention of the verse XVIII.61 seems to attribute Karttva to God on a grand scale for He is here described as dwelling in the hearts of beings and moving the whole existence by His power. Both these contentions find their consummation in emanationism, says Prof. Kanade. The universe emanates from Prakrti but as Prakrti is passive it cannot act without the guidance of an intelligent agent. So in the verse IX.10 we are told that Prakrti gives rise to all beings under the supervision of God. God is both Akarta and Karta. He is Akarta for things are only effluences of Prakrti; he does

1. See Vedanta, The Culmination of Indian Thought : P. 75.

not create them. But some Karttrva surely goes to Him as the first Sphurana comes from Him. So both the thesis and the antithesis are combined in the synthesis in an et-et or inclusive fashion.

The famous Kantian antinomy of freedom and necessity is present here by implication. If God is active, man cannot be free; he is determined. But if God is only a spectator, man can retain his freedom. Kant solves it by taking resort to the doctrine of two truths and says that though we are phenomenally determined we are noumenally free. The Bhagavad-gita has solved this antinomy regarding God's Kartrva by saying that God is to be regarded as Adhyaksa under whose supervision Prakrti acts. The same solution will be applicable to the implied antinomy of freedom or determinism. Man is not given unrestricted freedom. Actions follow from him but this happens under the supervision of God. The same is found in Badarayana in his Vedantasutras. Prof. Ranade rearranges the Adhikaranas in the Vedantasutras to render them internally consistent and to find out what Badarayana has to say on the problem. Thus according to the Sutras: "Man is neither a free agent nor a bare automation in the hands of God but that he is an actor under the supervision of God."¹ God is a "Karmadhyaksa who.... gives them rewards and punishments."²

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Really speaking God's supervision of man's actions as well as His judging of them takes away the

1. Vedanta- The Culmination of Indian Thought : P. 128.

2. Ibid : P. 129.

freedom of man. How can any man afford to be free when a superpower is watching him with a view to administering reward and punishment? Freedom implies to do even bad actions with impunity. Though the Bhagavad-gita and Badarayana thus allow man an iota of freedom, Prof. Ranade's own inclinations are rather towards the doctrine of predetermination. In developing Nurnenism of Rudolph Otto, Prof. Ranade says that according to Otto the God of the Bhagavad-gita is the God of Pre-destination. And then adding his own comments to Dr. Radhakrishnan's statement that God decides the fate of battles, Prof. Ranade says : "Instead of speaking in the present, we might even speak of the plue-present. Instead of saying that God decides the fate of battles, we might even say that God has already decided them. The future has been already fixed by God."¹

Another illustration of the same inclination may be noted. While replying to Deming's charge that Ramadasa seemed to enjoy prosperous circumstances at the close of his life while Jesus bore the cross, Prof. Ranade says that "these are accidental circumstances over which man has no control, and that each was playing out his role where God had chosen to place him."² Again in one of his letters prior to his acceptance of the Vice-Chancellor's post of the Allahabad University he writes : 'I had really no desire to accept this job; but as one must succumb to the wishes of God, I have

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

Pp 160-161

2. Mysticism in Maharashtra : P. 424.

to accept it.... whatever befalls us we must discharge dutifully all the while supposing that whatever we do is contributing to the fulfilment of His purpose.'

The last antinomy belonging to the sphere of theology is whether God is immanent in the universe or whether he is transcendent. Both types of verses are there in the Bhagavad-gita. God remains uncontaminated just as the sun and the sky remain uncontaminated (XIII 32-33). These verses indicate transcendence. On the other hand, the verse VII. 7 shows God to be the very indwelling principle in the whole existence because everything is woven round Him as beads round a thread. Coming to the solution, we find that the expression 'by only an iota of Me, I have filled the whole universe and stand infinitely outside' (X.42) definitely tells us that He is both outside and inside; He is transcendo-immanent. Thus the antinomy of immanence or transcendence is reconciled in all-pervasiveness. Prof. Ranade arrives at the same solution of immanence-transcendence when he interprets Avatara in an ingenious way. God is a transcendent being but descends into the world as an Avatara. This is transcendo-immanence. The solution given is of the et-et type for God is described as transcendo-immanent, both outside and inside. But here is a flash of the nec-nec type solution where it is stated that "neither mere transcendence nor mere immanence is valid,"¹ as found in the 'tricky' expression -

मत्स्थानि सर्वभूतानि न चाहं तेष्ववस्थितः । IX.4

न च मत्स्थानि भूतानि पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् । IX.5

Why are these expressions called tricky? In the first verse (IX.4) it is stated that all beings abide in God and in the very next verse (IX.5) that the beings do not abide in God. Though it is stated that the beings are in God, really speaking, the multiplicity of the quality-ridden world cannot find a place in God as He is beyond multiplicities and qualities.¹ The verse explains the multiplicity as being due to Yogamaisvaram, God's inscrutable power or Maya. To say that God is immanent in the universe or to say that he envelopes the universe and stands outside of it is all ignorance. To speak of the very relation of God to the world – whether it be immanence or transcendence is the result of Avidya or nescience. What relation can that spaceless, timeless, independent Brahman have with the world which has no independent existence? Whatever is, is Brahman and the question of immanence-transcendence is irrelevant. Hence it is better to have a nec-nec type solution of the antinomy i.e., God is neither immanent in the world nor does He transcend it for God is the only Reality and there is nothing aught beside Him.²

The fourth antinomy takes up the subject of the reality or the unreality of the world. Prof. Ranade says that it is this question which has divided thinkers like Madhva and Samkara, the former declaring the world real and the latter, illusory. The unreality of the world is given in the conception of the Asvattha (XV.1). As'vattha means that which does not last till

1. See B. G. Tilak : Gitarahasya : P. 698.

2. See Ibid: Pp. 194-198

tomorrow (na Svo'pi tisthati). This is one side of the antinomy. But we also have verses like VII.4-5 where we find the realistic conception of Prakṛti described as eight-fold. So in the first place the world is called unreal and in the second place reality is ascribed to it. What is the way out? The Bhagavad-gita itself, as in the first three antinomies, comes to our rescue by telling us that things are not lasting and at the same time they are not non-existent. They exist only for a short while i.e. they are ephemeral. Ephemerism is the synthesis which is inclusive of both the opposite stands. It gives *et-et* to both the contending parties. In the Gita idea of Vyaktamadhya, both the reality and the unreality of the world are present. We know neither the beginning nor the end of things but only the middle portion. The beginning is unmanifest (avyakta); the end is equally unmanifest. What is manifest is the middle (Vyaktamadhya). This middle portion has some duration; it is the specious present, it is "no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time".¹ This is the middle portion we experience. The past is a 'no-longer' and so non-existing; the future is 'a not-yet' and so non-existing; the so-called present moment is an evaporating phenomenon; only the specious present of some duration can be experienced. This is the nature of the world. The antinomy can, however, be solved by denying both sides in the Advaitic fashion. The question whether the world is

1. W. James: Principles of Psychology Vol. I P. 609.


real or unreal is irrelevant, an Advaitin would contend, for it does not exist at all.

The fifth antinomy gives the thesis and the antithesis from the field of psychology. The thesis is that Krama-mukti is real, i.e. man is liberated after a successive series of lives. Krama-mukti in the sense of a soul travelling from Moon to Mars and then to Jupiter and so on, remarks Prof. Ranade, is only a postponed or procrastinated liberation and should not concern us. What we consider here is the Krama-mukti as in the verse VI. 45 i.e. mukti is earned after a number of lives. The antithesis is Videha-mukti or Ante-mukti, i.e. man is liberated if he concentrates on God at the time of death which is referred to in the verse VIII.5. The thesis and the antithesis are synthesised in Jivan-mukti, liberation while living and though living. It does not totally deny what the contending parties assert but says et-et to both by accepting part of their contention. According to Krama-mukti death is not important for liberation; we have not to leave the body for that. Only we have to amass merit gradually. For Jivan-mukti also death is irrelevant, because Jivanmukti is not an event but a process of approximation towards the ideal; it is a kind of Krama-mukti! We need not wait for death but can enjoy the presence of God here and now. "To know God, to do His work, to enjoy His presence and to devote oneself to His service are exactly what a Jivan-mukta ought to do and that is the teaching of the Bhagavad-gita."¹ Jivanmukti also accepts the con-

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation : P. 190.

tention of Videhamukti that when we have our mind fully concentrated on God we are liberated. Jivanmukti rejects the reference to death and posits the liberated state in this very life. Thus we are told in the verse II.72 that, that is the divine state free from delusions where one enjoys the bliss of Brahman. It does not matter whether this state is reached during life or at death; time is irrelevant for realisation itself is liberation.

It is no use keeping too much faith in our intellect as it is not able to know the nature of God. It is really audacious on the part of the intellect to fight for a dogmatic assertion about the ultimate reality; for Reality is a great miracle and it is not given to man to know it fully. If anyone knows God, it is He Himself.



Chapter IV

Theonomic Ethics

It is not merely the consciousness of our finitude that leads us Godward. There are other incentives prompting man to spiritual life. We are blind to what is real and mistake the unreal for real. This pursuit of vain things which results in frustration is one such incentive. Further, we see in this world good people suffering and bad people prospering and this imbalance between desert and fruit would be another incentive leading man to God. Again, consciousness of sin, old age and death are too obvious incentives to need any elaboration. These incentives make man look Godward for succour. Then there arises the necessity of moral preparation without which one cannot hope treading the spiritual pathway.

As intellect, will and emotion are inseparable in man, so are the sciences of metaphysics, ethics and reli-

gion. In metaphysics we analyse the nature of reality. This is the intellectual aspect. In ethics, we determine the summum bonum or the supreme good and try to lead a virtuous life in order to achieve the highest goal. This is the volitional aspect. The moral preparation is a necessary condition for the attainment of the spiritual ideal. In religion we experience reality; this is the emotional aspect. As the determination of the highest goal presupposes a rational investigation into the nature of reality (for 'ought' cannot afford to neglect the 'is') ethics depends upon metaphysics. An understanding of reality will be incomplete if no reference is made to the will aspect. Similarly ethics and religion cannot be sundered. Ethics finds its consummation in religion and no religion worth the name can stand without the moral backbone.

According to Aristotle, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom must cooperate to produce excellence. "The function of moral virtue is goodness of aim or rightness of purpose and that of practical wisdom is the correctness of reasoning in finding the means to that purpose. But these elements are not really separate for practical wisdom apart from moral virtue is not practical wisdom at all; it is mere facility of taking steps cleverly : and this power as Plato shows may be mischievous and not an excellence. And moral virtue apart from practical wisdom is not excellence, it is at best a natural virtue, a natural disposition which proper training will develop into an excellence."¹

1. Joachim : The Nicomachean Ethics : P. 218.

A survey of Prof. Ranade's writings reveals the great importance he attaches to moral preparation for mystical life. He insists that moral preparation is absolutely necessary not only for entering into spiritual life but also for developing it and ultimately for making oneself perfect in it. A mystic is necessarily a moral being so much so that a 'moral mystic' is a tautology and an 'immoral mystic' a self-contradiction. With his God-centred philosophy, it is no wonder if Prof. Ranade understands good as that which contributes to the realisation of the infinite, while that which does not so contribute, is evil. He observes in this connection that fine arts are a double-edged sword. They may help the moral and spiritual path as they might also excite sensual passions.¹ For example music may lead you to the experience of the Nadabrahma or degenerate into carnal love. In the same strain he teaches that everything except the pursuit of God is a vanity. The same thing is found in Bacon who had lent support to the doctrine of Pythagoras by saying that in this mortal fair our only profit should be God.

We must direct our mind and our senses to the service of God. They must be made theotropic. It is well-known how our senses are extratropic i.e. their energies are always outgoing. They are open to the external world and are lured by it. To divert them from their natural tendencies and turn them inward requires a stupendous moral and spiritual effort. As we have to control the sense-organs, so we have to control the motor organs and prevent them from

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 51.

going astray. The motor organs would follow the mind and do bad actions. Really speaking the mind is the main culprit in an evil action; the body is just an abettor. Hence if the sense-organs and motor organs but follow the mind, the mind needs much more control than they. The question is: whether even a bad thought makes man bad or whether he becomes bad only when the bad thought is translated into bad action. The Bhagavad-gita says that the mere presence of a bad thought makes a character bad even though the action may not be done. Jesus Christ has said likewise. But Kabir offers some concession by saying that a bad thought need not make a man bad provided his body does not follow mind and commit bad action. If mere good intentions do not make a man good mere bad intentions may not make him bad. We can slightly change a line from Shakespeare and say: 'Thoughts without deeds can never to heaven go.' Mere thoughts do not lead a man either to heaven or to hell, if actions remain undone.

All this may be taken as a solace to one who is troubled by bad thoughts. He need not condemn himself for ever for a mere bad thought and give up improving himself. He should not take an occurrence of a bad thought as an indelible crime and distrust the efficacy of the spiritual path to help him. But one must remember that prevention of bad actions will be all the more difficult if the presence of bad thoughts is excused. Bad actions will be stopped only when bad thoughts are habitually stopped. Further what is to be really feared is not the translation of a bad thought into bad action but the very occurrence of a bad thought.

Unlike political science which asks us to *do* good, morality asks us to *be* good. The Bhagavad-gita is certainly right in this case though Kabir's advice must be taken as a first step towards improvement. Kabir's meaning is: 'do not allow at least your body to commit bad actions.' If you do not allow even bad thoughts, nothing excellent than that; but if that is difficult, at least the body should be controlled. Bad desires which are not fulfilled die their own death. The energy underlying them must be diverted to good actions and that is what spiritual Sadhana does.

It is a psychological truth that there is an energy underlying all emotions. This energy must be channelised and turned towards God. Suppression of emotions does harm to the organism. Let not the emotions, therefore, be suppressed; they should be expressed by 'displacing' their original object or 'sublimating' them as the psychologist puts it. We come across examples of sublimation when we find that when a person cannot relieve the tension by direct satisfaction of the tendency he resorts to expressing that emotion by substituting another object. When a man is deprived of home life, he dedicates himself to an institution. It is thus a redirection of energy into scientific, artistic or socially useful pursuits. We are exhorted to transform all emotions for the sake of God. In a true devotee all natural emotions will undergo divine transformation. This is theotropism. It can be considered from another angle. We come across a description of different plexuses or cakras in Yoga philosophy. That there are plexuses in our body is beyond question. Purify them and make them ready for the reception of God's power,

advises Prof. Ranade. We must awaken ourselves to the consciousness and presence of God and keep ourselves awake in that state. We have to detach ourselves from our individual passions and desires, come out of our narrow caves and behold the sun of reality. In this fashion can we understand Heracleitos' cryptic utterance : 'The sleeping drift each to his different world, but those that are awake have one common world.' By 'sleeping' we mean turning away from God; by waking, awareness of God's presence. Sense-bound people are fully awake to the mundane world while a saint is awake to divinity over which the ignorant man sleeps. We all know that the Bhagavad-gita has expressed this in an apparent paradox (II.69). Any lapse on our part must be corrected by reminding ourselves of God. Surely then, " it is not God who needs awakening, but it is the man who has to awaken himself to God. The Lord is always awake. How would it be possible for a man to awaken Him? Man is to awaken himself to the consciousness and presence of God and keep himself awake in that state. All Prabhatīs and Bhupālīs would therefore seem to be out of place....A famous saint of the South used to say that by Kakadarati, which is only another name of the Prabhati or Bhupali, we ought to understand that we have to drive away the Kak or canker of sleep from our own eyes, and rouse ourselves to the consciousness of God instead of making any attempt to awaken God Himself."¹

God is the source of all virtues; consequently ingodliness is the root of all vice. The importance of

cultivation of virtues and rooting out of vices cannot be overestimated. Virtues like truth, self-control, discrimination, patience, sympathy, benevolence, purity or fearlessness must be practised continuously and step by step till our character is confirmed in virtue. Virtuous behaviour should become a habit. If a thing is done from habit it is done without any conscious effort or without extra energy. Habit determines a great deal of our actions in daily life which it would have taken a long time to perform if thought out afresh day after day. The familiar saying, habit is character is no exaggeration at all. As children, all of us learned the lines :

Sow an act and you reap a habit,
Sow a habit and you reap a character,
Sow a character and you reap a destiny.

A stray act because it takes root in a nutritive environment leads to destiny. Why not try to make each act good so that we reap a good habit? Prof. Bain gives two rules as to how we should formulate a habit. They are: i) We have to start with a firm resolution to do a thing and help that resolution by other considerations. If you decide to meditate one hour daily arrange your time table anew so that lack of time will not be an excuse for you. As it is shameful not to do a thing when you have told others what you would do, a public declaration of your resolve will always help. People will remonstrate, will at least laugh when they see you not doing an act which you had planned and proclaimed. At least to avoid that censure you would be compelled to meditate. There is a saying: so act with

God as if man saw you and so act with man as if God saw you. Do not just make a silent pledge before an image of God which will not come next day to laugh at you; make that resolve as if somebody is standing near you and hearing you. And while behaving with man be honest, for God is a witness to what is going on in your heart though the man can hear only the words coming out of your mouth.

(ii) In no case should you allow an exception to occur to your resolve. A single exception does away with a good deal of construction work, for it pushes you back many a step from the stage at which you had arrived. You may not count the exception saying 'I won't count this one act and shall improve now and not repeat the bad act;' but even that single act is being counted nonetheless. 'Down among a man's nerve cells and fibres the molecules are counting it, registering. and storing it up to be used against him when the next temptation comes.'¹ Our body itself is the real Chitragupta keeping an account of each deed, good or bad, in the form of modifications of the brain cells.² Brain paths are created and these traces make easy a subsequent action, good or bad. And so, 'as we become permanent drunkards by so many separate drinks, so we become saints....by so many separate acts.'²

To these two maxims of Bain, James himself adds two more: 1) Take every opportunity to exercise your resolve. If you decide to give a coin everyday to a

1. W. James : Principles of Psychology : Vol. I P. 127.

2. Ibid : P. 127.

beggar, give it to the first beggar, for another beggar you may not meet at all during the day. Actually doing the thing brings into operation the motor organs also and thus the whole body can be turned into an ally. 2) Fortify the action each day with some extra work. It may not be useful at the time, but if a crisis comes all this stands you in good stead. Little acts of self-denial may make you a hero and you can sacrifice even a great thing without much effort.

Practical suggestions like these are really very useful in actually carrying out a resolution. It may involve a period of suffering in the beginning; but it helps an act to take a very firm rooting in you. Patient practice of a habit sees you reaping a bumper harvest in the long run. We are told that a single moment of sincerity is enough for the attainment of God. But that moment would not come without continual practice. How can you reach the peak of the Everest without being on the top for a long time? Activity should alternate with meditation. We should lead an intensely active life for some time and should immediately engage ourselves in intensive meditation. Ramdas called peoples' minds to the performance of duty while the heart was to be always set on God. Let there be awareness of God even while engaged in other activities. It is only when our efforts are backed by devotion that they are likely to succeed.

Solitude is not meant for inaction; on the contrary it is the nurse of supreme action. We know how Dag Hammarskjöld had kept a room apart in the U. N. building which he named Meditation Room. When—

ever any crisis arose he used to retire to that room to gather strength. Regarding the question as to which is to be pursued, whether secular duty or spiritual duty, Prof. Ranade says that it would not be incompatible to combine the two. His truest advice is a combination of secular and spiritual work. We should utter the name of God with every breath while the hands may be engaged in work. Thus the conflict between a rightful performance of duty and an all-absorbing love of God can be resolved in a synthetic performance of duty in the midst of God-realisation. The sector of duty and the sector of God should not be separate. God-love should pervade the sector of duty. He who sees all beings in Himself and Himself in all beings dislikes none. He loves others as he loves himself because the same divine principle he visualises in others as in himself. We interpret the dictum Love Thy Neighbour not only in its social colouring but in the spiritual sense as well. The saint sees every one as the manifestation of divinity and as such cherishes love and respect for all. What better enunciation of Love Thy Neighbour can we have than the one in the Bhagavad-gita? 'He who loves all as Himself in pleasure and in pain; he is considered, O Arjuna, as the Perfect Yogin' (VI. 32). God-love should be the only link between any two friends or relatives. The carnal love, or physical love or even intellectual love will be displaced by the spiritual love binding every one with every one else. This all-absorbing and all-encompassing love of God which includes love for little things as well is the highest kind of eudaemonism. In this connection, Prof.

Ranade observes that God is a very jealous God, who would not allow any love to be given to any other object besides himself.¹ What is demanded of us is wholehearted surrender to God. Complete surrender is effacement of personality. As long as the trace of individuality remains with all its accompaniments of egoism and the body-mind complex, to talk of complete surrender may be a mockery. Surrender thus philosophically implies identification with God. It is annihilation of individuality alone which will lead to mystical union with God. The way of egoism is not the way of God. God and egoism cannot go together. So Prof. Ranade gives the dictum: Egoism or God, choose.

In the unitive state we are completely free. We extricate ourselves from human bondage which is acting according to passions and desires. When the reign of reason begins we enter the region of human freedom according to Spinoza. With both Spinoza and Kant, the region of reason is the region of morality and which again is the region of freedom. But complete rationality is not given to man who is a mixture of sensibility and reason. That is, he is endowed only with a goodwill. This goodwill has a power to act on right principles but still has a susceptibility of acting according to the dictates of senses. It usually does act in the right way; but we cannot assert that it can never go wrong. The holy will, on the other hand, which is God's will, not only does act

1. Mysticism in Maharashtra: P. 210

on right principles but also is free from the solicitations of the flesh. Here sensibility is completely eliminated. What we have to do is to pass from good will to Holy will, from man's will to God's will, from phenomenal necessity to noumenal freedom. No need to say that we can only approximate to the ideal of Holy will where man's will and God's will become one. All our endeavour is directed to be really free by being in tune with God. This is the consummation of ethics. Here the freedom granted to man in the Gita expression, *Yatheccyasi tatha kuru*, and the surrender of individual will to God expressed in *Karisyevacanam tava*, become one. Freedom is being an instrument of God's will. Or as Otto puts it: it is becoming the pencil of the unearthly writer, the bent bow of the heavenly archer, the tuned lyre of the divine musician.¹ This then is the central point in Theonomic Ethics. Theotropism is inalienable from theonomic morality.

The Science of morality demands that the moral law should be autonomic i. e. it should spring from within. But as the consummation of ethics is in mysticism, the consummation of autonomy is in theonomy. Theonomic ethics means that the law of God is supreme. In obeying the law of God no doubt the moral freedom is set at naught; but this individual freedom is really freedom by sufferance and real freedom is the merging of autonomy in theonomy. We obey the law of God and still are free for we have made the law of God our own law. In theonomic

1. Otto: *The Idea of the Holy*: P 217

ethics we come out of the private worlds which follow as a consequence of Protagoras's theory. His theory is that man is the measure of things i. e. every man is his own standard. . Naturally everyone retires to his own private world where his own law reigns supreme. But in theonomic ethics the barriers between these private worlds melt away and only one common world remains. Here God's law reigns supreme. In a similar strain Bacon had taught that, instead of apprehending things in their relation to and in harmony with ourselves, we should apprehend things in relation to and in harmony with the universe.

God-devotion is the highest virtue man is capable of. Other virtues are subordinate to the supreme virtue of God-devotion and vices derelictions of this central virtue. All virtues to deserve the name must be conducive to this central virtue. Prof. Ranade finds the idea that Bhakti is the highest virtue, powerfully expressed in the twelvth chapter of the Bhagavad-gita. He says: "the moral virtues have been regarded there as exemplifications or specifications or exfoliations of the one central virtue of God-devotion."¹ He takes some of the representative virtues from the Bhagavad-gita and shows how they are all expressions of the central principle of God-devotion. To take a couple of examples: Saucha is purification of the mind. When God fills our mind to the brim where is the place for any other idea, much less a bad idea to enter into our mind

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

and defile it? Thus purity follows from devotion to God. Attachment (Asakti) to God implies detachment (Asakti) from everything except God. With the highest value i.e. the jewel of God-love in our hands, why should we care for lesser values i.e. other things? When the swan reaches the Manasa lake why should it hunt for ponds or tanks?¹ When we are devoted to the omnipotent we have a conviction that we need fear none because God protects us. This is Abhaya which has been included in the characteristics of Prapatti or surrender to God: Raksisyatiti Visvasah (faith that He will protect us). Bhakti or devotion is therefore the central virtue round which all other virtues are woven.

It is commonly supposed that absolutism and devotionalism cannot go together. Advaita bhakti is regarded as a contradiction in terms. But confirmed monists like Madhusudan Saraswati have shown that Advaita bhakti far from being self-contradictory is a truism. We start with Bhakti and end in unitive experience. In the very concept of Advaita-bhakti there is a reconciliation between Absolutism (Advaita) and ethical and spiritual discipline (Bhakti). Moral preparation and one-pointed contemplation or devout meditation are necessary; but the end is Advaita Bhakti which is the "unique power of the soul which unites man with God.... in which the union of man with God fulfills itself." In Advaita, therefore, there is still Bhakti. This is a matter of experience and not of words.

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp. 240-241

Spinoza held that the intellectual love of God was the highest virtue. This intellectual love of God can verily be said to be an analogon of Advaita bhakti. In Spinoza man's love for God is a part of God's love for Himself and is the same as God's love for man. The circle becomes complete when man begins with the love of God and ends with loving man – but he loves man as God and not as man. The implication seems to be that love for man is only a replica of man's love for God for it is through God that man comes to love man. As the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (II.4.2–5) puts it :
 न वा अरे सर्वस्य कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति आत्मनस्तु कामाय सर्वं प्रियं भवति ।
 It is not for the sake of every thing that every thing is dear but for the sake of the Atman. In fact, real Spinozism would not allow the distinction between man and God, for every thing is God. The intellectual love of God begins and ends with God. As Ramadas, the great Maharashtra saint says: as long as there is duality there is not true Bhakti. Only when there is complete elimination of egohood, true Bhakti or Parabhakti is generated leading to at-one-ment with God.

Another aspect of theonomic ethics is that God has to enkindle the spark of devotion in us. Can we ever hope even to be devotees without His Grace? We are told that God gives a particular bent to our intellect and volition, a stimulus and a direction in which we might work. This is what is meant by Buddhiyoga.¹ God should hold our hand and help us to take even the first step on the road to devotion. He Himself must awaken us from the dogmatic slumber. It is not ex-

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation : P. 255

licable how a man left to himself would conceive an ideal and try to achieve it if, like a Leibnitzean monad, he is not open to influences from outside. As a matter of fact man does try to make himself more perfect. What is this bettering due to? "It is actually intelligible only because the human "monad," in spite of Leibnitz's denials, *has* "windows," and windows which are open to the Infinite. To be quite plain, in all moral advance the *ultimate* "efficient cause" must be the real eternal source of both becoming and value. The initiative in the process of "assimilation to God" must come from the side of the eternal; it must be God who first comes to meet us, and who, all through the moral life itself, "works in us," in a sense which is more than metaphorical. Our moral endeavours must be genuinely ours, but they must be responses to intimate actual contacts in which a real God moves outward to meet His creatures, and by the contact at once sustains and inspires the appropriate response on the creature's part."¹

Similar is the teaching of Jñaneswara who says that even for the generation of spiritual impulse in Arjuna, God was responsible. The same initiative of the Eternal is evident here. "Many times before did the sages tell me of Thee, O God; but the reality of their words I now realise, because, I have been the object of Thy grace. The sage Narada used to come to me very often, and sing Thy glory in these words. But I could not catch the meaning of the words, and listened merely to the song.... But now that the Sun of

your words has arisen, the paths which the former sage had told me of have come to be seen.”¹

Prof. Ranade refers to the two theories of classical vedantic scholarship, viz., Jnana-karma-samuchaya, which means both knowledge and action are necessary for liberation, and Jnanottara-karma, i.e. whether any duty remains even after the realisation of the self. He points out that both these controversies can be resolved by pointing out that Jnana is not an event but a process. The proper meaning of Jnana is illumination and not merely knowledge. Now illumination never comes finally and fully. We always keep making an asymptotic approach to illumination but never actually reach it. The question what action is ordained after attaining to illumination does not arise at all. Similarly as the process of illumination never comes to an end, how can there be a combination of Jnana and Karma? While we are on the way to illumination, we are free to do actions suited to our temperaments.² Each saint has an individuality of his own even in spiritual development.

Prof. Ranade mentions the following characteristics of an ideal sage: 1) Silence or Mauna; this what the Greeks meant by epoche. 2) Humility consists in unawareness of one's own greatness. 3) Equanimity indicates that to a sage all beings are equal, neither high nor low. 4) Absolute self-surrender lies

1. Mysticism in Maharashtra : Pp. 112-113

2. See : The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

in dedicating every thing we have to God. Not only the worldly attainments but even our feelings and emotions should be handed over to God. 5) It is the duty of the ideal sage not to keep his spiritual achievement only for himself but to utilise it for the upliftment of humanity. A saint who has realised God cannot remain to himself. He must come into contact with souls similar to himself. Communion of saints is not only an ideal but a veritable reality. A real welfare state is the company of the saints. A saint belongs to the city of the spiritual world. He would not be satisfied with a mere cosmopolis; but must be a member of the Theopolis.¹ Here God is the supreme ruler and all human-beings bound together by the spiritual tie become equal and aspiring denizens whose only vocation is to fill the world with praise and glory of God. The ruling principle of their psychology is theotropism; of their ethics, theonomy; of their politics, theopolity.

Prof. Ranade discusses the Categorical Imperative, Moralism, Supermoralism and Beatificism as moral ideals and reconciles them from the realisational point of view. He notices not only the procedural similarity but the similarity of content as well between the general formulation of the Categorical Imperative and its three specifications in Kant and the treatment of the subject in the Bhagavad-gita. The general formulation of the categorical imperative in the Gita is: You ought to do a thing because it is your duty to do so. Then there are three specifications of it: 1)

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 57

This duty is to be performed leaving away all attachment and desire for the fruit. This rule is applicable not merely to ordinary actions but even to holy actions. 2) The second specification is that we ought to do our duty skilfully and in a spirit of equanimity. 3) The third specification is the concept of Yajna or sacrifice. Yajna has got both a social and a spiritual value. Whenever we are doing our actions in a spirit of sacrifice we are freed from their contamination.

The duality between good and evil occupies a central place in ethics. Supermoralism is going beyond this duality. It is a result of devotion and God-realisation and cannot be achieved only by the ethical and intellectual efforts. Prof. Ranade has considered supermoralism from the point of view of Naiskarmyasiddhi and Nistraigunya. Naiskarmyasiddhi means rising superior to Karmas and Dharmas. It also means doing action with a spirit of detachment. The literal meaning of Nistraigunya is rising beyond the triplets of Gunas. To achieve this state there are two ways: 1) Continuing to stay in the purified Sattva state (Nityasattvastha) and then destroying Sattva by Sattva itself or rising superior to it. 2) Another way to reach Nistraigunya is Avyabhicarini Bhakti i.e. pursuing the path of one-pointed and unswerving devotion to God.

The highest moral ideal attainable by man is that of Sthitaprajna or equanimous man. In the Gita doctrine of Sthitaprajna we have a peculiar compound of all the three shades of the ethical theory....moralism, supermoralism and beatificism. Still beatificism is

the main characteristic of a Sthitaprajna. It is because of beatificism that the Sthitaprajna loses the attachment to body and goes beyond duality.

But the distinctive contribution of Prof. Ranade to metaphysico-ethical thought is his doctrine of Beatificism. In fact this doctrine pertains to mystical experiences and has metaphysical and ethical implications. It is important to remember that the subtitle of his proposed book, 'The Pathway to God' was to be 'The Philosophy of Beatificism.' He has considered the idealistic conception of self-consciousness being the central point of existence and has shown that not human self-consciousness but divine self-consciousness should be the basic reality. Now he goes a step further and says that this central reality is not merely consciousness but bliss as well. The axiological conception of bliss and the metaphysical conception of Brahman are the same. The identification of bliss with reality is beatificism. Instead of self-consciousness being the centre of reality, bliss becomes the centre. Instead of idealism, we have beatificism.¹ Prof. Ranade arrives at this conception from another venue. While analysing the ethical thought in the Bhagavad-gita he says that though here the doctrine of Ananda or Beatificism has not reached the high analytic level as in the Upanisads, we get an account of Bliss which is the chief element in Beatificism. Beatificism here involves three elements: 1) The first element is touching God or coming into direct communion with him—Brahmasamsparśa as in

1. See: The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

the verse VI.28. 2) Secondly we get an account where there is identification of saint with Brahman. The saint enjoys the highest bliss and becomes Brahman, he attains to Nirvana. This is described in the verse V.24. 3) Thirdly this blissful state itself is said to be Brahman. Prof. Ranade comments that the expression Brahmabhuta in the verse can be taken either with Yogi (ब्रह्मभूतं योगिनं) or with Sukha (ब्रह्मभूतं सुखं) by a sort of देहलीदीप न्याय ¹ In the first alternative, we have the description of a Yogi who is identified with Brahman and who enjoys the bliss of Brahman. This is Absolutistic identification. But in the second alternative are the seeds of Beatificism. There we are told that the bliss which comes to be identified with Brahman is enjoyed by the Yogi. This is 'Brahmananda or Atmaprasadaja Sukha or Atmananda.'² Bliss itself which is enjoyed by the Yogi is Brahman and this identification of Bliss or Ananda with Brahman is Beatificism. Why confine our attention to only Cit, as it is done in idealism; why not bring Ananda into the focus?

The doctrine of Beatificism, though in an undeveloped state, is to be found in the Taittiriya Upanisad where Bhrgu is bringing to his father, Varuna, the knowledge about the source of reality.³ The last answer of Bhrgu, before the Upanisad breaks off, is that the intuitive bliss or beatific consciousness is

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation : P. 224

2. B. G. Tilak : Gitarahasya: P. 683

3. See : A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy :

the course of reality. In this Bhargavi-Varuni-Vidya we have traces of the doctrine of beatificism. They are found again in the Brahmanandavalli of the same Taittiriya Upanisad where we get a scale by which spiritual happiness is sought to be measured in terms of physical happiness. The unit of measurement is the bliss of a completely accomplished human being. A hundred-fold of this happiness gives us the next in the series and these hundredfolds piled upon hundredfolds ultimately give us the bliss of Brahman. This beatific calculus brings us in the end to the bliss of Brahman which obviously is the highest reality.¹ From this calculus we need not conclude, remarks Prof. Ranade, that spiritual happiness is really measurable in terms of physical happiness though the trend of the Upanisad suggests that. Howsoever enormous may be the amount of bliss of Brahman, when several hundredfolds come in the calculus, still the basic unit remains the physical happiness in that Upanisad. Perhaps scientific discoveries may come to the help of the Upanisad by saying that there is no contradiction in stating that the difference in quantity results in difference in quality. To take an example: we know that when we take a number of colours they differ in many ways. An important qualitative dimension of the colour manifold is the 'hue' or that character by which we distinguish one colour from the other, for example, red from blue. From Newton's experiment of the prism we learn that the hue i.e. the qualitative difference, mainly though

1 See : A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy :

not solely, depends on the wave length which is the quantitative difference. Other factors like brilliance also have some contributory effect. Thus at the wave length 660 millimicrons we get red, or at 485 millimicrons we get blue and so on. We do not know whether some such thing happens in the case of happiness by which physical happiness is transformed into the bliss of Brahman! Anyway, Prof. Ranade is emphatic that no such measurement is possible. We also read in Otto: Joy in the beautiful, however analogous to mere pleasure in the agreeable, is yet distinguishable from it by a plain difference in quality, and cannot be derived from anything other than itself.¹

Prof. Ranade further refers to the doctrine of the Bhuman in the Brahmasutras. Badarayana says that Brahman may be called Bhuman or infinite bliss. The doctrine of Bhuman has metaphysical, ethical and mystical elements; for greatness, beatification and realisation together make the conception of Bhuman. "Bhuman is a metaphysical entity, realised in a mystical state, put hedonically."² As an ethical conception Bhuman implies great bliss. The Vedanta Sutra 1.3.8 says that Paramatman may be taken to be bliss itself. The Anandamayadhikarana and the Bhumadhikarana in the Vedanta Sutras establish the beatific nature of the Paramatman.

We come across the discussion of beatificism in still another connection.³ The point under consideration is the intellectual beatificism or beatific theoria.

1. R. Otto: *The Idea of the Holy* : P. 138

2. Vedanta: *The Culmination of Indian Thought*: P. 81.

3. See Vedanta: *The Culmination of Indian Thought*: Pp. 174-176

In the Brahmadhikarana of the Vedanta-sutras (IV. 4.5 to IV. 4.7) we get the views of two Pre-Badarayana Vedantins – Jaimini and Audulomi as well as the view of Badarayana himself who reconciles their views. Jaimini says that the released soul enjoys the bliss of Brahman, while according to Audulomi the soul enjoys theoria in as much as he becomes the thought of thoughts. In this case the enjoyment becomes intellectual and not hedonic. Thus Audulomi's view implies idealism while Jaimini's view implies beatificism. But Badarayana reconciles these two (the view of merely enjoying Ananda and the view of enjoying only cit) in the conception of Cidananda or beatific theoria, as Prof. Ranade terms it. Here consciousness and bliss are welded together.

This reconciliation is understood in a slightly different way by Samkara. It is pointed out that the lordly qualities like Ananda and so on belonging to the self as described by Jaimini are to be understood only from a phenomenal point of view, while the real i.e. noumenal nature of the self is intelligence as opined by Audulomi. "Intelligence alone constitutes the nature of the Self, and hence it is proper to conclude that it manifests itself in a nature consisting of that only."¹ The nature of the self according to Samkara thus becomes essentially cit and not Ananda. But why should Samkara say that qualities like Ananda cannot belong to pure Brahman while he can give that concession to Cit? If Ananda has a defect, Cit also has the same defect, points out Prof. Ranade. If it is said that the self exists as consciousness why not add the beatific

1. G. Thibaut : Vedanta-Sutras with the commentary by
Samkaracarya : Vol. II P. 409

quality and say that self exists as Ananda? The compound word Cidananda suggests that Cit and Ananda belong to one and the same level. Samkara's procedure of treating one of them, namely, cit noumenally while demoting Ananda to the phenomenal sphere does not seem to be justified. The real meaning of Badarayana is that intelligence and happiness can well go hand in hand; for they can be reconciled in the concept of intellective beatificism or beatific theoria. The highest state is that of bliss and intelligence together.

Prof. Ranade says that in the Karika III. 47 Gaudapada speaks of Nirvana in a beatific sense where the highest Reality is said to be of the nature of bliss. Here bliss is identified with the Omniscient Brahman in clear terms. But this contradicts a statement made in an earlier Karika. In III.45 we are asked not to partake of bliss. Prof. Ranade, therefore, remarks that in Gaudapada there is some prevarication about bliss. Samkara comes to Gaudapada's rescue when in his commentary on these Karikas he says that in Karika 45 the happiness referred to is relative. The happiness arising out of Samadhi is a result of ignorance and so one must be unattached to it.

The element of beatification is also present when God is described as Rasa or Bliss. Prof. Ranade has called it flavourism. In the enjoyment of this flavour or bliss neither the one who gives it, nor the one who receives it can remain. Pure bliss is what remains. This can be enjoyed only as a result of self-realisation. So it is in the doctrine of self-realisation that the ethical and the mystical processes meet.

Chapter V

Liberating Influence of Rational Mysticism

Philosophy and religion, says Prof. Ranade, are related to each other as form and matter. While philosophy provides the logical framework for tackling the problem of God, religion gives the material to be enclosed in this framework. In Kantian fashion Prof. Ranade says that philosophy without religion would be empty and religion without philosophy would be blind. The two therefore must be combined. By religion he means, the direct relationship of man and God and not any unsystematised and uncriticised methods of beliefs and practices. The philosophy of religion should be the supremely engrossing object of our study. Elsewhere he says that philosophy is to mysticism what knowledge is to being. A systematic exposition of mysticism in all its aspects, faculty required for mystical experience, criteria to test its

validity, nature and types of mystical experience, its practical aspects, its aim and its effects, in a word, the origin, development and consummation of mystical experience was a subject most dear to Prof. Ranade's heart. "Mysticism denotes that attitude of mind which involves a direct, immediate, first-hand, intuitive apprehension of God."¹ It is a restful and loving contemplation of God, a silent enjoyment of God. According to him the attainment of Godhead is the only aim of man; hence he discussed the way to it in his various writings.

A question is raised as to whether there is any faculty in man by which the realisation of the self is to be attained. It is supposed that for mystical experience no separate faculty is necessary but that intellect, feeling and will might suffice. But this is wrong. A higher faculty is necessary and this higher faculty is intuition. Intuition, far from contradicting intelligence, feeling and will lies at the back of them all.

The only means of realisation is meditation on God's name imparted by the spiritual teacher. Jnana (knowledge), Karma (action), Dhyana (meditation), and Bhakti (devotion) are not independent paths, but when combined, form the grand pathway to God (Pantharaja). We strive after illumination (Jnana), while we are engaged in duty (Karma). We never leave aside meditation (Dhyana) and we carry it on with devotion (Bhakti).

1. Mysticism in Maharashtra: Preface P. 1.

The necessity of a spiritual teacher to guide the aspirant on the spiritual path needs no reiteration. Saints are never tired of singing the glories of the spiritual teacher whose guidance is indispensable both in worldly and spiritual matters. The real spiritual teacher shows God directly to our sight. He teaches the disciple the proper method of spiritual meditation. The teacher who has himself walked on the spiritual path takes the disciple step by step on the journey of spiritual perfection. Prof. Ranade speaks of the metaphysical, moral and mystical functions of the spiritual teacher.¹ Under the metaphysical functions are included the driving away of illusions and establishing unison between the individual soul and the universal soul. This confers beatification on the disciple. Then there is the moral function which is to help the disciple to conquer various passions that are a hindrance to the spiritual progress. Passions are to be overcome by devout meditation on the name of God. The grace of the Guru helps the devotee to remain detached from wealth or egoism. The teacher again wards off the calamities of the aspirant. The mystical function of the teacher consists in imparting a meritorious life on the Sadhaka. The most important thing of course is that the Guru shows the disciple the form of God and fills him with illimitable joy. We are told that the teacher enables the disciple to see God wherever he casts his eyes. Prof. Ranade is emphatic that the teacher who imparts the name to the disciple must be of a higher spiritual level. Only then will the disciple

1. See Pathway to God in Kannada Literature · Pp 75 ff.

be a recipient of spiritual experiences. The teacher who has himself no spiritual worth can never lead a disciple to the spiritual path. Even if the disciple seems to have experiences, there is limit to them.

Meditation on the name of God imparted by the Guru has been insisted on by great saints like Kabir who have attained to a very high spiritual status. Metaphors have been drawn from agriculture, epistemology and other sciences to bring out a distinction between a name with a seed (sabija nama) and a name without a seed (nirbija nama), a name which is viable and one which is non-viable. Sabija nama is the name which fructifies. From the epistemological point of view, the name is laden with meaning. It has got the potentiality of spiritual growth. This potentiality owes its existence to the fact that it has been imparted by a spiritual teacher who has realised God. Such a name replete with spiritual power is given to a disciple by the teacher. The disciple contemplates on the name which enables him to remove the husk of ignorance and behold the grain of Reality. The disciple does not add anything to the name. The power is contained in the name; it is our ignorance that we do not know it. If we consider the two theories of epigenesis and preformation in this respect, we have to conclude that the fructification of the Sabija nama is like preformation and not epigenesis. The hypothesis of epigenesis is convenient to the pluralistic theory. According to it there is emergence of new things in development. There may not be creation of new mass and new energy, they being constant, but there certainly is creation of new values. Further evolution for the pluralist is nothing

if not 'creative synthesis.' There is a beginning of new properties when a thing is organised. These properties were not present when the elements were still unorganised. There may not be emergence of properties without some kind of basis. But a pluralist will not unreservedly accept the *ex nihilo nihil fit* (from nothing, nothing comes) doctrine. What he proposes is the doctrine of *e minimo maximum fit* (from minimum the maximum comes). Thus far epigenesis. But the unfolding of spiritual experiences from a Sabija nama is not of this type. Everything is latent in the Sabija Nama. The disciple has to unroll and see what is contained therein. It is strictly speaking evolution i.e. coming out. Whatever is evolved was already there in the seed. There is no addition of an extraneous element, everything being contained implicitly. Leibnitz and Hegel understood evolution in this sense. Whatever we find is really preformed. Thus did Hegel's Absolute evolve and thus does the exfoliation of the nama take place. Everything is contained there to the last point, completely preformed, completely predetermined. The best example of this can be found in Omar Khayyam whom James Ward quotes:

With earth's first clay they did the last man Knead
And then of the last harvest sowed the seed

On the first morning of creation wrote

What the last dawn of reckoning shall read.¹

The power contained in the Sabija nama comes out as an explosion. Prof. Ranade comments that from the name as ultimate reality springs everything in the

1. See James Ward : The Realm of Ends : Pp. 97 ff.

universe by a kind of Sphota.¹ Such a name is a category by itself, something unique, a real atom-bomb of spiritual experience.

Prof. Ranade's study of the Brahma Sutras enables him to find there three types of meditation, symbolic meditation or Pratikopasana, qualitative meditation or Gunopasana and unitive meditation or Ahamgrahopasana. He says that temperamental differences among individuals cannot be neglected and each one will choose that type of meditation which suits his temperament best. The science of psychology has given us different factors of personality. Along with the structure of his body, i.e. his physique, another factor, which a psychologist is pleased to call chemique has to be taken into consideration. Every one has a different chemical constitution just as every one has a different physical constitution. This chemical aspect of personality is technically called 'temperament' and it is a bygone conclusion in psychology that it has much to do with the determination of a man's personality. This point is referred to by Prof. Ranade in another connection when he says: "Jnaneswara is the type of an intellectual mystic; Namadeva heralds the democratic age; Ekanatha synthesises the claims of worldly and spiritual life; Tukarma's mysticism is most personal; while Ramadasa is the type of an active saint. A man may become a saint, and yet...he may retain his native temperament."²

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 148 ff.

2. Mysticism in Maharashtra; P. 20

Coming to Pratikopasana, we learn that a Pratika is a symbol which represents God. It stands for divinity and thus has its own significance. Avyaktopasana or Nirgunopasana i. e. meditation on the impersonal Reality is very difficult; it is much more so at the initial stage. So some Pratika, some Saguna object or Alambana is felt necessary though it is to be transcended after some progress is made in the process of meditation. So we should not deride Pratikopasana. It has its own function to perform in our life of devotion. But symbolic meditation is not the highest type of meditation. After all a symbol is meant to lead us to the thing symbolised and when we are able to engage ourselves in meditation without an Alambana, we should leave it behind. This weaning away from the symbol must be achieved gradually. Then there is Gunopasana i.e. meditation on the qualities of God. When God is thought of as Saguna or personal, there is a mention of two kinds of qualities, positive and negative. A number of auspicious qualities are ascribed to God and He is said to be bereft of all inauspicious qualities. He is Mangalaguna-nidhana and Apahatapapman. As in the Pratikopasana here also our attention should not be on the attributes as attributes but on the attributes as belonging to the substance, viz., God.

Both these kinds of meditation, Pratikopasana and Gunopasana mark the initial stages in the spiritual career of a man. The rigid insistence on Nirgunopasana may scare him away and so these easy ways may be resorted to. But as progress is made on the spiritual path we should go beyond them and take resort to the

third type of meditation. The third and the most important type of meditation is the unitive meditation or Ahamgrahopasana. This is as difficult as it is important. As compared to Pratikopasana and Gunopasana this is rather abstract. Here we are asked to meditate on self as self. The self is here understood as identical with the highest Reality. The underlying philosophy of such a kind of meditation is therefore Advaitic in nature. It is already pointed out that Prof. Ranade attaches a great deal of significance to the experience of So'ham or the experience of identity. There should not remain any separateness between the self and Reality. The realisation of the identity between them makes us meditate on the self itself for what difference does it make when we meditate on God or on self when both are one? Further, we should not only meditate ourselves but make others meditate in the like fashion. The Upanisadic Mahavakyas or the Gita exhortation to visualise the self by the self all point to Ahamgrahopasana.

In his book on the Bhagavad-gita, Prof. Ranade gives a threefold classification of methods of meditation. The three methods are: the Ideological method, the moral method and the mystical method. In the ideological method we are asked to meditate on the idea of God. This method is said to be suitable to those who are philosophically minded or intellectually inclined. It may be that they are in the habit of contemplating on abstract ideas. Ten different conceptions of God are given on which one can meditate. They include conceptions like Purusottama, Sutra, Rasa or Tajjalan. These various conceptions reveal

the powers of God, his all pervasiveness, or his being the ground of everything. Next comes the moral method. This is said to be suitable to quite another type of people. There are persons who do not believe in God but who believe in ethical values. For them the contents of religion are none other than morality itself. Such people should do well to meditate on virtues themselves. Meditation on virtues consists in trying to inculcate the virtues in ourselves. For example, if we want to imbibe the virtue of fearlessness, we should do at least one fearless act everyday. Like this we should become embodiments of various virtues. But there are persons for whom mere morality does not constitute the highest ideal. For them this moral method is valuable in so far as it prepares the ground of spiritual life. The mystical method is the most important method. This is a method which is suitable not only for philosophers and moralists but also for everyone. It has been practised by all great devotees in the world. Anyone can go by this easy route leading to the Godhead.

Here Prof. Ranade advises the aspirant to make an active search for the Object of his realisation: no inaction would do, no indifference, no mental complacency to allow things to come their own way, and in their own time. Aristotle laid a great stress on practice in the matter of attainment of virtue. And Prof. Ranade laid an equally great stress on practice (Sadhana) in the matter of spiritual realisation. An excellent account of the methodology of meditation which offers practical hints to an aspirant who wants to begin meditation in right earnest is given in his

book on the Bhagavad-gita. These practical suggestions are useful both to the beginners as well as to the advanced Sadhakas. They are discussed as different elements in the mystical method noted above.¹

a) Physiological Element—when one wants to practise meditation, the first question is about the posture. Which Asana (posture) will be conducive to proper meditation? The answer is that there is no one fixed Asana for meditation. Further we have to remember that mere performance of different Asanas will not lead us to God. They give a kind of bodily and mental energy no doubt, but they by themselves are incapable of conferring spiritual experiences on us. Only that Asana is good in which we can perform meditation in a happy mood and for a long time (Sthirasukhamasanam). There are no restrictive rules as to the time and place of meditation. From the Vedanta-sutras also we learn that concentration is the chief thing by whatever way it is achieved. We can meditate at any time, any place and facing any direction. However, it is recommended that the sitting posture is better as other postures may distract the mind more.

Another point in the physiological element is the control of breath or Pranayama. As in the case of Asana mere Pranayama will not lead you to God. It is a help to achieve a certain sort of equilibrium but by itself it does not lead to realisation. There is a suggestion that

1. The Bhagavad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation :

the Prana and the Apana i. e the inhalation and the exhalation should be of equal duration. But important than this is the fact that sometimes the Prana and Apana may both stop whereby a Kevalakumbhaka is produced. This state is useful for concentration though it may not last long ordinarily. We have to make use of the rhythm of inhalation and exhalation by uttering God's name every time. In fact the same is the implication of the expression Ajapajapa. It is counting beads without beads, it is counting beads with breath.

The next thing to be considered is whether we have to meditate with our sight directed only to a certain point. We can understand the term Nasikagra in two ways: it is the tip of the nose or the top of the nose. Either will be useful only if such Nasikagradrsti helps us to withdraw our mind from external objects. It means that just like Asana and Pranayama, Nasikagradrsti also is only an instrument to be used for concentration. In itself it has no sanctity. Our sight, says Prof. Ranade, must be directed to the spiritual object which is most important. All other things should only help us to do so.

(b) Psycho-ethical element: This element is so important that no mystical experience is possible in the absence of it. Three things are to be remembered in this connection. In the first place, the senses must be controlled for they lead us astray. In the second place, lust has to be driven out because, as the Bhagavad-gita says, it is from lust that the way to complete fall of a man begins. The third point to be noted is the importance of concentration. Without concentration one

cannot even start meditation. One has to keep only one idea in the mind by clearing the mind of all the dross which comes to occupy it. Only one idea should be admitted and that idea is of God. But concentration is not an easy thing to attain. Initially when we meditate, thoughts overcrowd the mind and drown the name of God. Imagination runs riot and God's name is lost in the melee. Ramadas advises: "the only way to get rid of imagination is to go beyond imagination.... The relieving feature of imagination is that it can be made to imagine God and when it is led Godward it loses itself in the Unimaginable. When we imagine the Unimaginable, imagination evidently comes to an end."¹ True meditation is a meditation on God; false meditation is a meditation on any other thing except God. A psychological help that is offered in this connection is to draw the mind continuously from the periphery towards the centre until it becomes firmly established in the focus of consciousness. In other words we must attend to the idea of God for attention is 'taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.'² Attention brings a thing into the focus of consciousness pushing all others to the margin. But attention is by no means an easy process. We have to strive hard to bring into bold relief one single idea in sufficient clearness. Out of a crowd of thoughts loitering in the mind all ideas

1. *Mysticism in Maharashtra*: P. 403

2. W. James: *Principles of Psychology*: Vol. I P. 403

except the name of God must be driven out by withdrawing attention from them.

But more than anything else we have to wean the mind from its tendency of taking pleasure in the sense-objects. Even if a man does not indulge in sensual pleasures, the presence of lustful thoughts in the mind is sufficient to outflank the idea of God. Lust is an enemy in disguise and will have its way at the slightest opportunity. Prof. Ranade remarks that this interest or Rasa in the senses will be destroyed only after a vision of God. Again we may talk of reciprocal causality. The vision of God destroys the interest in the sense pleasures, and destruction of sensual pleasures makes the vision of God easy.

(c) Devotional element: Purging the mind of all unwanted things is a negative side while installing God's name in mind is a positive achievement. There should be a craving for God, a ceaseless longing to have a vision of him. Without the Bhava or Bhakti no realisation would be possible. We must have an unquestioning faith in the lord of the universe; that alone will assure us of the progress on the spiritual path. There should be one-pointed devotion. Prof. Ranade is never tired of insisting on the Avyabhi-carini Bhakti or unswerving devotion. This Bhava is said to be an unexplained and inexplicable love of God. We are further told that "the real insistence should be on the utterance by breath—whether by Para, Pasyanti or Madhyama. It is not simply a mechanical uttering of the name of God that will lead one to illumination. There must be a Bhava accompanying

the utterance of the name. So insistence may be laid on the quality of the heart rather than on utterance by tongue.¹

There must be an inner urge, an insatiable thirst for God. Unless our affection is centred on God, unless we carry on our intimate meditation by Kirtana, Gayana and Dhyana, we may not be able to rise to the full height of spiritual experience, says Prof. Ranade. The more an aspirant gets the vision, the more does his passion grow for it. He leads a life of consecration for the ideal, lives only for the attainment of the goal and then are his efforts crowned with Grace. With every thing that we have, we must surrender to Him. Such devotees who have made a conflagration of everything for the sake of God, are the dearest to Him as the Bhagavad-gita says. As man ascends to God with overflowing love God descends towards him.

We should be able to meditate whenever we want, and if we are fortunate enough to receive God's grace, we may meditate at all times. It is no use meditating one day and leaving it afterwards. It must be a habit and for the formation of habit, repetition of the act or Avrtti is essential. Continuity again is very important. There should not be a gap in the practice. For days together, for months together and for years together we should meditate. This will facilitate our remembering God at the time of death which is said to be very important. But unless meditation becomes our second nature how can we remember the name of God at the

time of passing away? It is interesting to note how Bahiro, a Hindi Saint, prays to God that he must remember God at the time of death. Prof. Ranade talks of five kinds of Mukti in his interpretation of Bahiro's song.¹ Bahiro says that he should leave the body when he is saying Krishna Krishna by his mouth; this may be called a Ratana-mukti or Smarana-mukti. Secondly the poet wants to be in the presence of God while dying; he wants to attain to Nikata-mukti or what Madhava called Samipya. Thirdly Bahiro wants to die when he has caught God in his mind; this is Antarbhava-mukti. Ramanuja who had talked about God as Antaryamin said that Mukti means attaining similarity with God. Fourthly there is Atmadarsana mukti where the poet wants to have the vision of God when passing away. When one is fully absorbed in God one will be merged in Him after death. This is like Samkara's Sayujya-mukti. Lastly, Bahiro surrenders to God and says that it is up to Him to choose the time of Bahiro's death. This is complete resignation or Saranagamana-mukti as taught by Krishna to Arjuna in the XVIII Chapter of the Bhagavad-gita. The real prayer is thus complete surrender to the will of God.

Patanjali has given us in a nutshell all the requisites of meditation: स तु दीर्घकाल नैरंतर्य सत्कारादर सेवितो दृढमूर्तिः Meditation should be carried on for a long time, continuously, and with a devotional fervour. We are again asked to make no exhibition of our meditation. It should not be just a show. In short we have to

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : Pp. 130 ff.

pursue the path of God (1) to the very end of our life, (2) without losing a single moment and (3) with a fully devotional attitude. As Prof. Ranade says: "It is only when we are bound, on the one hand, with the Master of the house with ties as those of association, affection and watchfulness and on the other with the ties of humility, secrecy and promptitude that we are able to see this Alaksya Purusa."¹ Whoever in the course of history, asks Prof. Ranade, has emerged successful except through an alliance with God? Resignation to God is thus the highest consummation for man.

When a person is meditating alone, his mind is likely to be distracted more. We are therefore advised to meditate in the company of the fellow aspirants so that the mind becomes equipoised. The two processes described by psychologists as social facilitation and circularity of response are at work in collective meditation. When we are meditating in the company of fellow Sadhakas, we are ashamed to leave midway. Social facilitation means "an increase of response merely from the sight or sound of others making the same movements."² Looking at other people meditating, we unconsciously resume meditation. The mere presence of other people inhibits the attitude of day-dreaming. The influence of co-acting group actually increases our energy. The work of one individual evokes a response and that response evokes another response from another individual and so the circularity

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 377

2. F. H. Allport: Social Psychology: P. 262

comes to facilitate the work. Both social facilitation and circularity of response help meditation. We again learn from psychological experiments that the influence of a group on mental work is seen in the increase in the quantity of work. We may be able to sit for meditation for a longer time when in a group.

Suggestion is also at work at this time. When we are in a group our attitudes are built up for the time being by the group. And suggestion further helps the release of an actual act when the act is seen being performed by others. If we are mentally set to practise meditation, the attitude is strengthened in a group and actual practice becomes easy when others are meditating. The company of fellow Sadhakas, thus, goes a long way in helping us to carry on our meditation.

We must not make the mistake of supposing that as soon as we are initiated by a spiritual teacher, we will begin to get spiritual experiences. Some interval is inevitable. A Sadhaka has to control his senses and mind and surrender himself to God. He has also to perform austere Sadhana and all this is a matter of time. It is just natural that while he is thus preparing himself, he ardently longs for God. He fails to understand why God is not revealing Himself after all that is done by him. The aspirant is deeply disappointed and thinks that all his efforts are in vain and that he will not be the recipient of God's Grace. This period of expectation, awaiting, sometimes leading to despair is known as the dark night of the soul. It is very difficult to convince an aspirant at such times that when winter

comes, spring is not far behind. He thinks that he is damned and there is no hope for him. This agonising stage is the trying period for the Sadhaka. But almost all mystics have passed through that stage. We have heard about the pains of Tukarama or Ramakrishna Paramahansa or of Bunyan. Prof. Ranade remarks that rarely a mystic here or a mystic there can be found who had the good fortune of getting the vision of God without the physical, moral and mental trials. The real value of mystical experience is appreciated only after such a dark night. This dark night disappears when in fulness of time the grace of God descends on man and he enters the region of light. We have seen that Sadhana on our part is necessary. But it is God's Grace which ignites the gun powder of our effort and brings about a spiritual explosion. Which then, is more important, effort or Grace?

(d) Element of Grace: Effort on our part is a necessary condition of attaining to perfection though not a sufficient condition. It is not sufficient because self-effort alone will not take a man to perfection unless his efforts are crowned by God's Grace which will be the sufficient condition. Still can we say that God's Grace is only a sufficient condition and not a necessary condition? Does it mean that God's Grace is sufficient to endow spiritual perfection on man but that he can attain to it by other ways also? Saying so would be putting limitations on Grace. For, what other things are necessary when Grace is there? Grace is all-powerful, recognises no law of causality and is showered at His will. Effort on man's part seems to be only a superfluous, but never a sufficient, not even a

necessary condition of perfection. But there lurks a danger in such a supposition. It is enough to make one relax and be lethargic. As Samkara points out in another connection: If man's effort is superfluous, man will attain to salvation without recourse to Sadhana (commentary on Brahma Sutra II.2.27). What we want is not a lazy dependence on God's Grace but an active self-surrender. Hence at least to induce us to the devotional path, effort must be taken as indispensable.

Before turning our attention to the different types of mystical experience, we may tackle a small point as to whether mystical experiences are personal or impersonal or whether they transcend both. When the saint expresses that he visualises the form of some deity, obviously it indicates a personalistic element. The experience of light and sound are definitely impersonal. A flood of light or a flight of colours has no personal element. In a way, to hear in the ecstatic state the names of deities of other religions is also transcending the personalistic element. The experience of God can be had in a personalistic way; it can also be had in an impersonalistic way, suggesting thereby that mystical experience is trans-personal.

Mystical experiences resemble sense experiences; but really they are supersensuous. We have experiences similar to visual, auditory, olfactory, tactual or gustatory experiences. The infusion of God in the mind of man, says Prof. Ranade, leads to supersensuous experiences to which the world is entirely blind. We have to remember that "it is not by our physical eye

that we are able to see God. That is what is meant by supersensuous nature of God-vision. It is not the eye of imagination but the actual eye of internal spiritual vision.”¹ When we shut all sensory organs to outer perceptions, then by meditation and grace, internal senses open. A vast panorama of supersensuous experiences is revealed. Just as there is a world of difference between the experiences of a blind man who has to apprehend the world without the eyes and the experiences of a man with both eyes open, or between the vision of a colour-blind man and that of a person who can enjoy the multi-coloured world, so is there a difference between sensuous experience and supersensuous experience. Huge expanses of lights, colours or sounds come within the range of a mystic as a result of God-infiltration.

A number of morphic experiences i.e. experiences of form are enumerated by Prof. Ranade. He points out that one of the early experiences in mystical life is the experience of spiritual atom which Jnaneswara called ‘Bindule’ and for which Prof. Ranade coined a word ‘Spiriton.’ This is also called Vastu. Vastu means a thing; philosophically it means the thing-in-itself. Here it is used in the sense of atomic or monadic form of God. The word Vastu has been used in this sense by many a mystic. The depth of the Vastu is immeasurable and it is beyond thought and imagination. Other experiences of form with which an aspirant is blessed are a network of pearls or a string of fresh pearls; God may also appear in the form of

1. Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : P. 202

corals. Jnaneswara's description of the morphic experience of a mystic is wonderful. Arjuna saw the cosmic form of God which filled the whole universe. Even with his eyes shut Arjuna saw the form within. God's feet and hands and eyes were visualised everywhere. Another very important experience is the vision of the Eye. The Spirit appears before an aspirant as an Eye before the eye. The Eye is seen everywhere and even fills the universe. The experience of the Eye is a result of previous merit and brings on further merit, remarks Prof. Ranade.

Light seems to be one of the chief forms in which God reveals Himself. These are termed photic experiences. There is a vision of fire or lightning or the dazzling light of a crore of suns. Prof. Ranade's comments on this last experience is that the experience of crores of suns is an exaggeration. What is meant is that a brilliant light is seen, and for this one sun is enough; why should you have a crore of suns? There is also an experience of various kinds of colours. Prof. Ranade remarks that Vibgyor is a small expression for these kinds of colours. Our sense-organs have a limited capacity and can receive sensations from a small range of the stimulus world. The visible spectrum is but a tiny fraction of different lights. We can see colours that have wave lengths only between .00007 cm. (red) and .00004 cm. (violet) roughly, though there is a slight shift when bright light is used. Beyond the visible red we have the infra-red, the heat waves and so on which are invisible and beyond the visible violet we have the ultraviolet, the X rays and so on which

are again invisible. "Out of the vast range of electromagnetic radiation, extending from cosmic rays with wave-lengths of only one trillionth of a centimetre up to infinitely long radio waves, the human eye selects only the narrow band."¹ So too about every sense organ which has its upper and lower thresholds above which and below which it cannot function. But no such law is there in the case of super-sensuous experience. Prof. Ranade describes flights of colours far beyond the range of ordinary seven-colour spectrum.

We learn that the colours should not appear independently but should be associated with an object. If the colours are on the objects they are more stable. If there is an experience of changing colours, the objects should be seen as changing the colours. The colour should not hang in the air. Again steadiness of God's vision follows the steadiness of the aspirant's mind. If our mind is steady, God's form also is steady.

A saint like Kabir has the experience of all the ten Avataras as incessantly and continuously present before him; or otherwise all the ten Avataras pass before him in a cinematographic show in one night. It is the experience of eternity being compressed in a single moment which fills the aspirant with the consciousness of the infinite power of God. Commenting upon Ekanath's statement that God could be seen even in the state of deep sleep, Prof. Ranade says that it is understandable that a vision is had in the waking state or in the dream state. But it seems to be a

1. Lincoln Barnett · The Universe and Dr Einstein. P. 19

contradiction to have seen God in the state of deep sleep. He further points out that Susupti is loss of consciousness while vision involves a full play of consciousness. Ekanath in fact might have in view the Turya state which transcends Susupti. We have an excellent account comparing Jagrti and Turya in Prof. Ranade's writings. "Jagrti and Turya are analogous in the sense that they give absolute reality of perception in consciousness or superconsciousness, the only difference being that while Jagrti involves normal consciousness, Turya involves super-consciousness. On the whole, therefore, we may say that to get the perception of God in the Svapnayoga is difficult, though not impossible; in the Susuptiyoga, it becomes a contradiction in terms; and in the Jagrtiyoga and Turya, it is analogous and real."¹

While one is in the midst of intense meditation on the name of God one visualises a flame in which a person is seen. Further there is a valuable experience where the devotee and God serve as mirrors to each other and reflect each other *ad infinitum*. They see each other and find that what they see is their own self, and thus the difference between them vanishes. Prof. Ranade again tells us that the vision of God's feet comes towards the end of man's spiritual career. The highest spiritual experience consists in the mystic's seeing his own form in a flood of resplendent light which arises from within himself.

Then there are sound experiences. An aspirant

hears sounds which are not struck. There is an experience of simultaneously reverberating sounds of different kinds. The sound of musical instruments such as drums, flutes, cymbals and trumpets is heard. Another phonic experience is that the Anahatnada resounds like a fundamental note from every pore of the body. The experience heightens the devotion. Further we note that "it is not merely the sounds of musical instruments that break forth, but veritably the words "Rama, Rama" with slender tunes at the time of the Samadhic experience of the aspirant."¹ This is a higher stage in hearing the Anahat sound.

There is no necessary order in which these experiences may come in any order and may cross or anticipate one another or there may be a combination of them. We have an Upanisadic description of different photic experiences in which the experience of the sun is mentioned first followed by the experience of fire. But it is not necessary that experiences should follow this very order. They may be taken as a list of experiences and there is no indication of any grade in the experiences. Prof. Ranade's' emphatic denial of such a determined order seems to be backed by his own spiritual experience. So too with the hearing of the sound of a bee or Bhranganada which is many times taken as constituting the acme of spiritual experience. Who are we to set a limit to the order or the acme of spiritual experience, he asks. It is interesting to note that the conception of the rum-

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 223

bling of the cloud first and the glittering of the lightning next occur only in the case of the spiritual mystic, who hears the sound of the cloud first and sees the flash of the lightning next. The laws of physics according to which light travels far more speedily than sound, Prof. Ranade points out, are not applicable to the spiritual realm where either sound of the cloud or the flash of the lightning may precede or the two may synchronise.

Another variety of mystical experiences is the experience of flavour or the experience of the enjoyment of ambrosial juice. Prof. Ranade discusses this experience of Amratarasa or Ramarasa extensively under the title flavourism. In a poem of Kabir we are told that a terrific Anahat sound was heard and as a result of that there was outflow of Amirasa into the lateral ventricle. In another of Kabir's poems the order is reversed and it is said that there was the oozing of Amirasa in the lateral ventricle and as a result of that a sound rose up to the sky. Which one is the cause and which the effect? Is the sound the cause of Amirasa or vice versa? Prof. Ranade reconciles both the positions by saying that there is reciprocal causality between these two; both are causes and both effects of each other. The two phenomena can also be explained as coexisting. The experience of Amrtarasa keeps a man in an equanimous condition and confers beatification on him. The concept of realisation as desirelessness is negative, the positive content being beatification or bliss. As a result of enjoying bliss, all desires vanish. Satiety or Trpti

therefore is the positive content and that Trpti is attained because of the experience of Amrtarasa.

There are also motor experience . A saint experiences that God follows him or runs after him and goes ahead of him like a torch-bearer. Next there are tactual experiences where the saint touches God. The saint is not satisfied only with the vision of God. For him mere Darsana is not enough; he craves for Spar-sana and even Sambhasana.

And there is another variety of experiences – the cumulative mystical experiences where there is amalgamation of various spiritual experiences. There is a combination of different supersensuous spiritual experiences like experience of light, sound and ambrosial juice. There is also a combination of morphic and photic experiences which consists e.g. in the visualisation of the luminous Atmalinga or Pranalinga where we have a combination of form and light. We are also asked to visualise the lustrous form of God and at the same time see various colours. Prof. Ranade in this connection adds that 'God appears all the more beautiful when He appears in this light and accompanied at the same time with sound, and followed by colours.'¹ It is interesting to note that psychologists speak of interinfluence of all sensations. We have examples of 'coloured hearing' as also one sensation augmenting the other. A very faint light becomes visible when a tuning fork is sounded near the ear. Similarly auditory acuity is increased when rays of

different lights are shown to the eye. Further there is synchronousness of light and sound. Not that we see the light first and then hear the Anahata sound; they are synchronous, they come simultaneously in a kind of integrated experience.

Prof. Ranade discusses three types of Sahaja samadhi: the first is the physiological, the second the absolutistic and the third the mystical. The physiological Samadhi is attained in the full control of the breath in a state of Kumbhaka. The second type is exhibited in holding that whatever actions are done constitute the worship of God. We must take care that any and every action is not justified under the guise of this maxim which is likely to degenerate into an idler's philosophy. He explains the distinction between an absolutistic interpretation of Sahaja samadhi and a mystical enjoyment of it. The true Sahaja samadhi goes on increasing in intensity in a geometrical ratio. It is the culmination of spiritual realisation. As one Hindi poet says do not shut your eyes, do not close your ears; but see God, recognise him and laugh. This is just the meaning of mystical enjoyment of Sahaja samadhi.

The saint again may have the experience of playing in the playground of the limitless. Prof. Ranade makes a very important point that the concept of sport synthesises the conceptions of liberation and beatification which constitute the acme of spiritual experience. As in liberation there is freedom in sport and as in beatification there is joy or bliss. There is also an experience where the saint loses the conscious-

ness of the body in the blissful enjoyment of the self. Here the self abides in its own nature.

Incidentally, Prof. Ranade observes that devotion is anabolic, beauty metabolic and sublimity catabolic emotional ecstasy. Anabolism (ana-up, ballein-to throw) physiologically speaking is building up activity. In devotion there is an upsurge of emotions or building up of an attitude of longing for God. It exalts or lifts us up to the divine region. By the power of intense devotion 'the soul is being wafted upwards.' Now catabolism (cata-down) is a process of breaking down. Sublimity is catabolic as it humbles down or conquers the mind of the beholding aspirant. Before that majestic power the devotee is but 'dust and ashes.' He experiences creaturely feeling before the overwhelming. Metabolism (meta-beyond) is a chemical and physical process comprising of anabolism and catabolism. It is a sort of a balancing principle. Beauty is metabolic because the beautiful object and the mind visualising it are on a par. The distinction between sublimity and beauty is that between conquest and assimilation. There is joy in the experience of beauty but at the same time there is restful contemplation. There is a feeling of harmony and equanimity. "An object is considered beautiful....when its form puts the power of the human mind in a state of harmony, brings the intuitive and rational faculties into concordant activity, and produces an agreeable proportion between the imagination and the understanding."¹ In short,

1. R. Falckenberg: A History of Modern Philosophy : P. 403.

devotion elevates us, sublimity humbles us down and beauty maintains eqanimity.

When analysing the concept of the sublime from the point of view of psychology of religion, Prof. Ranade points out that though in the metaphysical aspect of the sublime nature dominates the mind of man, in the psychological aspect it plays a subservient role. In an autobiographical strain, Prof. Ranade tells us that the total compound state of emotions which a saint enjoys while he experiences the sublime is a compound of reverence, fear, joy, wonder and love.

We shall now refer to a cumulative experience on a higher level or a supernal experience. When the devotee sings the praises of God in a sleeping posture, God sits up and listens; if he sings in a sitting posture, God stands up; and if the devotee stands up, God dances before the devotee. There is unanimity of saints in their description of this last experience of God's dancing before them when they themselves are standing, though there are slight differences in other respects.¹

Prof. Ranade has discussed the effects of God-realisation under various heads. Meditation gives an aspirant so much energy that without taking food he has the satisfaction of having partaken of food. The body becomes clean and fresh as if one has taken a good bath. His face shines with a lustre. The tongue becomes unable to utter bad words. We are also told that another effect of hearing the Anahat sound is that

2. See Pathway to God in Kannada Literature : Pp. 267-269.

the cells of the brain begin to discharge melliflous juice. As a result of this oozing, the lateral ventricle becomes like an overflowing lake. After hearing the sound, joy emerges from the pores of the body and all idleness is driven away. After all, the earthly vesture has paved the way for spiritual realisation and has thus fulfilled its *raison d'être*.

Psychology speaks of shortening of time in any pleasure-giving experience. A span of time spent in happy activity appears to be very short. Intense activity and blissful nature of an experience are the two factors which make time appear to be short. This is exactly what happens in meditation. If the hour of meditation comes to an end before one knows it, it is an indication that one was absorbed in meditation and was reluctant to come out of that blissful state. On the other hand, if meditation is only an idling away of time without involving any activity the hour of meditation would seem a 'small eternity.' Naturally when one is engrossed in the object of meditation one becomes indifferent to the flow of time. Time as if ceases for him in the state of ecstasy. While describing the musical experiences of a realised soul, Prof. Ranade tells us that the tune and beat and the pitch of spiritual sound having reached the limitless, a state of creative equanimity or Sama has been produced. Here the conception of the Sama is a remarkable one and is the Berecynthia of all further mystical experience. Sama implies the cessation of all clashes and emergence of a perfect harmony. We have already referred to a similar state of Sama produced by equalisation of inhalation and exhalation.

Prof. Ranade is emphatic that that kind of mystical experience must be invalid which does not tend to an intellectual clarification of thought. As a result of God-realisation all doubts are resolved. As to the moral effects of God-realisation it may be said that lust, anger, arrogance and avarice cease and all fears come to an end. The saint experiences illimitable joy. The seeker who was chained down to the world is now set free. Real freedom consists in the enjoyment of the imperishable bliss of Atman, as the Saint of Nimbargi used to say: स्वराज्यवेदरे आत्मनल्लिख्य अविनाश सुखवु । When a man realises God he has a feeling of disgust for all worldly things. A man is freed from his sins as soon as God reveals himself to his vision. It is only after God-vision that true Bhakti is attained. Para-bhakti is thus a result of God-realisation. By the power and grace of God all perils are warded off, and a mystic attains to a vision of absolute equality. It is again as a result of God-vision that one is able to solve the world-riddle. One then sees God as the centre of the universe. God is the *natura naturans*, the immanent and energising principle running through all existences which have their own place and function in the scheme of the universe. Hence Prof. Ranade writes: Of what value would our God-love be to us unless it sees in every happening in history and in nature the beck and call of God and unless it sees the fruition of the logical law of Sufficient Reason in the mystical realisation of a God-centred optimism ?¹

The vision of God leads to joy and peace. Appa-

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 97.

rently these two emotions are incompatible. Joy lifts us upwards while peace calms us down. There is an element of elation in joy while peace is characterised by equanimity. After a deep study of the nature of these two emotions, Professor Ranade strikes a fundamental note that these emotions are not incompatible. Far from excluding peace, joy actually leads to peace. Thus joy is a necessary condition of peace. It is beatific joy which leads to peace. In fact peace is the apex of joy. It is the cardinal criterion of God-realisation. Gaudapada in his Karikas has described this serene state in unsurpassable terms :

सर्वमिलापविगतः सर्वचिन्तासमुत्थितः

सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः समाधिरचलोऽमयः ॥ III. 37

This is the unshakable and the fearless Samadhi where all discourse comes to an end and where all anxiety ceases. It is peace and illumination all at once. The effects of God-realisation can be seen in a nutshell in a passage by Jñanesvara, which occurs in a famous Arati which goes after him: "When he had entered the Sanctuary, his bodily consciousness was lost. His mind was changed to supermind. All sense of boundness was then over. Reason came to a standstill. Words were metamorphosed into no-words; and he saw his own self. His eye-lashes ceased to twinkle. Distinction between night and day was gone. The whole universe was a-light, and was filled with the resonance of God. He was merged in an ocean of bliss, and his beatification was ineffable."¹ The experience of the Sublime, in a word, leads to intelle-

1. Mysticism in Maharashtra: Preface: P. 12.

ctual clarification, moral purification and spiritual sanctification.

A saint, according to Prof. Ranade, necessarily embodies the virtue of altruism. Accumulation of wealth, he maintains, should be intended for universal welfare. Inequality will vanish if material wealth is evenly distributed according to worth.¹ But the word Sampatti does not mean merely material wealth. Badarayana has used the word Sampatti to mean spiritual wealth. Here the individual good would not come into conflict with the good of the members of the community. Only when good means spiritual good, the individual good would be identical with the good of the community or the general good. The chief task of a God-realiser is distribution of spiritual wealth. After reading these lines, who will not agree that saints are spiritual communists?

Universal brotherhood, Prof. Ranade insists, should and could repose only on a spiritual basis. A saint's real task is not merely to attain peace for himself but to bring about peace and harmony in the world. In fact Prof. Ranade says that a mystic who is not of supreme service to society is not a mystic at all. A mystic makes people aware of the highest ideal in life, namely, God-realisation and also shows the path for the achievement of the end. "The supreme value of God-realisation for oneself is to create conditions for the realisation of God in and for others."² Jnanesvara says

1. Pathway to God in Hindi Literature : P. 397.

2. The Bhagavad-gita as Philosophy of God-realisation : P. 215

that a saint is so overcome by compassion for his fellows that he dedicates his life for the relief of suffering of others.

A saint may fall into raptures when he experiences the immortal Atman. He sings the auspicious song of self-realisation. As a great saint of Karnatak, Mahipati, exclaims: when the highest desire I could ever contemplate is fulfilled, what else now remains to be achieved? After complete self-surrender, the innermost meaning of the open drama of my mind became unfolded. I have experienced the truth of So'ham. Such is the state of blessedness.

There is no end to philosophic construction, says Prof. Ranade, and each philosopher has his favourite theory about the nature of Reality. The mystic may be a philosopher but is not necessarily so. His mystic experience is sufficient for his own elevation into Divinity; but if he philosophises, he may raise thinking humanity into a divine Kingdom of Ends.¹

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Appendix 'A'
Outline Scheme
For
The History of Indian Philosophy *

I

Volume First : The Origins :- (i) An attempt will be made in this volume to raise a philosophical superstructure on the data supplied by

- a) Ethnology, and by Comparative Philology and Stylometry as applied to the Veda;
- b) Assyriology, including the latest finds in Sind and Asia Minor;
- c) the Central Asian, Scandinavian, and Arctic Home theories; and
- d) studies in Avestic and Persian religions.

* Prepared in 1918

(ii) In regard to the Rigveda an attempt will be made to trace the inner development of its thought by classifying portions of the Veda into sufficiently distinct strata, and to adjudge the value of this thought from the point of view of Comparative Religion, Mythology, and Anthropology.

(iii) In the treatment of the post-Rigvedic period will be offered

- a) a new theory about the degeneration (as exemplified in the Atharva-veda) of the old Vedic religion by its contact with Chaldean magic and superstition; and
- b) a new *raison d'être* for the Saman and Yajus collections, and for the ritualistic practice of the exegetical texts known as the Brahmanas.

(iv) The volume is expected to afford many new points of view and new solutions of old problems, and in it an attempt will be made throughout to evaluate the contributions made by the Vedic period to the general problem of thought.

II

Volume Second : The Creative Period:— (i) The early part of this volume will trace the progress of thought from the Vedic through the Brahmanic to the Upanisadic period by showing how, for example, it proceeds *pari passu* with the development in the meaning of a word such as *brahman* which, originally signifying a hymn, later denoted sacrificial worship, and finally came to be identical with the Essence of the Universe.

(ii) The major part of the volume will however be devoted to the Upanishads. In it an attempt will be made

- a) to set forth conditions that called into existence the varied and extraordinarily fruitful thought-activity of the period, affording, along with it, a general and succinct characterisation of the Upanishadic method of philosophising;
- b) to reduce, wherever possible, with the help of the recognised objective tests such as those of stylometry, the contents of each Upanishad into sufficiently distinct strata;
- c) to afford a general survey of the various Upanishads one after another by a dove-tailing of these strata, wherever possible, with a view to trace their thought-development; and
- d) to rear up a philosophy of the Upanishad upon these foundations setting forth in bold relief the keen zest for knowledge and the fervent spirituality of the period.

(iii) The concluding chapters of the volume will be devoted to a brief account of the post-Upanishadic thought-ferment as gathered from references in Jain and Buddhistic literatures. This is a phase in the intellectual life of the people about which practically nothing has been written; but its recognition and adequate evaluation would give a new significance to the doctrine of Bhakti and to the great dissenting systems of Jainism and Buddhism.

III

Volume Third : The Synthetic Period :-

- (i) An attempt will be made in this volume, at first,
 - a) to set forth the sociological and philosophical significance of the earliest phases of the domestic, ritualistic, and other forms of the Sutra literature; and
 - b) to indicate the various lines along which, from its first nebulous beginnings, the philosophic thought of the period progressed, giving rise to the earliest and inchoate forms of Samkhya, Yoga, Mimansa, Bhakti, and other systems, all these different tendencies finding their illustration and synthesis in the philosophic thought of the Mahabharata.
- (ii) Then will follow a critical exposition of the Mahabharata from all points of view: textual, social, ethical, political, historical, and religious. Particular attention will be given to the forces of discontent and disruption that were gathering together at the time, and to which the Mahabharata, on a purely autonomous moralistic basis, supplies an answer, which, only in the Bhagavad-gita and allied episodes, assumes a definitely theonomous aspect.
- (iii) Finally, there would be given an adequate and unbiassed account of the theism and the 'activism' of the Bhagavad-gita and the philosophical synthesis it attempts and carries out, full justice being done to the very vast literature on the subject including some of the most recent pronouncements on it.

IV

Volume Fourth: The Voice of Dissent:— (i) This volume will be mainly taken up by Jainism, Buddhism, and the other protestant systems of Ancient India, which will be studied and expounded afresh in the light of original sources such as (a) the canonical texts; (b) their interpretations by latter day commentators, (c) the accounts of foreign pilgrims to India, and (d) the latest finds from excavations all over India and from the expeditions in Turkestan and Central Asia; as well as in the light of (e) the modern Indian, Ceylonese, European, and other expositions of these systems.

(ii) The treatment of each system will include—

- a) a preliminary survey of the conditions that brought it into existence, and an estimate of its indebtedness to its predecessors;
- b) a detailed and critical account of the cosmology, physics, ethics, psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics, and in general, an estimate of the permanent contribution of it to the problem of thought; and, finally,
- c) a brief review of the later history of all its diverging sects in the different parts of India itself as also in outlying countries like Ceylon, Tibet, China, Japan etc., bringing out clearly the doctrinal development of the system caused by reaction from and assimilation with the other sister-systems from which it had seceded.

(iii) Room will also be made in this volume for interesting monographs on topics such as (a) the great Buddhistic Universities of Ancient India and their contribution to learning and education, (b) the organised work of preserving literature carried on by the great Jain Bhandaras, (c) the extraordinary artistic and architectural development of the period as evidenced by images, frescoes, and paintings on the one hand, and temples, stupas, and viharas on the other, (d) the evangelic propaganda of Jainism no less than that of Buddhism in times ancient as well as those nearer to our own, and—just because it comes in here chronologically— (e) the Greco-Indian problem of priority or parallelism, which will be discussed in the light of the latest researches of specialists in the field.

V

Volume Fifth: The Period of Reconstruction:— (i) In its early pages this volume will set forth in its full significance (a) the great reorganising work, especially in Ethics and Jurisprudence, of the Smritis and Nibandhas generally, and (b) the valuable broadening and syncretic work of the Puranas, with an appraisal of their contribution to thought, as also a similar treatment of the more or less synchronous Neo-Upanishadic movement, which has failed hitherto to adequately engage the attention of scholars.

(ii) The main part of the volume will however be devoted to a historical and critical exposition of the various 'orthodox' Darsanas or Schools of Philosophy. The volume will thus deal with the Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems from their dimmest beginnings through their

Buddhistic and anti-Buddhistic or mediaeval phases and their relations to theistic schools like those of Saivism and Pancharatra, on to their latest activities in Mithila and their eclectic and manual-making phases. Or, to take another instance, it will treat of the Samkhya-Yoga systems in all their vicissitudes and even aberrations through all the centuries; and it will similarly deal with the great system of Mimansa, pointing out on the one hand its relation to the ritualistic speculations of the Brahmanas, and on the other, its influence in the making of the science of Logic with its closely defined criteria of truth.

(iii) All these systems will be set forth and evaluated from the point of view of Western Philosophy, and many interesting parallels will be drawn between, for instance, the Indian and Aristotelian Logic, or the Kanadian and Leucippian Atomism. With the sole exception of the Vedanta-darsana, which will be reserved in its entirety for the next volume, this volume will thus devote itself to the very cream of systematised Indian thought.

VI

Volume Sixth : The Crowning Phase:-

(i) This volume will be exclusively devoted to a study of the Vedanta in all its forms. The early chapters will contain -

- a) an exposition of the relation of the Vedanta Sutras to the Upanishads;
- b) a discussion as to the probable accretions

made in the course of time to the text of the original Sutras;

- c) a presentation, in the list of the latest pronouncements on the subject, of the probable original doctrine of the Sutrakara; and
- d) a brief account of the Vedanta doctrine prior to the advent of Sankaracharya as gathered from stray notices in different works.

(ii) A general survey of the philosophical position at the time of Sankaracharya will prepare the ground for an exposition of his philosophy as seen not only in the Bhashyas alone, but also in his other genuine religious and philosophical works.

(iii) The history of the school of Sankaracharya will next be pursued through the writings of the Master's immediate pupils and later followers such as Padmapada, Suresvara, Sarvajnamuni, Chitsukha, Vachaspati, Sriharsha, Sankarananda, Vidyaranya, Madhusudana Sarasvati, Appayya Dikshita, Dharmarajadhvarindra, and others.

(iv) There will then be given a similar treatment in the case of the other allied Vedantic schools such as those of Visishtadvaita, Dvaita, Dvaitadvaita, and Suddadvaita, setting forth their peculiar doctrines and practices down to their latest developments.

(v) Throughout the volume an attempt will be made to set forth the philosophical background of each of these schools and to show how it was necessitated by the peculiar circumstances of the time and the parti-

cular temperaments to which it addressed itself. On an impartial consideration of all these types of thought, an attempt will finally be made to see if they could not all be subsumed under a single larger synthesis.

VII

Volume Seventh: Mysticism:-

(i) An attempt will be made in this volume to accurately define and analyse and evaluate that peculiar mental attitude to reality known as 'Mysticism', which is observable in the people of all lands and ages, and which is especially observable in the Mediaeval mystics of India scattered through its various Provinces.

(ii) The roots of Mysticism, it will already have been seen, reach even so far back as the days of the Upanishads, and this peculiar attitude was practically never extinct from Indian soil. It received a most systematic form in the Narada and Sandilya Sutras, and we also meet it in the Saiva and Pancharatra and other Bhakti schools, as well as in the Bhagavata and the other Puranas. Its aberrations are exemplified in one form or another in Tantrism or Occultism, as also in some of the more pronounced Yogic practices. An account will be given in this volume of all these manifold phases of Mysticism in the order of their occurrence.

(iii) The major part of this volume will however be devoted to a discussion of the spiritual leaven introduced into Indian thought by writers such as Ramananda and Kabira, Gauranga and Tulasidasa, Narasi Mehta

and Mirabai, Mukundaraja and Jnanesvara, Namadeva and Ekanatha, Ramadasa and Tukarama, Purandara-dasa and Mahipati, Manikkavasagar and Sarvajna. These names are merely representative of many others that might easily be enumerated, and they practically exhaust all the types of Mysticism that are known to exist. These Prakrit Saints attempt a synthesis of Bhakti and Advaita which altogether distinguishes them from the Sanskrit writers of the preceding period and in setting forth their thought in appropriate local colour and in adjudging its great spiritual value, reliance will be mainly placed on the original writings of these mystical authors in the several languages in which they addressed the people, account being also taken of the Mahomedan and the alleged Christian influence on Indian Mysticism.

VIII

Volume Eighth : Modern Tendencies:-

(i) This volume will attempt the task of making an exhaustive survey of the most recent tendencies of Indian thought in their chronological order. The survey will include almost every modern system of thought such as the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, the Prarthana Samaj, Theosophy, Ramakrishna Mission, and Indian Christianity, as well as every organised attempt on similar lines made by the orthodox adherents of the several existing religions of India. The thought of the times in which we are living and in which the poet-philosopher Rabindranath and the scientist Bose are playing such a large part cannot fail to afford valuable suggestions to reflecting minds.

(ii) Although contemporary thought is always difficult to evaluate in true perspective, an endeavour will yet be made in every case to make the presentation as fair and as objective as possible. Thus, in regard to Christianity, an attempt will be made, by a succinct preparatory study of the development of the Christian doctrine in Europe, and by an examination of it in the search-light of the progress of modern science, to assign to that peculiar phase of it-the Indian militant Christianity-its proper place and value in the general scheme of things. And a similar treatment will be given of the modern Parsee, Jain, and Mahomedan thought.

(iii) Lastly, an endeavour will be made to apply the tests of modern science to Hinduism itself, and, if possible, to place it on a firm rationalistic foundation. Room will also be made in this last volume, by way of a fitting conclusion to the entire History, for a picture of the possibilities of Hindu thought in the days to come.

Appendix 'B'

Sixteen - Volume Scheme

1. The Pathway to God.
2. Recent Tendencies of European Thought.
3. The Metaphysics of Aristotle.
4. The Problems of Metaphysics.
5. The Search of Religions for God.
6. The Mystical Basis of Christianity.
7. The Scientific Approach to God.
8. The Principles of Theopolity.
9. An Outline of Indian Philosophy.
10. A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy.
11. A Critical Survey of Buddhism.
12. The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-gita.
13. Vedanta in relation to Western Thought.

14. Indian Mysticism.
15. Contemporary Tendencies of Indian Thought.
16. Essays and Reviews.

The scope of the Academy's research must be as wide as Philosophy and Religion themselves. A brief sketch may nevertheless be permitted of the three chief departments of thought, viz. European Philosophy, Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion in which the Academy must institute research. Under the head of European Philosophy the Academy must take into account the development of the whole of Greek Philosophy, as well as of Modern Philosophy and of Contemporary Thought. In addition to research in the history of Philosophy in general, the Academy must devote its attention to Moral Philosophy, to Aesthetics, to Psychology in its various branches and to the Philosophy of Science. Under the head of Indian Philosophy it must consider the development of Indian Philosophy from the times of the Vedas downwards through the days of the Upanisads and the Bhagavad-gita, through the development of Buddhism and Jainism, through a systematic study of the different systems of Indian Philosophy, including the Vedanta, both Advaitic and non-Advaitic, through a study of Indian Mysticism in the medieval period, to even contemporary tendencies of Indian thought. Under the heading of the Philosophy of Religion, it must consider the history and the theology of all the different Faiths, viz., Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, Zoroastrianism, as well as Hinduism in its various branches

including Buddhism, Jainism, Lingayatism and so forth, as well as the history of mystical religion both in the East and the West. The Academy must not be content with simply making an empirical study of these faiths but must try to fit in the data supplied by them into a philosophic view of Reality, which may be arrived at independently with the help of reason.



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
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IMPORTANT ERRATA

Page	Line	Instead	Read
20	18	a new	anew
32	22	Rashdoll	Rashdall
38	24	तत्त्व	तत्त्व
42	6	अनादित्वात्	अनादित्वात्
46	13	alone is	alone which is
65	27	greal	real
57	18	Schematised	Schematiser
61	13	on self	oneself
61	15	summum	Summum
65	16	James	James's
72	21	Similarly in	Similar is
87	29	from	from
94	2	one	one's
98	27	ec - ec	et - et
103	31	योगमैश्वरम्	योगमैश्वरम्
121	2	(Asakti)	(आसक्ति)
121	3	(Asakti)	(असक्ति)
128	9	Ort	Sort
128	12	Sis	is
147	10	Madhava	Madhva
158	3	experience	experiences
169	20	ferven	fervent
170	21	morali tic	moralistic



PROFESSOR B. R. KULKARNI, M.A.,LL.B., had the rare good fortune of studying Philosophy under Shri Gurudev R. D. Ranade in his Ashram at Nimbal and in Allahabad University. Had also the proud privilege of being associated with monumental works of Shri Gurudev. On the basis of the notes of Shri Gurudev, he prepared in collaboration with Dr. V. H. Date, the book, " Vedant as the Culmination of Indian Thought ".

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